Rhetor

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For Michael Purves-Smith

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TRACY WHALEN

The publication of *Rhetor* 8 marks fifteen years since its inaugural 2004 issue, which I edited during my earlier days with the Canadian Society for the Study of Rhetoric, now RhetCanada. The introduction I wrote then, "Rhetoric as Liminal Practice," still holds true for the journal today:

> At annual conferences like that of the Canadian Society for the Study of Rhetoric, one meets classical rhetoricians, contemporary rhetoricians, professional writers, historians, musical scholars, discourse analysts, composition professors, cultural analysts, literary theorists — the list goes on. It is this kind of eclectic, dynamic community that creates the kinds of energies, intersections, and moments of rhetorical interrogation one encounters in this journal.

Over the past fifteen years, and with a variety of editors, *Rhetor* has continued to publish wide-ranging scholarship, including rhetorical studies of public address, eighteenth-century conversation,

personalized license plates, war and invasion, workplace writing, midwifery, word and image, gaming, literature, public controversy, national identity, Jewish homiletic, and the musical interpretation of textual rhetoric. Its pieces have examined rhetorical theory and theorists, traditions of rhetorical pedagogy, and sites of articulation between philosophy and rhetoric. As Pierre Zoberman writes in the editor's foreword for *Rhetor* 7, both the journal and the membership of RhetCanada are seeing increasingly international representation and vibrancy, with contributions from rhetorical scholars in Europe, Africa, and North America.

Rhetor 8 continues this eclectic and lively tradition. The articles in this collection examine Winston Churchill's 1940 "We Shall Fight on the Beaches" address, the classical figure of prosopopoeia as applied to social media image filters, media framing of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, and the rhetoric of malingering—the exaggeration or feigning of illness. They focus on a pivotal war moment, the final days of a federal election, the early days of a pandemic, and insurance risk assessments. Here we find moments of urgency that call for necessary and timely response and have uncertain outcomes. All of the pieces, if implicitly and in different ways, touch upon the rhetorical notion of exigence.

Within a rhetorical context, it is of course Lloyd Bitzer who first defined exigence as "an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be," an element of the rhetorical situation that, he argued, motivates and can be modified through symbolic intervention or discourse (6). Bitzer's understanding of the rhetorical situation—and exigence in particular—has famously been challenged by critics (most notably Richard Vatz), who argue that exigence

needs to be understood not as an extra-discursive situational given, but as a socially created reality, one rhetorically generated in the first place. Underscoring this point, Carolyn Miller defines exigence as "a mutual construing of objects, events, interest, and purposes that not only links them but makes them what they are: an objectified social need"F (157).

The first piece in this issue, Michael Fox's "The Anglo-Saxon Origins of Churchill's Elocutio: 'We Shall Fight on the Beaches'" opens with just such a focus on the "events, interests, and purposes" that created the exigencies for Churchill's famous wartime address to the British parliament. There was a lot at stake at this historical moment: the country lacked confidence in the previous government of Neville Chamberlain, Churchill needed to prove himself only four weeks into his Prime Ministerial post, and Britain was facing major setbacks in the war effort. As Fox writes, "Churchill needed to inspire confidence among his colleagues in the House of Commons and among the peoples of Britain, to prepare his country for a protracted fight, to shore up the resolve of France, and to demonstrate to many key players (mainly Hitler and the United States) his determination to continue the war, all while, so far as possible, accurately reporting the facts." In response to this situation, Churchill drew on powerful linguistic, rhythmic, and figurative elements from Anglo-Saxon prose, as well as an age-old narrative: the island of Britain under threat of invasion. Fox's novel hypothesis is that Churchill modeled the "we shall fight" sequence on the native Anglo-Saxon style of Ælfric and Wulfstan, vernacular prose writers in Middle English, to situate his stirring oration within a long and cherished tradition of oral verse. Fox's article contributes to scholarship on rhetorical traditions, generally, and the powerful

affect produced by the echoes and cadences of a resonant vernacular past.

A particularly instructive case study of how exigence is symbolically engendered and produced can be found in Monique Kampherm's graduate student prize-winning essay, "Democratic Prosopopoeia: The Rhetorical Influence of the I-Will-Vote Image Filter on Social Media Profile Pictures during the 2015 Canadian Federal Election." Kampherm demonstrates how social media users, by attaching an image filter to their profile picture, collectively generate urgency or necessity—in this case, to vote. The identity of such users, she argues, operates through the rhetorical figure prosopopoeia, where an absent, imagined, or dead person (or personified animal, abstract entity, or object) is represented as speaking. Through this figure, users become something other than their individual self: they become a manifestation or "acting together" of the multitude or commonwealth of voters in the 2015 Canadian federal election, giving voice from what Kampherm calls "their digital pulpit." Prosopopoeia functions as a present-day means of solidarity building and instruction for what constitutes the ideal, participatory citizen. Kampherm's article not only speaks the link between classical figures and digital rhetoric, but also a traditionally linguistic figure and a visual form, and adeptly demonstrates how an image filter can contribute to the circulation systems—the life and vitality—of the social political body.

Kampherm's essay begins with Canadian comedian Rick Mercer's statement that "voting is contagious." Tess Laidlaw and John Moffatt treat a different kind of contagion, that of the 2009 H1N1 virus. Their paper, right from the start, acknowledges the social exigence of a disease outbreak, which, as they write, "calls into being both

explicit linguistic responses in the form of statements from public health authorities and media coverage, and symbolic responses that operate only implicitly." Laidlaw and Moffatt study the international media framing of the outbreak in its early days, paying close attention to the strategies of management performed by reassuring narratives of containment, which ultimately enhance the ethos of the medical health establishment. In their analysis, constabulary rhetoric (a concept they borrow from Kenneth Burke) applies to the policing narrative readers are encouraged to identify with—not stories about how to protect oneself from disease so much as those that invite identification with the redemptive ethos of medical authorities whose role is to "police" suspiciously ill people and contain disorder. We learn from their analysis that Canadian readers were reassured by stories that suggested they were (symbolically) immune from a disease that affected only Mexico and Mexicans. While Canadian health authorities voiced concern, there was no travel advisory for Canadians travelling to Mexico; they would be in resort environments, safe and "pure" sanctuaries in an otherwise threatening Mexico, whose citizens and seasonal labourers to Canada were specifically targeted as threats. Laidlaw and Moffatt demonstrate how a tale of reassurance for some involves the scapegoating of others, a narrative they strenuously critique and resist in a nuanced analysis.

Shurli Makmillen, in "The Rhetoric of Malingering and the Management of Risk," considers exigence in her study of malingering narratives, reminding us (à la Miller and Segal) that genres aren't merely responses to predetermined exigencies, but "also structure and shape those social exigencies . . . by defining them according to the discourses provided by the genre." Makmillen examines accounts of malingering in medical, psychiatric, legal, and

actuarial discourses throughout history and traces their various
motivations. She notes that early institutionalized reports (Hector
Gavin's 1834 *On Feigned and Factitious Diseases*, for instance) were
motivated by a concern for detection and punishment, as fraudulent
sailors and soldiers were seen to pose a threat to the productivity and
cost-effectiveness of the military—and to the morality of the social
body. Early twentieth-century psychiatric discourses were motivated
less by detection and discipline and more by scientific diagnosis and
treatment. More recently, insurance companies and forensic
psychiatry have again prioritized the detection of falsified claims of
disease (through all kinds of surveillance) in order to manage risks
around false insurance claims and costly workplace
accommodations. Particularly interesting is Makmillan's brief yet
generative consideration towards the end of her article of
malingerers' tales *as told by themselves* as carnivalesque sites of
resistance, pleasure, and art.

These four articles, and the fascinating public discourses with which
they engage, are a resonant assemblage indeed. They all critically
examine and evaluate the public speeches, symbolic filters, media
framing, and institutional discourses that attract, alienate, worry,
excite, embolden, define, and electrify various publics, both past and
present. They make for an excellent, exigent group in the sense of
being compelling, pressing, and worthy of close attention. Enjoy!

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Contagion, bataille et risque : un ensemble exigent

TRACY WHALEN, TRANSLATION BY JULIE DAINVILLE

La publication du 8ème numéro de la revue *Rhetor* marque le 15ème anniversaire de son numéro inaugural, paru en 2004, que j'ai édité au début de ma collaboration avec la *Société Canadienne pour l'Étude de la Rhétorique*, aujourd'hui *RhetCanada*. L'introduction que j'avais écrite à l'époque, « La rhétorique comme pratique liminale » est toujours valable pour le journal aujourd'hui :

Lors d'une conférence annuelle de la *Société Canadienne pour l'Étude de la Rhétorique*, on rencontre des experts en rhétorique classique, en rhétorique contemporaine, des écrivains professionnels, des historiens, des chercheurs en musicologie, des analystes du discours, des professeurs de composition, des analystes culturels, des théoriciens de la littérature — et la liste n'est pas exhaustive. Il s'agit d'une communauté éclectique, dynamique, qui provoque le genre d'énergies, d'intersections et les moments de questionnement rhétorique que l'on trouve dans ce journal.

Durant ces quinze dernières années, sous la direction de différents
éditeurs, *Rhetor* a continué de publier des articles portant sur un
large éventail de sujets, dont des études rhétoriques portant sur le
discours public, la conversation au dix-huitième siècle, les plaques
d'immatriculation personnalisées, la guerre et l'invasion, l'écriture
professionnelle, le métier de sage-femme, les mots et les images, le
jeu vidéo, la littérature, la controverse, l'identité nationale, l'homélie
juive, and l'interprétation musicale de rhétorique textuelle. Les
articles publiés ont examiné la théorie rhétorique et ses théoriciens,
des traditions d'enseignement de la rhétorique, and les lieux
d'articulation entre la philosophie et la rhétorique. Comme l'écrit
Pierre Zoberman dans l'avant-propos de *Rhetor* 7, la revue et les
affiliations à *RhetCanada* montrent une représentativité internationale
et un dynamisme grandissants, avec des contributions d'experts en
rhétorique provenant d'Europe, d'Afrique et d'Amérique du Nord.

Rhetor 8 s'incrit dans la continuité de cette tradition éclectique et
dynamique. Les articles publiés dans ce numéro étudient le discours
« We Shall Fight on the Beaches », prononcé par Winston Churchill
en 1940, la figure classique de la prosopopée appliquées aux filtres
utilisés sur réseaux sociaux, la couverture médiatique de la pandémie
de H1N1 en 2009, et la rhétorique de la simulation — exagération
ou feinte — de maladie. Ils s'intéressent à un moment charnière de
la guerre, aux derniers jours d'une élection fédérale, aux premiers
jours d'une pandémie, et à l'évaluation des risques d'assurance. On y
trouve des moments d'urgence qui attende une réponse indispensable
et opportune, et dont les issues sont incertaines. Toutes ces
contributions, même si elles le font implicitement et chacune à leur
façon, touchent à la notion rhétorique d'exigence.

Dans un contexte rhétorique, Lloyd Bitzer est évidemment le premier

à avoir défini l'exigence comme « une imperfection caractérisée par une urgence ; il s'agit d'un défaut, d'un obstacle, de quelque chose qui reste en attente, une chose qui n'est pas comme elle devrait être, » un élément de la situation rhétorique qui, selon lui, sert de motivation et peut être changé par une intervention symbolique ou un discours (6). Il est bien connu que la définition que propose Bitzer de la situation rhétorique — et surtout de l'exigence — a été remise en question par ses opposants (en particulier Richard Vatz), qui soutient que l'exigence doit être comprise non comme une donnée situationnelle extra-discursive, mais comme une réalité construite socialement, que la rhétorique a généré elle-même. Carolyn Miller, qui insiste sur ce point, définit l'exigence comme « une interprétation partagée d'objets, d'événements, et objectifs, qui non seulement les associe, mais en fait ce qu'ils sont : un besoin social objectivé » (157).

Le premier article de ce volume, « The Anglo-Saxon Origins of Churchill's Elocutio: 'We Shall Fight on the Beaches' », par Michael Fox, s'ouvre justement en mettant l'accent sur « les événements, les intérêts et les objectifs » qui ont forgé l'exigence du célèbre discours de Churchill au parlement britannique en temps de guerre. Les enjeux étaient nombreux en ce moment historique : le pays manquait de confiance dans le précédent gouvernement de Neville Chamberlain, Churchill devait faire ses preuves seulement quatre semaines après son intronisation comme Premier Ministre, et la Grande-Bretagne faisait face à un revers majeur dans ses efforts de guerre. Comme l'écrit Fox, « Churchill devait inspirer confiance à ses collègues dans la Chambre des communes, et aux peuples de Grande-Bretagne, pour préparer le pays à un conflit prolongé, pour soutenir la résolution de la France, et pour démontrer à plusieurs acteurs centraux (surtout Hitler et les États-Unis) sa détermination à continuer la guerre, tout en rapportant précisément, autant que

possible, les faits ». En réponse à cette situation, Churchill a mobilisé de puissants éléments linguistiques, rythmiques et figuratifs de la prose Anglo-saxonne, ainsi qu'un récit ancestral : l'île britannique sous la menace de l'invasion. L'hypothèse novatrice de Fox est que Churchill a modelé la séquence « we shall fight (nous combattrons) » d'après le style anglo-saxon autochtone d'Ælfric et Wulfstan, prosateurs s'exprimant en langue vernaculaire en Moyen anglais, pour situer son vibrant discours au sein d'une longue et précieuse tradition de composition orale. L'article de Fox contribue à l'étude des traditions rhétoriques, de manière générale, et au puissant affect produit par les échos et les rythmes d'un passé vernaculaire éclatant.

On trouvera dans l'article de Monique Kampherm, « Democratic Prosopopoeia: The Rhetorical Influence of the I–Will–Vote Image Filter on Social Media Profile Pictures during the 2015 Canadian Federal Election », qui a reçu le prix de la meilleure communication étudiante, une étude de cas particulièrement intéressante sur la manière dont l'exigence est symboliquement générée et produite. Kampherm montre comment les utilisateurs des réseaux sociaux, en appliquant un filtre à leur photo de profil, produisent collectivement une urgence ou une nécessité de voter. L'identité de tels utilisateurs, selon elle, exploite la figure rhétorique de la prosopopée, qui consiste à représenter une personne absente, imaginée, ou décédée (ou encore un animal personnifié, une entité abstraite ou un objet) comme assumant un discours. Par cette figure, les utilisateurs dépassent leur individualité propre : ils deviennent une manifestation ou une « action collective » de la multitude ou communauté de votants lors des élections fédérales canadiennes de 2015, attribuant leur voix depuis ce que Kampherm appelle « leur pupitre digital ». La prosopopée fonctionne comme un moyen moderne de construction de la solidarité et d'instruction pour ce qui constitue le citoyen idéal,

participatif. L'article de Kampherm explicite non seulement le lien entre des figures classiques et la rhétorique digitale, mais aussi entre une figure linguistique traditionnelle et une forme visuelle, et démontre habilement comment un filtre peut contribuer aux systèmes de circulation — la vie et la vitalité — du corps politique dans la société.

La contribution de Kampherm commence par une déclaration du comédien canadien Rick Mercer, selon laquelle « voter est contagieux ». Tess Laidlaw et John Moffatt s'occupent d'une différente forme de contagion : celle du virus H1N1 en 2009. Leur article reconnaît, dès le départ, l'exigence sociale de l'épidémie de la maladie, qui, comme ils l'écrivent, « appelle tant des réponses linguistiques explicites sous la forme de déclarations des autorités de santé publique et d'une couverture médiatique, que des réponses symboliques qui n'opèrent qu'implicitement ». Laidlaw et Moffatt étudient le cadrage médiatique international de l'épidémie dans ses premiers jours, portant une attention particulière aux stratégies de gestion de la crise consistant en une réaffirmation de la maîtrise de la situation, ce qui, au final, renforce l'ethos de l'institution de santé publique. Dans leur analyse, la rhétorique « constabulaire » (un concept qu'ils empruntent à Kenneth Burke) est appliquée au récit de contrôle avec lequel les lecteurs sont invités à s'identifier — il ne s'agit pas tant d'expliquer comment se protéger de la maladie que d'inviter à s'identifier avec l'ethos rédempteur des autorités sanitaires, dont le rôle est de « fliquer » avec suspicion les personnes malades et de maintenir l'ordre. On apprend de leur analyse que les lecteurs canadiens ont été rassurés par des récits suggérant qu'ils étaient (symboliquement) immunisés contre la maladie qui n'affectait que le Mexique et les Mexicains. Alors que les autorités sanitaires canadiennes exprimaient leurs craintes, il n'y eut aucune

recommandation particulière aux voyageurs canadiens se rendant au Mexique ; ils seraient dans des complexes touristiques, des sanctuaires sans danger et « purs » dans un Mexique par ailleurs menaçant, dont les citoyens et travailleurs saisonniers au Canada étaient spécifiquement pris pour cibles comme menace potentielle. Laidlaw et Moffatt montrent comment un récit visant à rassurer certaines personnes implique que d'autres soient présentés comme des boucs émissaires, un récit qu'ils critiquent vigoureusement et auquel ils s'opposent dans une analyse nuancée.

Shurli Makmillen, dans « The Rhetoric of Malingering and the Management of Risk », s'intéresse à l'exigence dans le cadre de son étude sur les récits de simulation de maladie, nous rappelant (à la façon de Miller et Segal) que les genres de discours ne sont pas simplement des réponses à des exigences prédéterminées, mais qu'en outre « ils structurent et façonnent ces exigences sociales… en les définissant en fonction des discours fourni par le genre ». Makmillen étudie des cas de sinistrose dans des discours médicaux, psychiatriques, légaux et actuariels à travers l'histoire et retrace leurs diverses motivations. Elle relève que les premiers rapports institutionnalisés (par exemple le *On Feigned and Factitious Diseases* d'Hector Gavin, paru en 1834) étaient motivés par une volonté de détecter et de punir, car les marins et soldats prétendument malades étaient vus comme une menace à la productivité et au rapport coût-efficacité de l'armée — et à la moralité de la société. Les discours psychiatriques du début du vingtième siècle n'étaient pas tant motivés par le repérage des fraudeurs et la discipline que par l'établissement d'un diagnostique scientifique et d'un traitement. Plus récemment, les compagnies d'assurance et la psychiatrie légale se sont à nouveau consacrées en priorité à la détection de déclaration falsifiée de maladie (par toute sorte d'inspections) en vue de faire face aux risques liés aux

fausses demandes d'intervention et aux équipements coûteux sur les lieux de travail. La brève mais inspirante considération de Makmillan, à la fin de son article, sur les récits de ceux qui simulent une maladie, qui se présentent eux-mêmes comme des lieux carnavalesques de résistance, de plaisir et d'art est particulièrement intéressante.

Ces quatre articles, et les discours fascinants auxquels ils s'intéressent, constituent un ensemble tout à fait percutant. Tous examinent, avec un œil critique, et évaluent les discours publics, les filtres symboliques, le cadrage des médias, et les discours institutionnels qui attirent, embrigadent, inquiètent, exaltent, donnent du courage, définissent, et électrifient différents types de publics, tant passés que présents. Ils constituent un ensemble excellent et exigent en ce qu'ils sont convaincants, impérieux, et méritent toute l'attention du lecteur. Bonne lecture !

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The Anglo-Saxon Origins of Churchill's Elocutio: "We Shall Fight on the Beaches"

MICHAEL FOX

ABSTRACT

Winston Churchill's "We shall fight on the beaches"[1] is one of the best-known speeches of the twentieth century, yet the speech has not been closely analyzed for its rhetorical features and possible sources and models. This essay looks at the conclusion to the speech and suggests that, although Churchill's known and stated views and influences, such as his fondness for short, old words, his opinions in "The Scaffolding of Rhetoric," and the model of William Bourke Cockran, are important, the speech's rhetorical style and subject matter are shaped by the Old English writers Ælfric and Wulfstan and by Churchill's knowledge of Anglo-Saxon history.

Keywords: Churchill, elocutio, Anglo-Saxon rhetoric, Ælfric, Wulfstan

On June 4, 1940, not long after the evacuation at Dunkirk, Winston

Churchill delivered his well-known "We shall fight on the beaches"
speech to parliament. Churchill had been First Lord of the Admiralty
since September 1939, when Britain declared war, and had,
therefore, already been "an interpreter of the war to the British
people and to global opinion" (Toye 27). Churchill became Prime
Minister on May 10, 1940, after Neville Chamberlain resigned
following several days of meetings known as the "Norway Debate,"
ostensibly about the failings of British efforts in Norway, but
ultimately about a lack of confidence in Chamberlain's government.
Churchill was not a unanimously popular choice for the office, even
among members of his own Conservative party (Johnson 15). On
May 29, Churchill had to convince members of the War Cabinet
not to seek terms with Hitler, all while the evacuation of British
forces from Dunkirk, which had begun on May 26, was underway
(Gilbert, *Continue to Pester* 21-23; Johnson 11-20). On June 4, 1940,
then, Churchill had been Prime Minister for less than four weeks.
He did not have the confidence of many at home. To say that the
war effort had been going badly would be an understatement. He
was "fighting for his political life and credibility" (Johnson 22; Toye
42), and the speech must be understood with the situation in mind:
Churchill needed to inspire confidence among his colleagues in the
House of Commons and among the peoples of Britain, to prepare
his country for a protracted fight, to shore up the resolve of France,
and to demonstrate to many key players (mainly Hitler and the
United States) his determination to continue the war, all while, so
far as possible, accurately reporting the facts (Maguire 258-59;
Cannadine 11).[2]

The speech, though often admired, has never been closely analyzed
in terms of the rhetorical canon of style. Most recently, Lori
Maguire looks at audiences, contexts, and the reception of the

speech under such headings of dispositio as confirmatio, refutatio, and peroratio, but apart from a brief section on language (260-62), Maguire does not consider elocutio, and her comments on language do not focus on the "we shall fight" sequence of the speech. (See Maguire 269-75, however, on the historical context and significance of the passage generally.) Of course, handbooks of rhetoric and guides to writing do often mention the speech. Most commonly, the mention is brief and addresses only the conclusion: the sequence of "we shall" clauses is cited as an example of anaphora (e.g., *Rhetorical Devices* 186; Keith and Lundberg 64). The *Business Communication* volume of the *Harvard Business Essentials* series generalizes the effect slightly by naming it "parallel structure," suggesting that it "helps audiences hear and remember what we have to say" (85), but the text does not specify exactly what constitutes "parallel structure" (i.e., whether or not the parallel structure is only in the repetition of "we shall" clauses or if other structures in the passage cited are also to be considered "parallel"). Other texts treat the concluding passage in somewhat more detail. Joseph Williams and Ira Nadel, for example, in discussing "climactic emphasis," use part of the final sentence of the speech ("the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old") to illustrate the weight of nominalizations. As Williams and Nadel put it, instead of "banally" and "simply" writing "until the New World rescues us," "Churchill end[s] with a parallelism climaxed by a balanced pair of heavy nominalizations" (152-53; Farnsworth 30-31).

The diction of the "we shall" portion of the passage has also received some attention. Several readers have noted a preponderance of Anglo-Saxon words and the notable use of the French loan "surrender" at the passage's conclusion. Bill Stott further suggests that Churchill balances a Latinate word ("confidence") with a

"primitive monosyllable" ("strength"), but does not explore these possible juxtapositions further (Bragg 8; Lacey and Danziger 30; Stott 84). Examples could be multiplied, but, even though the conclusion to the speech is well known, observations about Churchill's style tend to be brief and, except for comments on word choice, ignore how and under what influences Churchill might have composed those famous lines. An extended study of Churchill's style and his English sources will demonstrate that the best explanation for the unique features of the speech is that Churchill was paying particular attention to history: he carefully situated his speech in a tradition of English rhetoric about the island's attack and defence and then strove to highlight native Germanic vocabulary and to use verse-like structures, doublets, and alliteration in order to echo the rhetoric of Anglo-Saxon authors such as Ælfric and Wulfstan.

The first impediment to a more thorough investigation is access to and historical pinpointing of the text of the speech itself. Because Parliament refused to allow Churchill's speeches to the House of Commons to be broadcast and because Churchill did not broadcast this speech separately, we cannot be certain about the precise form of the original performance (Gilbert, *Continue to Pester* 38; Toye 231). At least three versions of the speech exist: (1) the typescript in the Churchill Archives; (2) the script at the official site www.winstonchurchill.org; and (3) the audio of Churchill reading the speech, recorded after the war.[3] Only the post-war recording reveals substantial differences in the conclusion of the speech,missing an entire paragraph. This essay is based upon the version at winstonchurchill.org, mainly because this is easiest for general access. (See Table 1 for a comparison of the three versions).

Churchill's speech concludes as follows, though, for ease of reference

and to highlight the structure of the passage, I have altered the format (and punctuation) from the continuous prose of the original typescript and the winstonchurchill.org version:[4]

The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength.

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule,

we shall not flag or fail. (1)

We shall go on to the end. (2)

We shall fight in France. (3)

We shall fight on the seas and oceans. (4)

We shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air. (5)

We shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be. (6)

We shall fight on the beaches. (7)

We shall fight on the landing grounds. (8)

We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. (9)

We shall fight in the hills. (10)

We shall never surrender. (11)

And even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this Island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond

the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the
struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power
and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.

Repetition is obviously the key rhetorical feature of the passage.
Jonathan Charteris-Black assesses the effect—"Repetition of 'we'
implies unity of purpose and 'shall' clearly predicts the future . . .
repetition implies physical and mental obduracy"—and characterizes
each of the main repetitions as "WE + SHALL + 'MILITARY'
VERB + LOCATION" (56). Specifically, of course, that repetition is
anaphora, the repeated beginnings of sentences and clauses with "we
shall," particularly "we shall fight." There are eleven "we shall"
clauses in the passage, and given that many of them are roughly the
same length, one could also argue for the use of isocolon here and
many other figures of repetition, such as, for example, the general
term conduplicatio (repetition, or literally doubling), though such
terms do not fit as well. The long list of places the English are
prepared to fight might be seen to have the effect of a litany, but
Ward Farnsworth notes how the locations introduce variation:
Farnsworth sees "relief," "abandonment," or "irregularity" in the
"internal varieties" of the anaphora that slowly move the focus of the
fight from France to upon the water, into the air, to the island, to
the beaches, to the landing grounds, to the fields and streets, and to
the hills (30-31; Maguire 272). In increments, Churchill pauses at
each point of retreat until the fight could be in the very hills of
England, a retreat and stubborn resistance which bears a striking
resemblance to Bede's account of the fifth-century Germanic
conquest of England, as we shall see.

The passage, however, is more intricately constructed than has
generally been recognized, with patterned repetition in the "we

shall" sequence, parallel and chiastic structures in the passage as a whole, deliberately patterned word choice, a purposeful use of coordinate structures or doublets, and alliteration. First, in the eleven repetitions of "we shall," the first and last instances are presented negatively—"we shall not" and "we shall never"—and the whole series balances around and therefore emphasizes the central iteration: "We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be." Generally, also, the length of the clauses or sentences grows, from "in France" to "on the seas and oceans" to "with growing confidence and growing strength in the Air," before shortening again in the middle and at the end, creating a pattern which is almost chiastic (or enveloped)[5] in its short statements at each end, but which is certainly internally parallel in the relative lengths of occurrences 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 7, 8, 9. Iterations 1 and 2 could be isolated before a set of three lengthening sequences (3, 4, 5); 6 stands alone before another set of three lengthening sequences (7, 8, 9); and 10, 11 parallel 1 and 2 in their brevity, making a perfectly balanced 11 iterations.

Further, the initial "we shall not flag or fail" (1) links back to "have fallen or may fall," itself an example of polyptoton (that is, repetition of a word in a different form), echoing the two possibilities expressed by the modals "have" and "may" with the coordinated "flag or fail." Further, the four /f/ verbs in the first sentence ("have fallen," "may fall," "flag," and "fail") lead us to the most important /f/ verb, "fight," which appears three times before a break and appears four times again in occurrences 7-10 of the "we shall" series, effectively negating the possibilities of the prior /f/ verbs.

The whole of the passage is also chiastic, demonstrating what some would call an "envelope pattern" from "old" in "old and famous

states" of the opening to the "Old" at the conclusion, functioning
within a parallelism of "even though" and "even if" statements which
bracket the sequence of eleven "we shall" clauses. Even the brief
passage cited above by Williams and Nadel is chiastic, moving from
"New" to "power and might" to "rescue and liberation" and back to
"Old." The envelope patterns highlight the full passage and the "we
shall" sequence as separate and significant, and the chiastic and
parallel structures echo the highly formalized structures of traditional
oral-formulaic composition, a tradition which includes Old English
poetry.

The diction of the passage is also significant for the way it reinforces
the themes of the speech. The words are generally short, simple,
direct, and without ambiguity. In fact, there are only eight words in
the entire passage which have more than two syllables ("Gestapo";
"odious"; "apparatus"; "confidence"; "whatever"; "surrender";
"subjugated"; and "liberation") and, though the elements of
"whatever" are Germanic in origin, the word itself is a late
compound, meaning that all the multisyllabic words are of French or
Latin origin or are later additions to the language. In his choice of
vocabulary, Churchill has not only attempted to use simple,
unadorned language,[6] but he has also, I would argue, used an
intuitive or perhaps learned sense of what constitutes native
vocabulary.

For example, a coordinate structure like "subjugated and starving" is
a characteristically well-chosen alliterative doublet: the former word
has a clear Latin origin (fifteenth century) while the latter is as
clearly a Germanic word, an Old English (OE) word, from the
Proto-Germanic (PG) *sterban and OE steorfan, "to die," a word
whose meaning has weakened since the OE period, like so many

OE verbs meaning roughly "to kill" or "to die."[7] Churchill may well have been aware of the word's origin, but even if he were not, the Latin multisyllabic "subjugate" with the Germanic monosyllabic "starve" is an effective juxtaposition both syllabically and phonetically. The same is ultimately true of "armed and guarded," at least in form, as "armed" is closely related to PG *armaz* and OE *earm* (the noun meaning "arm"), though the specific verbal sense "to furnish with weapons" seems to be an early borrowing from either Old French (OF), *armer*, or Latin, *armare*; "guard" comes via OF, though descended from the PG *wardōn*, "to guard" (the "gu" for /g/ marks the word immediately as French). "Flag or fail" similarly combines words with Germanic ("flag" is likely a late borrowing from Old Norse [ON] *flaka* "to flicker, flutter") and French origins ("fail" from OF *falir*, "to be unsuccessful in executing a task"), and "seas and oceans" combines OE *sæ* (PG *saiwaz*) with a late thirteenth-century entry from OF, *occean*, from Latin *Oceanus*. The list goes on, including "confidence and strength" and "power and might," both combinations of native, Germanic words with words ultimately of Latin origin which entered English (in these two cases) via Middle French and Old French, respectively. The pattern, however, is not perfect, as "fields and streets" are both native words, but this too seems deliberate: "fields and streets" is part of the final five "we shall" clauses, where after the non-native word "cost," the only other loan is the French loan "surrender," which is, as Stott points out "not a nice word" (Bragg 8; Stott 84). The last paired words, "rescue" and "liberation," though appropriately contrastive syllabically, are in fact both from Latin via French, thought the phones of "rescue" seem almost Germanic. Further, the French/Latin with Germanic pairings may have been intended to reinforce a theme of the speech, as Churchill has previously stressed how Britain

and France will work together: "The British Empire and the French Republic, linked together in their cause and in their need, will defend to the death their native soil, aiding each other like good comrades to the utmost of their strength." Even here, "cause" and "need" are (chiastically reversing "British Empire" and "French Republic") from French and PG/OE, respectively.

The linking of different parts of the passage (and the speech as a whole) operates at a high level of sophistication: for example, "confidence" and "strength" begin and end the first paragraph of the conclusion, then appear together in iteration 5 of the "we shall" sequence.[8] The central and crucial "we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be" has been introduced by "we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our island home" (a parallel structure of "we shall," "defend," and "island") and also in the united efforts of Britain and France mentioned above: "The British Empire and the French Republic … will defend to the death their native soil" (also "[we] … will," "defend," "native soil"), but the latter looks forward to "whatever the cost may be" by introducing "to the death" in a sequence which has chiasmus embedded in the parallel structure ("defend [a] to the death [b] their native soil [c]" and "defend [a] our Island [c], whatever the cost may be [b]").

In addition to the careful word choice, apparent awareness of etymology, and sophisticated patterning the passage seems to exhibit, a feature which has never (so far as I have been able to find) been isolated and discussed is what I have so far called the "coordinate structures" or "doublets" of the passage, in which two words, usually two nouns or two verbs, are linked by a coordinating "and" or "or." I count nine such instances of note, several of which also alliterate:

have fallen or may fall

flag or fail

seas and oceans

growing confidence and growing strength

in the fields and in the streets

subjugated and starving

armed and guarded

power and might

rescue and liberation

Finally, alliteration is an obvious feature of the passage, but one might not readily notice how alliteration functions to link or structure the passage, as, for example, with "into the grip of the Gestapo" and "in God's good time," in the same way that the coordinate verb structures of the first "sentence"—"have fallen or may fall" and "flag or fail"—are repeated in "subjugated and starving" and "armed and guarded" in the last "sentence."

Clearly, the conclusion of Churchill's "We shall fight on the beaches" is rhetorically sophisticated. Paradoxically, that sophistication is, in my view, proven by the manuscript appearance of this portion of the script of the speech. Whereas many of Churchill's speeches are laid out in short phrases and clauses, like free verse, as many have said (Hayward 22; Watts 99), the "we shall" sequence is not, suggesting that its content and form had been given such attention that Churchill had no need for visual cues.[9] In fact, the minor discrepancies between the archived version of the speech

and the audio of its presentation would suggest the same thing. A question presents itself: where did Churchill find a model for this particular "style"? The answer may be found in considering Churchill's education, the speaker he says influenced him most, and his early essay on rhetoric.

Churchill's education, first of all, is recounted in some detail in his autobiography, *My Early Life*, which was first published in 1930. Churchill takes some pride in being in the lowest division of the bottom form at Harrow, suggesting that students of his ability were considered "dunces," able to learn only English and not Latin or Greek. That focus on English, Churchill claims, was an "immense advantage": "Not only did we learn English parsing thoroughly, but we also practiced continually English analysis . . . Thus I got into my bones the essential structure of the ordinary British sentence—which is a noble thing" (30-31). While the focus of Churchill's language training may indeed have been English, the level of his facility in Latin is unclear. Churchill definitely began to learn Latin at St James's School (Churchill mentions his initial exposure to the Latin singular first declension noun *mensa*), and he later talks about his Latin translations at Harrow (he had an "arrangement" with a boy who was excellent at Latin translations, but who struggled with English essays), though Latin was not one of the exams he passed to get into Sandhurst. Churchill says of the Sandhurst exams: "Latin I could not learn. I had a rooted prejudice which seemed to close my mind against it" (39). Of Latin and Greek learning overall, he comments further that "[i]n all the twelve years I was at school, no one ever succeeded in making me write a Latin verse or learn any Greek except the alphabet" (27). However, Churchill's preference for "English" over Latin seems to colour his remarks about Latin, and, I suspect, to lead him to downplay how

much Latin he knew. He continued to have to do Latin translations of "ten or fifteen lines" per day, and he even had private tutelage from the Head-master for a time (35-36). Though he was perhaps unable to compose Latin verse, I believe Churchill would have acquired a basic competency in Latin (see also Johnson 79), a fact which will prove relevant below.

When asked about his oratorical style in the early 1950s, Churchill reportedly said: "It was an American statesman [William Bourke Cockran] who inspired me when I was 19 [and presumably after!] & taught me how to use every note of the human voice like an organ." Further, Churchill was able "to quote long excerpts from Bourke Cockran's speeches of sixty years before," and said of the man "[h]e was my model—I learned from him how to hold thousands in thrall" (R. Churchill, Vol. 1 *Youth* 282-83). Churchill's relationship with Bourke Cockran—and Bourke Cockran's influence on Churchill's political thought—has recently been investigated by Michael McMenamin and Curt Zoller, and in passing by Martin Gilbert (McMenamin and Zoller 7-8; Gilbert, *Churchill* 17; for a summary of influences, see Toye 12-17). Though Bourke Cockran's speeches have not been studied in detail and only selected speeches have even been published, prominent features of the passage from Churchill are not difficult to find. Churchill would have seen in Bourke Cockran coordinate structures, coordinate structures with antitheses, anaphora, and even chiastic anaphora with variation, almost all of them in one of his major speeches about World War I, "The World War":

1. Coordinate structures: "To this **gross misrepresentation and utter misconception** of **American spirit and American purpose**, Boston today gives **final and**

conclusive answer, in this mighty demonstration, in the enthusiastic multitudes that have thronged its streets this afternoon, and in all the manifestations of welcome extended by the people of this Commonwealth to the Belgian Delegation, from the moment that it crossed the borders of this state." ("The World War" 334; see also "The Cost of War" 264)

2. Anaphora in a chiastic structure (note also the alliterating coordinate structure): "Moreover this mighty demonstration is conclusive proof that **when the President of the United States asked Congress** to declare war he was not imposing a policy of his own upon a reluctant country, but was obeying the command of a nation. **We have** not been **dragooned or driven** into this conflict. **We have** insisted on entering it, to make justice, which is divine, supreme over military force, which is brutish. **When President Wilson urged Congress** to declare war as a necessary step to make the world safe for Democracy, he raised this conflict far above any sordid enterprise of conquest, or vengeance, or advantage." ("The World War" 336)

3. Parallel anaphora with lexical chiasmus ("soil . . . Belgium . . . Belgium . . . soil"): "The **soil** of **Belgium** will forever be sacred in the eyes of freemen, for it has drunk the blood of heroes who died not merely for the safety of their country, but for the Justice of Heaven. **Belgium** suffering; **Belgium** ravaged; **Belgium** with **her** people plundered, **her** cities ruined, **her** noblest temples of commerce and of religion mere piles of blackened ruins; **Belgium** driven

almost completely from her own **soil** has uttered no complaint of the sacrifices which loyalty to justice has entailed upon **her**." ("The World War" 345)

4. Concluding anaphora, again with variation, almost in perfect parallelism ("it"/"it is"); concluding tricolon with anadiplosis/epizeuxis; adjective and adverb/verb coordinate structures: "That answer ['God wills it,' that is, to save Christian civilization by fighting the war] is not shouted by the lips of thoughtless multitudes. **It** governs the heart throbs of the whole people. **It** finds expression deep down in the bowels of the earth when the miner drops his pick; in the field, when the laborer abandons his plow; in every workshop where the mechanic quits his bench; in every field of industry where men give up their daily gain to hasten to the recruiting offices for enrollment in the army of the Republic. **It is** the absorbing prepossession of men wherever they assemble for discussion or for worship. **It is** the burden of every address to which an audience will give ear. **It is** embodied in every prayer addressed to the Throne of God. **It** finds a place in the ritual of the Protestant. **It** animates the fervor of the Jewish Synogogue [sic]. **It** rises to Heaven with the incense that is burned before Catholic Altars. **It is** part of the blessing which the American woman bestows upon her son departing for the battlefield. **It** mingles with the prayer which the mother breathes by the cradle of her infant. **It** has held you, my friends, listening to these poor words of mine which could command your attention only by reason of the sublime subject which they discussed: **Democracy! Democracy**

made safe, and therefore triumphant! **Freedom! Freedom** to all nations, **great and small! Justice! Justice** to Belgium–to all the children of men. 'God wills it!' The American people are **unanimously resolved and immovably determined** to make that Will successful, triumphant, supreme throughout the world." ("The World War" 349-50)

Even from these brief examples of Bourke Cockran's rhetorical figures, we can see that Churchill could have had Bourke Cockran's speeches in mind when composing the "we shall" sequence. The major rhetorical devices are almost all there: the only features that do not have a major role in Bourke Cockran's speeches are the clustered three-word coordinate structures and the particular attention to diction that characterize Churchill's speech. Churchill's concluding passage has an entirely different effect as a result of these departures than any of the passages quoted above.

While the focus here is the "we shall" sequence of Churchill's speech, also worth noting is that Churchill's historical perspective may have been influenced by Bourke Cockran as well. The same speech quoted above, the full title of which is "The World War, the Greatest of the Crusades," goes into some detail about the history of the Germanic peoples, beginning with Armenius [Arminius] and the Battle of the Teutoberg Forest (a Germanic/Roman conflict), demonstrating knowledge of Tacitus, and concludes with a lengthy invocation of the Crusades, another "enterprise" as "valiant" as the First World War (346-49). In Churchill's speech, the focus is opportunity, and Churchill shifts the focus to England and Arthur by including "The Knights of the Round Table" with the Crusaders. Churchill even quotes Tennyson's *Morte D'Arthur*, Sir Bedivere's

melancholy and reflective words to Arthur just before his funeral ship sets sail (ll. 230–31). That same sense of historical parallels leads Churchill to mention Napoleon's plans to invade England: "We are told that Herr Hitler has a plan for invading the British Isles. This has often been thought of before. When Napoleon lay at Boulogne for a year with his flat-bottomed boats and his Grand Army, he was told by someone: 'There are bitter weeds in England'" (winstonchurchill.org). Incidentally, the First World War might even have provided the basic model for the "we shall fight" anaphora: about the same time as Bourke Cockran was addressing the American people, Churchill was in France in his role as the British Minister of Munitions (1917-1919), where he visited Amiens with Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister. Clemenceau reportedly told Churchill: "I will fight in front of Paris; I will fight in Paris; I will fight behind Paris" (Persico 222).[10]

Though Churchill wrote prolifically, he did not address the subject of rhetoric very often. *Savrola*, an early work of fiction, includes a description of the main character's compositional process, but the passage is not enormously helpful: "His ideas began to take the form of words, to group themselves into sentences; he murmured to himself; the rhythm of his own language swayed him; instinctively he alliterated . . . That was a point; could not tautology accentuate it? . . . The sound would please their ears, the sense improve and stimulate their minds" (74).[11] Churchill's only clear statement on the topic comes in "The Scaffolding of Rhetoric," which was originally unpublished and which he wrote it in 1897 (just before, it seems, he began to write *Savrola*) at the age of twenty-two. There, Churchill noted that some "elements" were "inherent in all rhetoric," but suggested "that there are certain features common to all the finest speeches in the English language" (817). Churchill felt there

was a particularly English tradition of oratory, achieved via what he called "six principal elements," though in fact he lists only five, discussing correctness of diction; rhythm; accumulation of argument; analogy; and a "tendency to wild extravagance of language" (R. Churchill, Vol. 1 *Companion* 816–21):[12]

1. Correctness of diction is of primary importance. As Churchill says, "there is no more important element in the technique of rhetoric than the continual employment of the best possible word" (818). Churchill's only example is the use of the word *dour* to describe the Scottish people: "*Dour* is a rare and uncommon word: but what else could it convey to the Anglo–Saxon mind than the character of the people of a cold, grey land, severe, just, thrifty and religious?" (818). In fact, our sense of the diction of the passage is confirmed:

The unreflecting often imagine that the effects of oratory are produced by the use of longer words . . . the shorter words of a language are usually the more ancient. Their meaning is more ingrained in the national character and they appeal with greater force to simple understandings than words recently introduced from the Latin and the Greek. (818–19)

2. Rhythm: Sentences should be "long, rolling, and sonorous" and should achieve a "balance" which "produces a cadence which resembles blank verse rather than prose" (819).

3. To achieve an "accumulation of argument," to move toward "the climax of oratory," is to give to the audience a "rapid succession of waves of sound and vivid pictures," to muster a "series of facts" "all pointing in a common

direction," which allows the listeners to "anticipate the conclusion," to recognize what is to come (819).

4. Churchill says of analogy that, if "apt," it has the power to connect the known to the unknown, the concrete to the abstract, and the finite to the infinite. Analogies, "whether they translate an established truth into simple language or whether they adventurously aspire to reveal the unknown," are among the "most formidable" tools of the rhetorician (819-20). Churchill gives several examples (this seems to have been his fifth point), including one from Lord Salisbury: "They (Frontier wars) are but the surf that marks the edge and advance of the wave of civilisation" (820).

5. Finally, what Churchill means by a "wild extravagance of language" seems to be a statement of the heightened emotion of the audience and speaker, an extreme statement of the principle, in other words. The effect of that wild extravagance is to give outlet to the energies and passions of the speaker and the audience, to avoid inciting them to immediate and reckless or violent action. Churchill calls it "the safety valve," having given two examples (820-21).

The first three elements are clearly in evidence in the "we shall" passage. We have explored Churchill's diction, his preference for shorter and more ancient words, except as a feature of contrast or variation (note how "foreign" the "odious apparatus of Nazi rule" sounds), the balance he favours, though not precisely blank verse and not in long sentences, and the accumulation of argument as a key feature as the speech moves toward its conclusion. The passage does not exhibit analogy, his fourth (and fifth) elements, nor any wild extravagance, as metaphor would interfere with the immediacy

of the passage and Churchill's "safety valve" is not required in an address to parliament. Churchill's essay focuses on style, even if one might argue that inuentio or dispositio are partially addressed,[13] offering a hint of Churchill's early thinking about effective rhetoric, and corresponds to a surprising extent, at least in general terms, with "We shall fight on the beaches."

Although Churchill's education, influences, and statements about rhetoric must be understood in order to assess the genesis of the "we shall" sequence, the coordinate structures and the rhythm, including alliteration, of the passage remain relatively unaddressed. Though Churchill suggests in the essay that Samuel Johnson's *Rasselas* is "a remarkable instance of correctness of diction and rhythm" (819), Johnson's 1759 novel hardly models the structures we see in Churchill. Instead, I would suggest that the closest analogue to our passage, certainly the only model I can think of for the coordinate structures, lies in English much earlier than Johnson, particularly in the writings of the two most significant vernacular prose writers of the Old English period, Ælfric of Eynsham and Wulfstan of York, and it is here that Churchill's education and study may prove important. The "prose" of both Ælfric and Wulfstan has been shown to approach verse, or to share qualities with Old English verse, though, as stylists, they are much different. In both cases, though, scholars and editors have debated strenuously how to present their writings, either continuously, as prose, or broken into verse lines. (For a summary of the scholarship, see Fox 30n23.) The opening of Ælfric's translation of Alcuin's commentary on Genesis is an example of Old English "rhythmical prose," here laid out as alliterating verse:

Sum geþungen lareow wæs on Engla lande

Albinus gehaten and hæfde micele geþincða.

Se lærde manega þæs Engliscan mennisces

on boclicum cræfte, swa swa he wel cuþe,

and ferde siþþan ofer sæ to þam snoteran kyninge,

Karolus gehaten, se hæfde micelne cræft

for Gode and for worulde, and he wislice leofode.

To þam com Albinus, se æðela lareow,

and on his anwealde ælþeodig wunode

on Sancte Martines mynstre, and þær manega gelærde

mid þam heofonlican wisdome þe him se hælend forgeaf. (1–11)

[A certain distinguished teacher in the land of the English was called Albinus, and he had great merit. He instructed many of the English folk in book knowledge, such as he well understood, and then travelled over the sea to that wise king, called Karolus, who had great skill both for the things of God and of the world and lived wisely. Albinus, the noble teacher, came to him and lived as a foreigner in his kingdom, in the minster of St Martin, and taught many there with the heavenly wisdom which the Lord himself had granted him.]

The passage could be argued to achieve a balance, a cadence almost like verse—and, indeed, such has been argued—and there is a clear use of alliteration in every line; ornamental additional alliteration in the central line (chiastic /k/, /h/, /h/, /k/); a repetition in lines 2 and 6 that emphasizes the complementary talents of Alcuin and Charlemagne and that links Alcuin and Charlemagne to God in line 11 (the first pair of lines alliterate "gehaten"/"hæfde," and the final alliterate "heofonlican"/"Hælend"); and an apparent attempt further

to organize the passage around the chiastic repetition of "lærde manega" and "manega gelærde" (Fox 31-32). However, though the passage's rhythm, alliteration, and overall structure might be similar to Churchill's "we shall" sequence, Ælfric's introduction does not have many coordinate structures, containing only "for Gode and for worulde," an example which hardly has the weight of Churchill's heavy use.

Wulfstan's writings, and primarily his sermons, have in recent years also been subject to extensive stylistic analysis for their resemblance to poetry. In fact, Andy Orchard has shown that the sermons are generally organized into short two-stress "lines" or "phrases" that resemble the half-lines of Old English verse. Many of the sermons also contain "pointing," or scribal marks indicating the rhythms of the stressed syllables. Some critics have also focused on features resembling our coordinate structures, but, in most cases, more specifically than I think is perhaps warranted. For example, Don Chapman has identified Wulfstan's echoic compounds, in which "a constituent of one compound is echoed in a nearby simplex or compound, either as a full lexical repetition like 'wedlogan ne wordlogan' . . . or as a chiming of similar sounds, as in 'þeofas and ðeodscaðan'" (1). Others have looked at what they call "doublets" or "word pairs," and offered a brief definition in term of translation theory, suggesting that paired terms in place of one Latin word could advance adequacy (an adequate single word not existing in the target language) or acceptability (using words the audience knows and will accept) (Discenza 58; Koskenniemi 12; Williams and Nadel 109). However, this is not what happens in Wulfstan's sermons, in which alliterative doublets appear on average ten times per sermon (Orchard, "Crying Wolf" 248), and in which Wulfstan shows a marked preference for a few particular examples as he reuses the

same kinds of structures (such as "wide and side" ["widely and extensively"] or "wordes and weorces" ["of word and of deed"]).

Defining this device is difficult. The closest classical term is probably polysyndeton (the use of many conjunctions), though the figure can also be a form of zeugma (when one part of speech governs two or more other parts of a sentence). When the figure is embellished by repeating inflectional endings or derivational prefixes (for example), it could also involve similiter cadens (or homoeptoton, two or more words with the same endings) and simple alliteration (or paromoeon). Hendiadys (expressing one thing by means of two) is also a possibility. Scholars of Old English have, for straightforward coordinate noun and verb examples such as "fæhðe ond fyrene" ("feud and crime") and "ongitan and oncnawan" ("[to] perceive and [to] recognize"), offered the simple term "doublet," which perhaps works better than the terms of classical rhetoric.

The best-known user of the "doublet" in Anglo-Saxon England was Wulfstan, and Wulfstan's most studied work is the *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos*, probably first delivered at York on or about February 16, 1014 (and extant in a few versions), when the king, Æthelræd, had fled to Normandy and Danish raids were constant. A typical passage heavy with doublets is as follows:

Ne dohte hit nu

lange inne ne ute,

ac wæs here and hunger,

bryne and blodgyte,

on gewelhwylcan ende

oft and gelome.

And us stalu and cwalu,

stric and steorfa,

orfcwealm and uncoþu,

hol and hete […] (Bethurum 269, ll. 55-8)

[Nothing has prospered now for a long time, here or abroad, but war and hunger, burning and bloodshed, was nearly everyplace often and frequently. And theft and killing, pestilence and death, murrain and disease, malice and hate (have damaged us very severely).]

Examples from the sermon could be multiplied, but this excerpt gives a sense of the various ways in which Wulfstan uses doublets: many pairs alliterate, rhyme, or have various phones in common, and some of the doublets become features of Wulfstan's essential technique of repetition (Orchard 248).

When Wulfstan composed his sermon, he himself took a long view of Anglo-Saxon history, making reference to Gildas, the sixth-century author of *De excidio Britanniae*, an account of the fall of Celtic Britain to Germanic invaders. Wulfstan said

An þeodwita wæs on Brytta tidum Gildas hatte. Se awrat be heora misdædum hu hy mid heora synnum swa oferlice swyþe God gegræmedan þæt he let æt nyhstan Engla here heora eard gewinnan and Brytta dugeþe fordon mid ealle. And þæt wæs geworden þæs þe he sæde, **þurh ricra reaflac and þurh gitsunge wohgestreona, ðurh leode unlaga and þurh wohdomas, ðurh biscopa asolcennesse and þurh lyðre yrhðe Godes bydela** þe soþes geswugedan ealles to gelome and clumedan mid ceaflum þær hy scoldan clypian. (Bethurum 274, ll. 176–84)

[A wise man in the time of the Britons was called Gildas. He wrote about their misdeeds, how they by their sins angered God so much that he at last let the army of the English conquer their land and destroy the power of the Britons completely. And that happened, as he said, through the robbery of the rich and through the coveting of ill-gotten gains, through the lawlessness of the people and through unjust judgements, through the laziness of bishops and through the wicked cowardice of God's messengers, who all too frequently kept silent about the truth and mumbled with their jaws when they should have cried out.]

Wulfstan's report of Gildas' words includes isocolon (beginning with the parallel "Engla here" and "Brytta dugeþe"), three coordinate structures (here also with anaphora with "þurh"), and a fair bit of alliteration (as well as other more sophisticated aural devices, such as the "yðr" of "lyðre" repeated in parallel with chiasmus in the "yr_ð" of "yrhðe"), not to mention vocabulary that echoes other parts of the sermon. The passage about Gildas, however, is not completely original to Wulfstan. This part of the sermon has long been recognized to come directly from Alcuin, who, devastated to hear of the destruction of Lindisfarne, wrote home to Archbishop Æthelheard, probably in June of 793. In fact, Wulfstan had a copy of the letter in a collection of documents he deemed significant, and he had underlined the following Latin words:

Legitur uero in libro Gildi Brettonum sapientissimi, quod idem ipsi Brettones propter **rapinas et auaritiam** principum, propter **iniquitatem et iniustitiam** iudicum, propter **desidiam et pigritiam** praedicationis episcoporum, propter **luxoriam et malos mores** populi patriam perdiderunt. (Alcuin, Epist. 17)

[One reads in the book of Gildas, wisest of the Britons, that in fact the Britons themselves, through the pillaging and greed of the leaders, through the iniquity and injustice of the judges, through the laziness and

slackness of the bishops, through the lasciviousness and wicked ways of
the people, lost their homeland.]

Surprisingly, I think, we see in Alcuin's Latin both a heavy use of
doublets (here objects of a single preposition, "propter," unlike in
Wulfstan's *Sermo*), an unmistakeable dose of alliteration, and some
assonance and consonance, particularly between the coordinate
nouns. Wulfstan, at least in this passage, would seem to have
adopted and adapted Alcuin's figures,[14] though the "pure"
doublets of the first passage are uniquely Wulfstan's.[15]

In Anglo-Saxon England, then, the rhetorical tradition in times of
national distress looked back to Gildas' account of the invasion of
the island by Angles, Saxons, and Jutes in the late fifth century.
There, as Bede relates, the Celts were pushed back and west to the
hills: as Churchill promises to fight in retreating stages from France
to the hills of England, Bede notes how the invaders forced their
way from east to west, until those who remained "eked out a
wretched and fearful existence among the mountains, forests, and
crags" (64), making the "we shall" sequence of the speech a striking
evocation of Christian Celtic defiance in the face of Germanic
invasion. The Celts rallied under Ambrosius Aurelianus, at least for a
time, and Ambrosius Aurelianus is the historical foundation of the
legend of King Arthur, whose stand against barbarian invaders
Churchill relates in terms that demonstrate clearly his familiarity
with the historical tradition and the parallels he sees with World
War II:[16]

> There [in Gildas' and Nennius' histories and the naming of Arthur]
> looms large, uncertain, dim but glittering, the legend of King Arthur
> and the Knights of the Round Table. Somewhere in the Island a great
> captain gathered the forces of Roman Britain and fought the barbarian

invaders to the death . . . And wherever men are fighting against barbarism, tyranny, and massacre, for freedom, law, and honour, let them remember that the fame of their deeds, even though they themselves be exterminated, may perhaps be celebrated as long as the world rolls round. Let us then declare that King Arthur and his noble knights, guarding the Sacred Flame of Christianity and the theme of a world order, sustained by valour, physical strength, and good horses and armour, slaughtered innumerable hosts of foul barbarians and set decent folk an example for all time. (Churchill, *A History* 45-48)

When the first wave of Viking incursions threatened England and the monastery at Lindisfarne was sacked in 793, Alcuin turned to the words (and reasoning) of Gildas when he wrote home. As we saw, Alcuin used coordinate structures and alliteration even in his Latin letter. Wulfstan, seeing the English nation oppressed by a second wave of Viking incursions, turned to Alcuin, quoting Gildas, and peppered his sermon not only with coordinate structures, but with more elaborate alliteration and parallel and chiastic structures. Inna Koskenniemi and E.S. Olszewska have shown that these coordinate structures appear throughout Old English, and persist into the early Middle English period in works such as the *Peterborough Chronicle*, the *Ancrene Riwle*, and the *Ancrene Wisse*. Olszewska has found the same structures in the *Ormulum* and has shown how there are many Old Norse parallels, suggesting a particular Germanic affinity for the device. In its origin, it is not a technique that arrives with French (or even with Latin), a juxtaposition of a native word and a "new" or "foreign" synonym, and as Otto Jespersen has pointed out, some of these doublets, comprised of two native words, become idiomatic expressions.[17]

Much more could be said about Anglo-Saxon rhetorical traditions and their roots in classical rhetoric. That Churchill's "We shall fight

on the beaches" speech looks back to Old English, and specifically to Wulfstan, cannot be proven. By the time the speech was composed, however, Churchill had submitted what he thought was the final draft of *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples* on December 16, 1939 (Clarke 232-39), and he was clearly thinking about the tenth- and eleventh-century invasions of England as recently as 1938, when he had decided to spend part of his holiday studying the reign of King Æthelræd the Unready (Clarke 252; Churchill, *History* 107-108).[18] In the *History* (which was not published until 1956, ten years after the end of the war), Churchill relates an idiosyncratic, but not unreliable, history of the events that led to a Danish king of England in 1016. He does not mention Wulfstan, but if we go back to the first Viking age and the raid of 793, we find Churchill quoting one of Alcuin's letters home, a letter to the Northumbrian king, Æthelred, written around the same time as Alcuin's letter to Æthelheard, Archbishop of Canterbury (Churchill, *History* 75; Alcuin, Epist. 16). Though the original Latin does not contain many doublets (only "miserie et calamitatis . . . exordium"), Alcuin uses anaphora twice, polyptoton, parallelism, alliteration, and other effects of sound.

More interestingly, Churchill's quote is precisely the same—both in its words and its ellipses—as that given by a well-known Anglo-Saxonist, R.W. Chambers. Chambers' *England Before the Norman Conquest* came out in 1926, and thus was certainly a work that Churchill could have seen, though Churchill clearly acknowledges only his debt to R.H. Hodgkin's *A History of the Anglo-Saxons* (1935), a work which contains part of this passage, but not as translated by Chambers. Chambers later translates most of Wulfstan's *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos* (276-80), meaning that Churchill, if he used

this book, might well have had knowledge of the whole sermon. Chambers, however, also wrote a chapter called "The Life of Saxon England" for a popular encyclopedia of the period. The precise evolution of the encyclopedia is difficult to unravel, but it appears that *Harmsworth's Universal Encyclopedia* (1920-1922) was re-edited by Sir John Alexander Hammerton as *[Harmsworth's] Universal History of World* (beginning in 1927), at which time the chapter by Chambers was added. The encyclopedia was often reprinted, sometimes under different titles (such as the *Illustrated Encyclopedia of World History*). In any case, the chapter (which was not in every edition) originally included the quote from Alcuin's Epist. 16 (with the same ellipses) and two translated passages of Wulfstan's sermon. As Churchill prepared his address after the evaluation at Dunkirk, he certainly knew Alcuin's letters and Wulfstan's sermon, and he had detailed knowledge of historical threats to England, the prior invasions of the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, and the two Viking ages of the Anglo-Saxon period.

In 1932, R.W. Chambers suggested that the "continuity of English prose [I would not, however, limit this statement generically] is to be found in the sermon and in every kind of devotional treatise . . . there is a series of links, sometimes working very thin, but never broken" (*On the Continuity* xc). The sophistication of Churchill's speech is clear, especially in its most memorable sequence, the conclusion. Deciding precisely how Churchill might have come to compose the conclusion as he did is impossible, but understanding the rhetorical features of the passage, considering Churchill's thoughts on rhetoric and possible influences, and looking at the tradition in which he was writing, both linguistically and historically, gives us an idea of the range of possibilities. His early

thoughts on rhetoric and the influence of William Bourke Cockran are important, but the passage is significantly different from Churchill's known models, especially in its diction and use of doublets. Given that Churchill knew both the history (the previous invasions of England) and the rhetoric surrounding that history (perhaps even in Old English and Latin), I believe he modelled his speech at least partly after Anglo-Saxon examples, recognizing his island nation to be under the same kind of threat it had faced several times. Churchill, with an extraordinary sense of native versus borrowed vocabulary and consciously echoing the verse-like structures, doublets, alliteration, and rhythms of Old English writers such as Ælfric and Wulfstan, was, in the composition of "We shall fight on the beaches," deliberately claiming his place in a long national tradition. Andy Orchard links Wulfstan, the earlier Latin poet (and perhaps Old English poet) Aldhelm, and the *Beowulf*-poet as "literate Anglo-Saxons who chose to compose in the traditional oral style of vernacular verse" (259). To call Churchill's a "retrospective style," as Orchard does for those Anglo-Saxons, is certainly apt.

NOTES

[1] I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this article. Their extensive and detailed commentary much improved this final version.
[2] The difficulty of the multiple audiences of the speech is perhaps best demonstrated by the struck-through text in the final passage: "Even though the United States continues to watch with a strange detachment the growth and advance of dangers which menace them ever more darkly" (Churchill Archive CHAR 09/140A/25).
[3] "Extracts from it [the speech] were broadcast on the BBC by a presenter. Churchill recorded it after the war . . . it is impossible to

know if that is exactly how he delivered the speech in the House of Commons" (Maguire 262).

[4] In the section quoted below, the typescript and text of churchill.org have five differences in word choice or phrasing.

[5] Adeline Bartlett defines an envelope pattern as "any logically unified group of verses bound together by the repetition at the end of (1) words or (2) ideas or (3) words and ideas which are employed at the beginning" (9). Bartlett also discusses a special category of parallel pattern that resembles the "we shall" sequence and that she calls the "incremental pattern," when the parallelism demonstrates "cumulative force" (30, 49).

[6] Weidhorn comments that "[t]he secret of [Churchill's] great wartime orations, as A.P. Herbert suggests, lies partly in the deliberate, recurring use of simple, vivid words in lieu of the polysyllabic, Latinate abstractions beloved of conventional politicians and administrators" (31–32).

[7] The etymology of the words discussed in this paragraph is informed by the relevant entries in Watkins' dictionary of Indo-European roots.

[8] This part is not reproduced here or in Table 1. The concluding section of the speech begins: "I have, myself, full **confidence** that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone." This leads to "utmost of their **strength**," meaning that the repetition is also chiastic.

[9] The whole of this speech in the typescript version (which may be viewed at the Churchill Archive site) is laid out in syntactic and thought units (CHAR 09/140A 9-23), like free verse (the Churchill

Archive calls it "psalm style"), until the final two sections of the speech (from "Turning once again, and this time more generally, to the question of invasion") which appear as continuous prose (CHAR 09/140A 24-26).

[10] See also Toye 49-52 on the possible influence of William Philip Simms and Lord Rosebery's promises about the Boer War on the "we shall" sequence.

[11] For a discussion of *Savrola* and Churchill's oratory, see Reid 156-60.

[12] On *Savrola* and "The Scaffolding of Rhetoric," see also Weidhorn 18-21.

[13] The "accumulation of argument" (accumulatio or amplificatio) could perhaps be classed as inuentio or dispositio; by Geoffrey of Vinsauf (c. 1200), for example, amplificatio and abbreuiatio are a separate new category between dispositio and elocutio. The heightened emotion in the peroratio could be argued to be a feature of dispositio, though the rhetorical device in question seems more to be pathopoeia (and thus elocutio).

[14] It could be argued, of course, that Alcuin's Latin is heavily influenced by his knowledge of Old English; Wulfstan's Latin, in turn, contains similar features.

[15] See also Orchard, "Wulfstan," 324-26 for an analysis of the rhetorical features of the two passages.

[16] As Lori Maguire says, "Churchill consistently presents the Allies as defending . . . 'Christian civilisation' against the Nazi barbarians" (259).

[17] "Kith and kin," for example. See Jespersen 52; Koskenniemi; and Olszewska. For a useful semantic classification of different kinds of word pairs (for example, pairs based on opposition, complementary pairs, and tautological formulas), see Gurevič 33-41.

[18] The phrase "English–speaking peoples" is not original to Churchill, though he made it famous during the war, and it is not without its problems (Machan 269–305).

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Democratic Prosopopoeia: The Rhetorical Influence of the I-Will-Vote Image Filter on Social Media Profile Pictures during the 2015 Canadian Federal Election

MONIQUE KAMPHERM

ABSTRACT

Image filters, increasingly common in social media, are digital prosopopoeia. In this paper, I examine the act of voluntarily displaying the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter prosopopoeia on profile pictures during the 2015 Canadian federal election. Adopting the categorical voice of a voter through the image filter encourages like-minded family and friends to vote, the ostensible aim. But it also disciplines the image filter user into becoming a stronger advocate for voting through commitment and consistency, as well as social validation pressures; prosopopoeia both enhances and reinforces identification. By putting on the prosopopoeia mask, the social media rhetor *becomes* a representative of the commonwealth of

Canadian federal voters, and, as Kenneth Burke tells us, when we put on a role, the role puts on us. In "wearing" the filter on their profile picture, the individual has not simply *done* something, but has *become* something—the individual has become an electoral advocate through the process of identification, observed through recurrent political online statements, voting selfies, and the inclusion of political hashtags, embedding the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter user within the online collective of 160,000 similar voting peers on Facebook and/or Twitter during the 2015 Canadian federal election.

Keywords: prosopopoeia, social media, identification, voting image filter, voting selfie, hashtags, politics, activism, 2015 Canadian federal election, political rhetoric, Twitter, #votenation, rhetorical figures

Canadian political satirist Rick Mercer insists that "voting is contagious" (Mercer; Nickerson 54). Not only is he right, he is one of the social contagions influencing voting. Mercer introduced his social sharing #votenation campaign to advance voting through visually salient expressions during the 2015 Canadian federal election (Mercer). Civically engaged social media users were encouraged to use an "I will vote Oct 19" image filter, placing it over profile pictures on their Twitter and/or Facebook accounts prior to the election (*#votenation*). Mercer suggests that using this image filter on a profile picture will do two things: first, give accountability and responsibility to those who have pledged to vote, for, if you say you will vote, you are more likely to do so; and second, encourage others to vote, as friends will view the I-will-vote image filter over profile pictures, and may also be inspired to vote.[1] What Mercer probably did not realize, however, is that image filters enact the ancient rhetorical figure, prosopopoeia

(literally, "to create a face/person," to put on a mask). The "I will vote Oct 19" image filter may have been applied to a personal profile picture without a second thought, but in exhibiting the image filter *over* their profile picture, the individual has not simply *done* something, but has *become* something—the individual has become an electoral advocate through the process of Burkean identification.

A corollary effect ancient rhetoricians did not anticipate, however, is that in addition to influencing the audience, as intended, this act of "wearing" an image filter over their profile picture influences the rhetors themselves. Conventionally, figures and tropes are rhetorical tools used by rhetors, or performed by rhetors in language, as Johanna Hartelius notes in her application of prosopopoeia (and apostrophe) to immigration discourses (315). Paul de Man reverses this order. Figures and tropes, for de Man, operate on humans, and Hartelius shows how this is the case for prosopopoeia especially; it is, after all, a "mask" that allows the "wearer" to become someone, or something else. Image filters are especially interesting because the "mask" becomes almost literal again, overlaying a photograph of the rhetor. The image filter user may have used the I-will-vote language as a rhetorical operation, but the I-will-vote language operated on the image filter user. The visual I-will-vote prosopopoeia over a personal image affects the individual's identity, in that the rhetor becomes bound to enact the promise described by the image filter. The object is speaking for the person, advancing their ethos by displaying their allegiance; considered *en bloc*, it visually encodes identification, like uniforms or conference badges.

After voting, many image filter users shared on their social network a statement indicating that they voted, posted a voting selfie, a Barthian *having-been-there* image (*Image, Music, Text* 159), and/or

applied a hashtag such as #votenation, #cdnpoli, #canadavotes, or
#elxn42, to demonstrate they had fulfilled their promise and enacted
their role. Hashtags are another digital tool of identification, which
show users "*acting-together*" in solidarity, consubstantial with others
(Burke, *Rhetoric* 20–21). This article examines the rhetorical
influence of placing an I-will-vote image filter *over* users' personal
profile pictures and charts the influence of the prosopopoeia image
filter on users, and their online community, during the 2015
Canadian federal election.

ON PROSOPOPOEIA, WITH AN EXCURSUS ON RHETORICAL FIGURES

Like most rhetorical figures, prosopopoeia has an inconsistent
history. It is often conflated with the trope, personification, and it
has a variety of synonyms or partial synonyms (confirmatio;
personae confictio; the counterfait in personation; allocutio;
ethopoeia). We can start with a clear and representative definition,
from the best general source in English, the *Oxford English
Dictionary*:

> A rhetorical device by which an imaginary, absent, or dead person is
> represented as speaking or acting. ("Prosopopoeia, n.")

Paul de Man defines prosopopoeia as "the fiction of […] an absent,
deceased, or voiceless entity, which […] confers upon it the power
of speech" (75–76). The rhetorical function of prosopopoeia, he
notes, is performative in that it "makes the unknown accessible to
the mind and to the senses" (de Man 80; Davis 38). Cynthia Chase
explains that de Man does not merely read prosopopoeia as the

giving of face, but he reads *face* as given by prosopopoeia (84; Davis 43). "What is given by this act is figure," she says, "[f]igure is no less than our very face" (Chase 84; Davis 43). Diane Davis observes that "prosopopoeia *de*faces and *ef*faces precisely to the extent that it *en*faces" (43), meaning that the figure defaces the idea of essential selfhood, the thinking that there is a pre-existing and substantial self that the face would (mis)represent (43). In a sense, then, it enacts pure identification, where the rhetor is nothing but the associations conjured by the mask. The prosopopoeia image filter absorbs the social media user into a specified identity, a "self" in a community of selves, all viewing each other as what they prefer to be—voters, in our case, voting with others, for a common good. There is often an air of idealism, of Burkean perfection, in prosopopoeia. Demetrius cites a classic instance of the figure prosopopoeia from Plato's *Menexenus* in his *On Style*, Socrates speaking directly for the fallen soldiers of the Peloponnesian war, addressing their families (pts.265–266). "[W]e might have lived dishonourably," Socrates says under his rhetorical mask, "but have preferred to die honourably rather than bring you and your children into disgrace" (Plato pt.246d).

Many rhetoricians extend the prosopopoeia from the dead, imagined, or absent to abstract concepts, physical objects, and the like—"to cities, beasts, birds, trees, stones, weapons, fire, water, lights of the firmament" (Ruffin 393). In these extensions, one can see how prosopopoeia can get mixed up with personification, the attribution of human characteristics to abstract concepts, as well as with anthropomorphism, the attribution of human characteristics to animals and non-animate objects. And, of course, speech is a human characteristic.

But, as Randy Allen Harris argues, if we are to be precise with the
way we use our technical vocabulary in rhetoric, we need a one-to-
one mapping between our terms for rhetorical figures and their
definitions; and, in turn, to the instances that exemplify those figures
(18). This has rarely, if ever, been the case in rhetoric. In particular,
instances are inevitably curated as representing only one figure,
when multiple figures are not only present but in complete
functional cooperation. The classic representative of antimetabole,
for instance, "all for one and one for all" (reverse lexical repetition of
all and *one*) would not achieve its effects without mesodiplosis
(medial repetition of *for*) or parison (syntactic parallelism, which
reverses the semantic roles of *all* and *one*); nor would it be as elegant
without isocolon, or prosodic parallelism (Harris and Di Marco
218). The point made here is that figures very frequently co-occur,
and not just "coincidentally" or "merely aesthetically" but cooperate
functionally. As Harris maintains, "[f]igures work relentlessly in
concert with one another" (16).

Returning to prosopopoeia, we find that rhetoricians often include
examples like "[w]isdom crieth at the gate. […] Unto you, O men, I
call, and my voice is to the sons of men" (Proverbs 8:3-4; see Ruffin
393). This is personification. The abstract concept, wisdom, is given
human attributes, including speech. But it is also prosopopoeia,
because the author speaks the words of that abstraction. Certain
figures travel together (Harris 26). Antimetabole, mesodiplosis, and
parison—as above—are very frequent companions. So are
personification and prosopopoeia (as well as anthropomorphism and
prosopopoeia). For the purposes of this article, however, I focus on
examples of prosopopoeia in isolation. This excursus is primarily for
clarification, to distinguish prosopopoeia from figures with which it
is frequently enmeshed.

The most important aspect of prosopopoeia is that the rhetor does not just *attribute* human characteristics to absent people, objects, or abstractions; the rhetor *becomes* the absent person, object, or abstraction, giving it voice. Henry Peachum adds a particularly crucial concept to the figure, defining it as

> the fayning of a person, that is, when to a thing sencelesse and dumbe wee fayne a fit person, or attribute a person to a commonwealth or multitude […] the Orator by this figure maketh the common welth to speake. ([113])

The notion of speaking for a multitude, of speaking in a role, representing some commonwealth, is one of the central ways prosopopoeia functions. If we look back at Demetrius's example from Plato, for instance, we notice that Socrates is not giving voice to a single fallen warrior, but speaking on behalf of all the fallen soldiers of Athens from that conflict (pts.265–266).

When social media rhetors put on an image filter, everything they say from their digital pulpit is now "spoken" by the commonwealth that image filter designates; in our case, the commonwealth of the 2015 Canadian federal voters. What Peachum and other ancient figurists could not have anticipated is the reciprocal effect of a vast chorus of orators speaking in unison as a commonwealth.

A CANADIAN CHORUS OF 160,000 I-WILL-VOTE IMAGE FILTER USERS ON SOCIAL MEDIA

Over 160,000 Canadian federal voters spoke in the commonwealth chorus, having incorporated the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter over their social media profile picture on Facebook and/or Twitter

(Stanley).[2] With these users exhibiting this political filter as their virtual identity, the visual content and statements posted to social media newsfeeds prior to, on, and after the day of the election by these individuals discussed what their avatar promoted: voting in the Canadian election. Even a cute-cat video or fun pictures of friends and family came not just from Barbara or John, Chantal or Chloé, but from a representative of the commonwealth of Canadian voters. Even the cat videos were now explicitly part of a Canadian culture that the poster pledged to calibrate on October 19. They made this pledge to all their friends, friends of friends, or the public (in concentric groupings, depending on privacy settings). But they also made the pledge to themselves. Robert Cialdini proposes that commitment strategies "get us to take some action or make some statement that will trap us into later compliance through consistency pressures" (*Influence* 75). These commitment and consistency pressures are observable within the social media environment for those who use commonwealth-style image filters. Once the I-will-vote prosopopoeia image filter is applied to a profile picture and becomes a defining aspect of a person's virtual identifiable avatar, the individual is expected to demonstrate and represent the political statement.

METHODOLOGY

I examined the social media postings of 30 Twitter users who included the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter and #votenation hashtag. (See 1 in Appendix). I assessed the selected users' broader social media timeline and recorded the number of political statements and/or images tweeted the day before the 2015 Canadian federal election, the day of the election, and the day after the

election (i.e., October 18-20, 2015). I recorded whether image filter users included a voting statement, displayed a voting selfie after voting, and/or used voting-community hashtags. Twitter suffers from selection bias, in that it skews towards college-educated, affluent (over $50,000 household income), city-dwellers under 50 years old (Duggan et al.; Ruest and Milligan). It is not a random sample of Canadian society, but a self-selecting portion of it—as with many non-digital archival collections (Ruest and Milligan). But Twitter can provide important insight into the thoughts, behaviours, and activities of everyday people, those that are not generally preserved (Ruest and Milligan). To identify the 30 image filter users, I hydrated a data set of #elxn42 tweets (Ruest) and manually searched for the #votenation hashtag and posted "I will vote Oct 19" image filter. I also manually scraped Google and Twitter content posted from September 28, 2015, the day the image filter was released, to October 20, 2015, the day after the Canadian federal election.

A limitation with the Twitter platform is that profile images are not saved. Once the profile picture with the image filter is changed, it is not possible to revisit the earlier image. Thus, for this study, in addition to users posting the image filter over their profile picture, the selected users also tweeted the I-will-vote profile picture on their newsfeed, which is searchable. Another limitation of my project is its sample size, where 30 Twitter users is a small representation of the over 160,000 social media users who incorporated the "I will Vote Oct 19" image filter on their profile picture, but appropriately thick descriptions would not have been possible with a larger sample.

MOVING FROM "I-WILL-VOTE" TO "I-VOTED"

Modal verbs, such as "may," "could", and "will," often express ideas of "possibility, constraint, and desire" ("Modal, adj. 1 and n. 1"). The phrase, "I may vote" has low modality, as the certainty of the action is inconclusive, whereas the phrase "I will vote" is highly modal, as it asserts a promise to act. Twitter users exhibiting the highly modal "I will vote Oct 19" political image filter statement as their virtual identity, perhaps unsurprisingly, posted many statements and visuals to Twitter on and around election day, to discuss what their avatar promoted, voting in the Canadian federal election (1). From my population, all 30 rhetors incorporated an election-related hashtag, 23 included a statement indicating that they voted, 10 included a voting selfie, and 21 included an election-related follow-up statement and/or image gesturing to the resulting change in government (1). In assessing the political statements and/or political images from users' tweets during October 18 to October 20, 2015, of the 30 I-will-vote image filter users, 26 posted one or more political tweets while 4 of these users had no tweets during this timeframe. Of the 26 users who posted political tweets, 20 posted more political tweets than non-political tweets, 3 had an equal number of political and non-political tweets, and 3 had fewer political tweets than non-political tweets (1).

Typical of the political tweets, Adam Growe @adamgrowe stated on the day of the election, "I'm heading to the polls and hope for long lineups! #votenation #elxn42 #canadavotes" ("@AdamGrowe on Twitter: I'm Heading to the Polls") (Figure 1), while Jordan Roca @jroc23 commented, "I will vote on Oct 19 for Justin Trudeau as evident by my social avatar #canadavotes #votenation" ("@JRoc23 on Twitter: I Will Vote On October 19th") (Figure 2).

I'm heading to the polls and hope for long lineups!
#VoteNation #Elxn42 #CanadaVotes

4:31 PM · Oct 19, 2015 · Hootsuite

Figure 1: Twitter picture of Adam Growe @adamgrowe with I–will–vote image filter.

I Will Vote On October 19th, For Justin Trudeau, as evident by my social avatar.
#CanadaVotes #VoteNation

2:39 PM · Oct 19, 2015 · Twitter Web Client

Figure 2: Twitter picture of Jordan Roca @jroc23 with I-will-vote image filter.

Laurie McNeill and John David Zuern suggest, "our exposure to the constant, expectant gaze of prospective audiences creates a rhetorical situation that pressures us to take on, simultaneously and perpetually, the roles of curator, dramaturge, and censor of our moment-to-moment performances of selfhood within our online networks" (xxvi). The pressure of audience expectations in the performance of selfhood shows "that a choice made actively—one that's spoken out loud or written down or otherwise made explicit—is considerably more likely to direct someone's future conduct than the same choice left unspoken" (Cialdini, "Harnessing" 76–77). By putting on the prosopopoeia mask of the image filter, social media users rhetorically *become* a representative of the commonwealth of Canadian federal voters, and, as Burke tells us, when we put on a role, the role puts on us (*Philosophy* 267–68). In talking about assuming a role, he says that becoming a representative of a commonwealth is a kind of

> translation into a different medium of communication, a way of amplifying a statement so that it carries better to a large or distant audience. Hence, the persuasive identifications of Rhetoric, in being so directly designed for *use*, involve us in a special problem of *consciousness*. (Burke, *Rhetoric* 36)

Burke is not invoking prosopopoeia explicitly here, but the ethotic situation he describes is of a piece, with adopting an image filter—putting on a rhetorical mask in order to present oneself as a particular sort of person—and he notes that it affects the mask-wearer's consciousness. Burke's talk of a "different medium of communication" effectively means a change of terministic screens (*Language* 45), taking on a new vocabulary consistent with the

adopted role, but it surely applies at least as fully to the different medium of visual communication that the image filters manifest.

My extension to social media of Burke's role-adoption ideas are supported with a study by Joel Penney, which shows that social media users who took the symbolic step of replacing their Facebook profile picture with a red equal sign, symbolizing the fight for marriage equality, were more strongly identified with the movement, and "may be more likely to go further in their participation" in future activism (62). My extension also aligns with a study by Paolo Gerbaudo, which found that social media users who replaced their profile pictures with protest avatars, "experience[d] a collective fusion in an online crowd" (916), with participants presenting a highly selective collective identity, a version of themselves that they wanted their targeted audience to find out about (920). As Cialdini puts it, "most people, once they take a stand or go on record in favour of a position, prefer to stick to it" and "even a small, seemingly trivial commitment can have a powerful effect on future actions" ("Harnessing" 76).

I contend, however, that image filters are even greater expressions of identification, and greater commitment motivators, than Penney's equal signs or Gerbaudo's protest avatars. "Wearing" one on a personal image presents a person amalgamated with a cause more fully than moves of replacement or substitution can. Prosopopoeia is a *becoming*. Replacement by an object or symbol is metonymic, an *association*. Substitution by an avatar is an effacement of the rhetor. In our case, the I-will-vote image filter expresses an explicit commitment, the public formation of a voting plan, and we know voting plans increase voter turnout by up to 9.1 percentage points (Nickerson and Rogers 195).

By wearing the words "I will vote Oct 19" as a frame over their personal image every day while communicating within their social network, the rhetor enters an "imposed system" that "calls for specific kinds of personal recitations" (Smith and Watson, *Getting a Life* 10). Cialdini suggests that "whenever one takes a stand that is visible to others, there arises a drive to maintain that stand in order to *look* like a consistent person" (*Influence* 88). By wearing the pledge to vote, the individual is likely to become a more engaged democratic citizen in a "variety of other circumstances where his compliance may also be desired, and he is likely to continue his public spirited behaviour for as long as his new self-image holds" (Cialdini, *Influence* 101). This publicly spirited behaviour is evident in the Twitter postings of both Adam Growe and Jordan Roca (Figures 1 & 2). On the day of the election, for instance, Growe posted 23 vote related Twitter messages, 8 of which were humourous political memes ("@AdamGrowe on Twitter"). And the day after the election, Growe posted a new picture with a modification to the I–will–vote image filter, one that interpolated a phrase about his continued engagement, stating, "I will talk about the vote Oct. 20" ("@AdamGrowe on Twitter: #DayAfterVoteNation") (Figure 3).

#DayAfterVoteNation

7:40 AM · Oct 20, 2015 · Hootsuite

Figure 3: Twitter picture of Adam Growe @adamgrowe with "I will talk about the vote Oct. 20" filter.

Roca remained similarly engaged. On the day of the election, Roca posted 55 political tweets, one being, "I did not see a majority Liberal government coming. Here we are Canada & Prime Minister Trudeau @macleansmag" ("@JRoc23 on Twitter: I Did Not See a Majority Liberal Government Coming"). In addition to tweeting 'at' *Maclean's Magazine* @macleansmag, which shows his level of civic engagement, Roca also incorporated a hyperlink to the breaking news announcement from *Maclean's* on the election of a Liberal majority government. Two and a half weeks after the election, on November 4, 2015, Roca continued to discuss election-related material with the comment, "Now that my boy Justin Trudeau is the Prime Minister designate of Canada, I may have to relax on informally referring to him as 'my boy'" ("@JRoc23 on Twitter: Now That My Boy").

These politically engaged personal statements are examples of how "in these and other social situations people assume positions as actors within known scripts" (Smith and Watson, *Getting a Life* 11). The practices that are attached to Growe and Roca by voluntarily wearing the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter on their profile picture "function as one form of 'discipline'" (Smith and Watson, *Getting a Life* 12). A study by Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer, testing the effects of priming intrinsic motives and applying varying degrees of extrinsic pressure on voters, found that social pressure is profoundly important as an inducement to political participation (33). Growe and Roca, through prosopopoeia, with its attendant commitment and consistency pressures, are disciplined into becoming stronger advocates for voting.

THE "*HAVING-BEEN-THERE*" VOTING SELFIE

In recognition of their commitment to vote and pressure to appear consistent and meet audience expectations, I-will-vote image filter users proved to their social media audiences that they upheld their pledge to vote and further outwardly demonstrated ethos framed by the act of prosopopoeia. Burke suggests that rhetors "seek to display the appropriate 'signs' of character needed to earn the audience's good will" (*Rhetoric* 55–56). In addition to filter users linguistically expressing their voting action, I-will-vote image filter users substantiated their avatar's claim visually by posting a voting selfie. Barthes tells us that "the signification of the image is undoubtedly intentional" (*Image, Music, Text* 152) and that is nowhere more apparent than in the endemically look-at-me ethos of social media

selfies. In the digital sphere, "the selfie is far more effective as relay than text ever could be, allowing others to see and experience the moment, the thought, and the space of the experience simultaneously, that is, as they too are having their own experiences" (Mottahedeh 82). Dan Speerin @danspeerin captioned his voting selfie, "No pressure, it's just your civic duty and the fate of a nation. So, no biggie. #canadavotes #votenation #elxn42" (Speerin) (Figure 4). Jessica Maria @AFabulousState said on her voting selfie, "Get out and have your say for your #Canada! #elxn42 #votecanada #votenation #federalelection #cdnpoli #nlpoli #yyt" (Maria) (Figure 5), while Ken Seto @kenseto on his voting selfie said, "It only took me 20 mins to vote for change and to restore dignity to Canada. Please vote! #only20minutes #votenation" (Seto) (Figure 6).

No pressure, it's just your civic duty and the fate of a nation. So, no biggie. #CanadaVotes #votenation #elxn42

2:19 PM · Oct 19, 2015 · Twitter Web Client

Figure 4: Twitter voting selfie of Dan Speerin @danspeerin.

Get out and have your say for your #Canada! #elxn42
#votecanada #votenation #federalelection #cdnpoli
#nlpoli #yyt

Figure 5: Twitter voting selfie of Jessica Maria @AFabulousState.

It only took me 20 mins to vote for change and to restore
dignity to Canada. Please vote! #only20minutes
#votenation

Figure 6: Twitter voting selfie of Ken Seto @kenseto.

By posting voting selfies, Speerin, Maria, and Seto enact what Barthes calls a "biographeme" (*Camera Lucida* 30) to inscribe themselves into a national event (McNeill 155) and visually record that they cast a ballot. Cialdini argues that individuals feel particularly "obligated to live up to their commitments [when] those commitments were active, public, and voluntary" ("Harnessing" 76). And in virtual environments, David Graxian notes that it is important to present oneself as authentic in conforming to an idealized representation of reality (qtd. in Smith and Watson, "Virtually Me" 75). In this way, Speerin, Maria, and Seto demonstrated that they have met their commitment to vote and proved themselves to be authentic by visually displaying an image, a piece of public evidence, that meets "a set of expectations regarding how such a thing ought to look, sound, and feel" (Smith and Watson, "Virtually Me" 75). They are living up to their acts of prosopopoeia. Like Burke, Barthes is also concerned with consciousness, and states that "[t]he type of consciousness the photograph involves is indeed truly unprecedented, since it establishes not a consciousness of the *being-there* of the thing (which any copy could provoke) but an awareness of its *having-been-there*" (*Image, Music, Text* 159). The *having-been-there* image that the voting selfie depicts when shared with social media audiences provides greater salience of authenticity and truthfulness than simple text could ever produce. It is with no surprise then, in maintaining their consistent behaviour in the eyes of their audience, the completion of the I-will-vote image filter users' commitment to vote would be publicly displayed with a voting selfie.

THE PULL OF IDENTIFICATION WITH VOTING HASHTAGS

In addition to employing voting selfies to publicly display their civic engagement, the I–will–vote image filter users also incorporated hashtags specific to the 2015 Canadian federal election on posts and images such as #votenation, #elxn42, #cdnpoli, and #canadavotes. According to Twitter Canada, there were over six million election-related tweets sent over the two-and-a-half month period leading up to the election (Ladurantaye) with #cdnpoli as the most mentioned "made in Canada" hashtag, while #elxn42 was listed as the third most mentioned (Doyle). The official hashtag of the 2015 Canadian federal election, #elxn42, received 3,685,885 Twitter mentions (Ruest and Milligan) throughout the campaign, compared to only 715,000+ mentions of #elxn41 during the 2011 Canadian federal election campaign ("What Role Did Social Media Play in #ELXN42?"). Hashtags ostensibly are methods of generating archives, which users can sift through for relevant postings, links, videos, and so on. But they also build communities, becoming symbols of engagement. Alice R. Daer, Rebecca F. Hoffman, and Seth Goodman argue that metacommunicative hashtags are "communicative genres" in that "they are dynamic, interactive functions of designed software being appropriated by users for tacit, recurring purposes of meaning-making within and across technology" (14). As acts of identification and consubstantiality, hashtags are not as salient as image filters, but they create a "collective sensorial solidarity online" (Mottahedeh 17), which provides "social validation […] through communicating with others and confirmation that personal beliefs fit with social norms"

(McNeill 155–56). Burke's remarks on identification reads like a recipe for image filters and hashtags:

> A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. […] In being identified with B, A is 'substantially one' with a person other than himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he is both joined and separate at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (*Rhetoric* 20–21)

The profile picture testifies to the user's distinct substance, the image filter to her consubstantiality with other adopters of that filter. The user's specific tweet (as well as other features) testifies to a distinct substance; the hashtag to consubstantiality.

Hashtags are not examples of prosopopoeia. They work quite differently. Tweets are in a sense apostrophe, since even the most active Twitter user encounters tweets asynchronously (the addressees are not "there" when the tweet is posted). But hashtags allow the addressees to call up tweets in a group. The hashtags are tickets that serve to redeem or de-apostrophize the tweets. So, hashtag users do not speak primarily as *representatives* of a community. They speak as *participants* in a community. They effect identification from the other direction. Ethotically, they work more from the bottom up (just another voice *in* the community) than from the top down (a voice *for* the community). Hashtags and voting selfies are concrete examples where the image filter *acting* on the social media user can be observed, including themselves within the greater #votenation community.

As the I-will-vote rhetors encounter others with the same filter and are united through hashtags, they engage with the accepted social

norm of their commonwealth. By entering into the I–will–vote
movement, they "receive a psychological benefit from expressing
identity with the group or individual" (Jankowski 2). They consider
themselves as embedded within the online collective; that is, they are
part of a group of voters speaking as a homogenous "we" (Smith and
Watson, "Virtually Me" 84) and assimilate within an environment of
over 160,000 similar peers. They are both participating in and
representing online commonwealths.

MOBILIZING FRIENDS TO VOTE

To this point I have discussed how an individual who employs the I–
will–vote image filter increasingly becomes a publicly spirited
citizen. However, Evgeny Morozov views this type of digital
activism as "slacktivism" ("The Brave New World of Slacktivism"),
suggesting that Twitter and Facebook might be doing more harm
than good (Marichal 109). For Morozov, slacktivism is described as
"feel good but useless Internet activism" ("Iran"). However, research
has found that online participation does not damage civic
engagement offline (Christensen; Penney 55), but may be doing
more good than Morozov expects, by "extending the life of various
social movements" (Hackman). As we have seen, putting on a mask
has not just social implications (others will vote) but has personal
implications as well (increased likelihood of voting, and increased
civic behaviour). With the individual becoming increasingly
engaged in the voting process through wearing the I–will–vote
prosopopoeia on their profile picture, the individual's sharing of
information to their social network can also influence the family and
friends who view this commitment. Research shows that "online
political mobilization works" (Bond et al. 297) and close friends

exert about four times more influence on mobilizing voters (Bond et al. 298). In Cialdini's phrasing, "social creatures that they are, human beings rely heavily on the people around them for cues on how to think, feel, and act" ("Harnessing" 75), offering a kind of social–science moral to Burke's famous parlour allegory, where without having been there from the beginning, one can listen in on an argument to catch the tenor and join in the conversation (*Philosophy* 94–95).

Those who incorporate the I-will-vote image filter over their profile pictures are repeatedly communicating that linguistic and image-based message with people within their social network when they post, like, comment, or retweet. And although people often think of *prescriptive* norms as being the way to influence others, telling an individual what they should do, research shows that *descriptive* norms, observing what people *actually* do, is much more effective in mobilizing a community (Tannenbaum). Imagine a social-media image filter that said, "Get out and vote on Oct 19," or simply "Vote on Oct 19!" Such a filter might have some positive effects, dependent on pre-existing conditions of identification and ethos, but it could certainly have negative effects as well, and definitely lacks the norms-through-osmosis persuasion of "I will vote on Oct 19."

Descriptive norms describe the way things are and what should be done, but most people respond more favourably to what others actually do (Tannenbaum). The persuasion of observing what others are doing is extremely effective when it comes from peers (Cialdini, "Harnessing" 75). The simple action of posting a profile picture with the statement, "I will vote Oct 19" has the potential to mobilize others to vote, as people respond particularly strongly to descriptive

norms set by the people we care about most, which, presumably, includes the people we are linked to on social media (Tannenbaum). Publicly acknowledging a pledge to vote along with thousands of other people who are also publicly displaying their promise makes the attitude on the issue of voting clearly obvious. It is likely then that if respected friends have made a pledge to vote, others will observe this to be socially normal and do the same. Kylie Cardell and Emma Maguire suggest that "the personal voice, the authentic perspective, is a highly valued commodity, and digital contexts make this even more apparent" (219).

CONCLUSION

The visual prosopopoeia of the "I will vote Oct 19" image filter proves that Rick Mercer is right. Voting is contagious. Perhaps millennials are especially susceptible, a powerful political force that can be mobilized, impacting the outcome of elections (Blevis and Coletto). They are avid social media users and they made a difference in 2015. The 18.3 per cent youth-voter increase, along with the change of government in the 2015 Canadian federal election, shows that (Elections Canada, *Voter Turnout by Age Group*). Over 70,000 of those who voted in 2015 were students who registered and cast their ballot in the advance polls at university and college campuses across the country (Elections Canada, *Voting at Select Campuses, Friendship Centres and Community Centres*). As many factors influence voter engagement in elections, it is not possible to unequivocally confirm that the I-will-vote image filter and the #votenation initiative directly contributed to the greater turnout in the 2015 Canadian federal election, but given the circumstantial data and the supporting theories, I suggest that the psychological effect

from the over 160,000 people who voluntarily displayed the I–will–vote image filter prosopopoeia on profile pictures and the incorporation of #votenation hashtags in social media posts influenced this growth. Once an individual pledges to vote and assumes this visual identity online, the individual is likely to be a "publicly spirited citizen in a variety of other circumstances" (Cialdini, *Influence* 101). Voluntarily placing the I–will–vote image filter onto a profile picture could have trapped users into "later compliance through consistency pressures" (Cialdini, *Influence* 75). Once the image filter was applied, the user was compelled to fulfill what the utterance stated and vote in the federal election on October 19, 2015, as reflected in the posts, voting selfies, and hashtags, before, on, and after the day of the election. Linguistically campaigning on the importance of voting upholds their visually stated conviction and conforms to social expectations of an individual who is wearing the I–will–vote message as their avatar. In addition to the image filter mobilizing those who pledged to vote, the principle of social proof suggests that family and friends who viewed this I–will–vote image filter were also more likely to vote to conform to the social norm, for like-minded people tend to want to appear similar to their peers. Further, through identification, individuals who wanted to include themselves as part of the collective movement incorporated focused hashtags that represented the election, such as #votenation, #cdnpoli, #canadavotes, and #elxn42. All these combined factors had an effect on the individual's identity once the I–will–vote image filter was incorporated onto their profile picture. Thus, the I–will–vote image filter user became more civically engaged and mobilized others as the democratic activist post appeared alongside the "records of meals eaten, photos taken, and milestones reached" (McNeill and Zuern xii). As we

create and "curate" our lives online, and as the I-will-vote image filter is removed and replaced with another profile picture or subsequent visual political statements, it becomes obvious how unique the social online medium is in sculpting our prosopopoeia (face/person) in real time. In this instance of catching the contagious I-will-vote democratic identity, it contributed to an enhancement of civic engagement within ourselves and within our society, both online and offline on election day 2015.

"The *formation* of role," Burke tells us, "involves, in its working out, a *transformation* of role" (*Philosophy* 33). Prosopopoeia reflects this kind of transformation broadly in rhetoric, but the I-will-vote image filter prosopopoeia of the 2015 Canadian federal election demonstrates its moral or civic dimensions in a particularly striking way; it involves how "one would symbolically form a role by becoming 'most thoroughly and efficiently himself'" (Burke, *Philosophy* 33).

NOTES

[1] See also The Samara Centre for Democracy, "Message Not Delivered: The Myth of Apathetic Youth and the Importance of Contact in Political Participation" (Anthony et al.).

[2] A total of 161,963 users downloaded the Vote Nation "I will vote Oct 19" image filter. The English language downloads totaled 159,515. The French language downloads totaled 2,448 (Stanley).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Table 1: Select "I will vote Oct 19" Image Filter Users' Public Twitter Posts During The 2015 Canadian Federal Election

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Jordan Roca @jroc23, Toronto, ON; 70 political tweets and 84 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 14:39, image filter and statement, "I Will Vote On October 19th, For Justin Trudeau, as evident by my social avatar. #CanadaVotes #VoteNation" 2015-10-19, 15:23, statement, "While I am voting for Justin Trudeau, I'm pretty sure my actual 1 Physical Vote is not worth as much as my Tweets."	2015-10-19, 19:37, voting selfie and statement, "The classic unflattering view from the Front Camera, #IVoted #VotingSelfie. Yes, this was my version of the Niqab." 2015-10-19, 19:40, statement, "Apparently, I took the #VotingSelfie way too literally—As I took it when casting my ballot, and not posing in front of an Election Sign."	2015-10-19, 22:47, reply to @MacleansMag and statement, "I did not see a Majority Liberal Government coming. Here we are, Canada, & Prime Minister Trudeau. V/ @MacleansMag" 2015-11-04, 10:30, statement, "Now that my boy, Justin Trudeau is the Prime Minister-Designate of Canada, I may have to relax on informally referring to him as 'My Boy.'"
Adam Growe @AdamGrowe, Toronto, ON; 38 political tweets and 10 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 19:02, image filter and statement, "Not that any election should be different, but this one-c'mon! You gotta VOTE! #VoteNation #elxn42 #CanadaVotes"	2015-10-19, 16:31, image filter and statement, "I'm heading to the polls and hope for long lineups! #VoteNation #Elxn42 #CanadaVotes."	2015-10-20, 7:40, modified image filter, "I will talk about the vote Oct. 20." Statement, "#DayAfterVoteNation."
Dan Speerin @danspeerin, Toronto, ON; 115 political tweets and 16 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 13:29, image filter and statement, "Have you voted yet? #CanadaVotes #elxn42 #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, 14:19, voting selfie and statement, "No pressure, it's just your civic duty and the fate of a nation. So, no biggie. #CanadaVotes #votenation #elxn42"	2015-10-19, 22:12, statement, "Justin Trudeau is a GenXer but what's more Millennial than having to move back into the place you grew up? #elxn42 #CanadaVotes"
Jessica Maria @AFabulousState, St. John's, NF; 7 political tweets and 4 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 12:30, image filter and statement, "Tomorrow I'm voting for #NoMoreStolenSisters #WomensRights & SO MANY OTHER THINGS! Why are you voting? #canadavotes"	2015-10-19, 15:26, statement, "Hi ho! Hi ho! It's off to vote I go! #elxn42 #votenation #Cdnpoli #CanadaVotes" 2015-10-19, 16:46, voting selfie and statement, "Get out and have your say for your #Canada! #elxn42 #votecanada #votenation #federalelection #cdnpoli #nlpoli #yyt"	2015-10-19, 22:34, statement, "Nice hair, tho!" 2015-10-20, 00:12, statement, "May Sophie Grégoire be our Michelle Obama."

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Ken Seto @kenseto, Toronto, ON; 3 political tweets and 1 non-political tweet October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-30, 14:30, image filter and statement, "I will vote on October 19th. Go to http:/votenation.ca to make your 'I Will Vote' profile pic. #VoteNation #elxn42"	2015-10-11, 15:22, voting selfie and statement, "It only took me 20 mins to vote for change and to restore dignity to Canada. Please vote! #only20minutes #votenation"	2015-10-20, 6:35, Canada flag image and statement, "Thank you Canada! You did it! I'm very proud to be a Canadian this morning. #elxn42 #RealChange"
Dulce Rosales @dulceisnormal, Vancouver, BC; 16 political tweets and 8 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-29, 9:15, image filter and statement, "We've got voices, let's take the time and use them. elections.bc.ca #VoteNation #cdnpoli"	2015-10-10, 16:31, voting selfie with "Use Your Voice" text on image. Statement, "Why wait til the 19th? I just voted! Done and done."	2015-10-19, 22:04, statement, "I am so happy of all the people who turned out and voted today. YOU ARE ALL AMAZING. #elxn42 #votenation."
Johanna Hatt @york_cottage, Toronto, ON; 11 political tweets and 3 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-28, 17:58, image filter and statement, "If I can do it while attending University in Virginia, you have no excuse. #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, statement, "I did it all the way from Virginia. Let your voice be heard. Take an hour out of your day and vote. #CANPoli #Elxn42 #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, 22:37, statement, "Way to go Canada. You just elected a camp counselor as our new leader. #Seriously #YouHadOneJob #cdnpoli #elxn42" 2015-10-19, 23:41, statement, "So will Justin get his old room back at 24 Sussex Drive? #canpoli #Elxn42"
Ann Tran Fazzalari @annetranfazz, Toronto, ON; 2 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 9:10, image filter and statement, "We live in a great nation! Vote on Oct 19th and go to votenation.ca to make your own profile pic #VoteNation"	No	2015-10-20, 7:19, image of autumn leaves changing colour. Statement, "A new day…"
Brittany Burek @beeburek, Toronto, ON; 0 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-07, 12:56, image filter and statement, "thumbs up, let's do this 18-25s. #votenation #exln42 #cdnpoli"	No	No
Caleb Harder @cjaharder, Vancouver, BC; 44 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, image filter and statement, "Will you be voting on October 19th? I know I will! First time voter and I'm proud to exercise my democratic right!"	2015-10-19, 20:49, voting selfie and statement, "I am so happy to have voted for the first time! #elxn42 #VoteNation"	2015-10-20, image of Trudeau in crowds. Statement, "Congratulations @JustinTrudeau on becoming the next Prime Minister of Canada! #RealChange."

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Heather Thomas @H3Connections, Fort McMurray, AB; 6 political tweets and 4 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 16:12, image filter and statement "Max & I are exercising our right to vote tomorrow. Are you? #vote #votenation #DemocracyInAction #canada #ymm"	2015-10-19, 14:26, voting selfie of hedgehog and statement, "Max & I voted today. Make sure you do the same. #elxn42 #cdnpoli #canadavotes #maxexplores #voting #votenation #ymm"	2015-10-19, 22:07, statement, "That time we took the #selfie with #justintrudeau and #kyleharrietha in Fort McMurray. Fantastic… instagram.com/p/9CsO2TyYoF/"
Ken Franczek @KenFranczek, Edmonton, AB; 1 political tweet and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 00:10, image filter and statement, "I Will Vote October 19th #VoteNation #Canada @CityofEdmonton #Yeg #ETown #Edmonton"	No	No
Jahanzeb Khan @Jahanzebca, Hamilton, ON; 3 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 10:09, image filter and statement, "I will vote on Oct 19th. Will you? Go to votenation.ca to make your 'I Will Vote' profile pic. #VoteNation votenation.ca/810798f7-616b-44b0-a856-127906b0e6f7 #HamOnt"	2015-10-19, 11:11, statement, "Go Vote Today and make your own story! cbc.ca/player/Embedded-Only/Politics/ID/2677248507/ #canadavotes #Canada #HamOnt #Conservatives #NDP #Liberals #election2015"	2015-10-24, 23:37, image of PM Trudeau at desk. Statement, "Our PM @JustinTrudeau on @UN Day 4"more peaceful world" liberal.ca/statement-by-prime-minister-designate-justin-trudeau-on-united-nations-day/ #Liberals #HamOnt #UNBlue #UN70"
Ben Hayward @bengrh, Edmonton, AB; 12 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-17, 5:23, image filter and statement, "The most exciting day in four years is almost here! Get your democracy on! #votenation #cndpoli @rickmercer"	2015-10-19, 9:02, statement, "Dear Canada, today is a really important day. Stand up for what you believe in and help make this country better. #VOTE #timeforchange"	No
Melissa of Voth Photo @VothPhoto, Kelowna, BC; 2 political tweets and 1 non-political tweet October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-09, 11:50, image filter and statement, "#iwillvoteoct19 #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, 18:55, statement, "Going to go #VOTE now! I hope a) registration is ok b) my ballot isn't pre-marked c) the line isn't long & d) I help my country be better!"	2015-10-20, 00:04, link to Instagram image "Make Way For The New." instagram.com/p/9C5t0szcBV/ Statement, "#canadaspeaks #newgovernment #hoorayfortoday #makewayforthenew #timeforachange"

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Timothy Burke @Timmy0707, Burlington, ON; 8 political tweets and 5 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 7:07, image filter and statement, "Please @Canada #VOTENATION #DEATVote #UnifoVotes #elxn42 #cdnpoli #StopHarper #StevieHarper #Ready4Change"	2015-10-19, 19:34, image of Unifor Red 'Want to DEFEAT the HARPER Conservatives' Vote?' Statement, "Want to DEFEAT the @peeharper @CPC_HQ? Vote! #UniforVotes #TVoted #StopHarper #StopC51 #Ready4Change"	2015-10-28, 00:57, statement, "Congratulations @JustDemeff on winning in our new riding of ONB & congratulations to @JustinTrudeau & @liberal_party #RealChange #UniforVotes"
[Latina] @MyFamilyStuff, Canada; 2 political tweets and 6 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 11:41, image filter and statement, "Today's the day. Remember to vote because every vote is so important. #votenation #vote #canadavotes #vote"	2015-10-19, 20:17, image of news program with LIB at 32. Statement, "Interesting stuff happening in Atlantic Canada. #canadavotes #votenation #vote #elxntonight2015"	No
Radical Johnny Robertson @JRobertsonEieb, Etobicoke, ON; 8 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 00:54, image filter and statement, "It's officially the day!! #VoteNation @jdelvudio all day! #cdnpoli #elexn42 #Etobicoke #NDP4Etobicoke"	2015-10-19, 20:13, voting selfie and statement, "I voted! #VoteNation #Vote4Change #NDP4Etobicoke"	2015-10-28, 9:23, statement, "I'm so happy to have volunteered for the amazing @tjdavnolio and the #NDP"
Nessa Kear @janarasasmore, geographic location not specified; 4 political tweets and 1 non-political tweet October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-19, 15:58, statement, "The Rick Mercer Report on Instagram liked my #votenation picture and I'm fangirling SO HARD #sombailaSajadaFRperson #testilforcorne"	2015-10-19, 19:44, statement, "Drove a friend to vote today and he bought me Tim Hortons in return. If that's not Canadian, I don't know what is #VoteNation"	No
Terri Lamb @terri1amb, Regina, SK; 1 political tweet and 2 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
26-09-2015, 23:50, image filter and statement, "I will vote on October 19. Will you? Go to votenation.ca make your 'I Will Vote' profile pic. #VoteNation @rickmercer"	2015-10-19, 15:47, image of holding voting card while on sidewalk. Statement, "We're doing this right now! #vote #cenpoli #toneyright #letovote @johanvanvanlamb #Thankful4WeCanVote"	2015-10-19, 12:52, statement, "Let's vote Canada! #vote #election2015 #cenpoli"
Katrina B. @Kajakhops, Ottawa ON; 0 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-11, 13:31, image filter and statement, "I will vote on October 19th. Will you? Go to votenation.ca to make your 'I Will Vote' profile pic. #VoteNation"	No	No

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Ben Keast @coach_keast, Vancouver, BC; 1 political tweet and 1 non-political tweet October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-07, 15:24, image filter and statement, "October 19, 2015 #VoteNation #OhCanada"	2015-10-19, 11:30, statement, "Exercise your right #VoteNation #OhCanada"	No
Glenda Ann Robertson @gar5061, Montréal, QC; 5 political tweets and 5 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-29, 00:47, image filter and statement, "Replying to @rickmercer @rickmercer"	2015-10-19, 17:19, image of voting sign. Statement, "I did it! Did you? #RealChange #elxn42 #GetOffYerArseAndVote"	2015-10-19, 22:28, image of Trudeau's face on Jose Bautista bat flip. Statement, "@markcritch @JustinTrudeau @alanthomasdoyle @allanhawco Have you seen the Trudeau bat flip? #majority"
Sarah C M @SarahCcoutureMc, Toronto, ON; 0 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-29, 17:34, image filter and statement, "I will Vote Oct. 19th. Let's vote together! Make the pledge and announce it via: votenation.ca #VoteNation"	No	No
Nikkivee @nikkivee2, The Prairies, Canada; 4 political tweets and 4 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-09-28, 22:08, "Replying to @rickmercer @rickmercer Create an "I Will Vote" profile pic @votenation.ca Voting is contagious. #cdnpoli #elxn42"	2015-10-19, 21:18, Link to Instagram image of an "I Voted" sign with a red Canadian Maple Leaf instagram.com/p/9CmIX4k_uS/. Statement, "muchmusic's"	2015-10-19, 22:28, Image of Trudeau and money with the words, "Change, because that's all you'll have when I'm done...." Statement, "#elxn2015 Welp....."
BrandonAmyot @BrandonAmyot, geographic location not specified; 4 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-13, 20:48, image filter and statement, "In '11, 1.8M ppl. 18-24 didnt vote. Take the pledge, vote Oct 19. #fe42 #Elxn42 #Elxn2015 #elxn42 #GOTV #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, 19:53, statement, "7 out of 7 ridings reported in Newfoundland-Labrador, Liberals and NDP exclusively. And so it begins. #elxn42 #fe42"	2015-10-20, 1:19, statement, "@pmharper reigned as Leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Gilles Duceppe (Leader, Bloc Québécois) has lost his seat to the NDP. #fe42"
Rahul Mehta @OpportunCity, Mississauga, ON; 52 political tweets and 7 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-01, 23:17, image filter and statement, "Let's do this! For me, you, Canada AND @rickmercer! ROCK THE VOTE OCT 19th, or sooner! votenation.ca #elxn42 #votemob"	2015-10-13, 13:41, voting selfie and statement, "Because, democracy! On Oct 19th, make it count! #votingpride #govote #votenation #elxn42 www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/10/12/govote-advance-polls_n_8279852.html"	2015-10-19, 10:37, statement, "BOOM. LIBERAL MAJORITY. #elxn42"

I-will-vote statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. image filter)	I voted statement / image / hashtag(s) (e.g. voting selfie)	Election follow-up statement / image / hashtag(s)
Robert White @rbrtwhite, Vancouver, BC; 5 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2016-10-16, 22:24, statement, "Getting my hair did in the bro barbershop, when #elxn42 comes up and almost all say it's the first time they're voting. YES! #VoteNation"	2015-10-19, 19:50, voting selfie and statement, "Douglas Park Community Centre in #VanGran, in and out in 6mins! Get your vote on! #ivoted #votenation #elxn42"	2015-10-20, 00:38 statement, "Welcome back, Canada. We missed you. #exln42"
Priscilla Smith @PriscillaSmith7, geographic location not specified; 0 political tweets and 0 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-17, 00:08, image filter and statement, "Votenation! #VoteNation #RickMercerreport @rickmercer"	No	No
Sarah Olmstead @sarahjolmstead, Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory, ON; 10 political tweets and 2 non-political tweets October 18-20, 2015		
2015-10-18, 16:34, image filter and statement, "Go to VoteNation.ca to generate an "I Will Vote" pic & help increase voter turnout on Oct 19th #VoteNation"	No	2015-10-19, 22:24, statement, "A Liberal Majority Government!! What an incredible shift, I'm so excited to see what comes next, Canada #elxn42 #cdnpoli" 2015-10-20, 1:15, link to Chatelaine article, "Ladies in the House (81) #elxn42 #woot. Statement, "Fantastic, a new record number of women elected tonight! #elxn42"

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- Kampherm Table – 6

Symbolic Cures: Scapegoating and the Constabulary Function in the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic

TESS LAIDLAW AND JOHN MOFFATT

ABSTRACT

A disease outbreak as rhetorical exigence calls into being both explicit linguistic responses in the form of statements from public health authorities and media coverage, and symbolic responses that operate only implicitly. An outbreak context is marked by the need to offer, seek, or obtain reassurance or preventative medicine, by way of information, behavioural change, or, as we argue, symbolic cures. We illustrate the operation of Kenneth Burke's constabulary function in addressing public concern, whereby rhetors strategically direct audience focus toward one element of a situation, while drawing notice away from another, in media coverage of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic as a case study. We also illustrate the operation of processes of scapegoating as a tool of constabulary rhetoric in the service of reassurance against the threat of infection. Finally, we examine

ethical conflicts attendant on such symbolic cures via the framework of the *pharmakon/pharmakos* continuum that Jacques Derrida discusses in the context of Plato's critique of the instability of written language.

Keywords: constabulary rhetoric; rhetorical theory and professional practice; risk communication; Kenneth Burke; scapegoating; rhetoric of health and medicine

INTRODUCTION

A disease outbreak is a rhetorical situation of enormous magnitude. Regardless of context, everyone in the audience will share, at a basic level, susceptibility to the disease: the threat of infection with a novel and frightening contaminant, at the level of individuals, communities, and nations. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic began in March, when Mexico reported cases of "respiratory illness" and "influenza-like illness" (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Upon analysis, virus samples were identified as swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Soon two cases were confirmed in California in patients who had had contact with neither each other, nor with swine (Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Investigation Team). By November, more than 482,000 cases had been reported worldwide, with more than 6,000 deaths (World Health Organization).

A pandemic, according to John M. Last, is "an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people" (131). The H1N1 pandemic occurred at a time when warnings of a "much-feared" avian (bird) flu pandemic had been circulating for six years (Butler). Thus, H1N1 appeared when pandemic fears were already high. Because the H1N1 virus was "much less severe than many had

anticipated or were prepared to acknowledge" (Kelly), the labelling of the outbreak with the term "pandemic" eventually became problematic (Kelly). Of interest to us in this study, however, is the media response to the H1N1 outbreak during its early days.

As key conduits to the public for public health information, journalists shape how a given disease outbreak is understood and are a persuasive force in inducing audiences to take protective measures. Analysing media coverage from the initial days (April 24–April 29) of the 2009 H1N1 (swine flu) crisis provides an opportunity to see how communication motivated by the desire to inform and reassure the public can in fact generate frameworks of understanding that deflect the audience's attention away from the pursuit of beneficial health-related practice. The principal hazard we identify is the practice of what Jordynn Jack, following Kenneth Burke, terms "constabulary rhetoric": "The set of rhetorical strategies that political and economic elites use to bolster a deteriorating social order and maintain the status quo while drawing attention away from broader, systemic problems within the social order itself" (Jack 67). Here, we argue that statements on the H1N1 outbreak provided by public health authorities, as mediated by journalists, function as "constabulary rhetoric": that is, communication that can be shown to create the impression of taking dynamic steps to address a public crisis while actually further entrenching practices and attitudes that effectively perpetuate the crisis. More specifically, public-health statements function to portray authoritative action being taken, in the effort to discourage panicked behaviour, but such statements do not address the risk of contagion among Canadians in practical terms. Burke warns that such "constabulary" practice, once it becomes the norm, erodes the agency of both authorities and the public with regard to their capacity to adapt to the actual conditions of the crisis,

generating a state of what he terms "alienation or cultural lag" (Burke
Attitudes 139). This cultural lag results in a stagnation in the
development of effective strategies for managing public awareness
and confidence.

While in the case of a novel disease outbreak one could assume
that society's attention and efforts would converge on the disease
itself, media coverage in the early days of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
illustrated a different reality. A surprising lack of consensus existed as
to the likely severity of the pandemic and the appropriate steps to be
taken in the face of possible infection. One motivation for how these
rhetors responded could lie in what epidemiologist Philip Alcabes
described as the potential for "social disruption" (4). Alcabes argues
that a saturation of pandemic warnings arouses both fear of death and
anxiety over social upheaval. He observes, "To live in civilized society
is to bear a dread that goes beyond the fear of death" (4).

This paper investigates the statements of public health authorities,
understood as delivered through the mediating influence of
journalists in terms of which statements are selected, how statements
are presented (i.e., paraphrased, provided as direct quotes and in
what quantity, whether first-person pronouns are used), and how
authorities are portrayed as acting (or not). Our analysis describes
Burke's concept of the constabulary function of public rhetoric and
details how we see it operating in the context of the H1N1 pandemic.
We understand these discourses as a means of transcendence, in
Burke's sense of the rhetorical process by which language goes
beyond the limits of its "scientistic" sphere (primarily denotative and
minimally connotative) to function in what Burke calls dramatistic
terms (*Language as Symbolic Action* 44-5), as "secular prayer" or the
"coaching of an attitude."

This paper will further explore how the enactment of constabulary rhetoric in public health discourse is often legible in acts of rhetorical scapegoating which, while ostensibly seeking to contain the risk posed by a novel outbreak, may induce an attitude in the public where the threat of disease is displaced by a symbolic Other, and managing the crisis comes to revolve around an implicit cultivation of attitudes with regard to this Other. A scapegoating impulse within health-care messages draws attention to a number of fundamental problems surrounding the rhetorical implications of how this reportage is interpreted. In particular, we examine the risks of ignoring symbolic dimensions of health-care discourse in which the communication comes to be received as itself a rhetorical *pharmakon*, that is, a medicine, drug, or even a poison, in the treatment of social upheaval and anxiety.

To explore the broader cultural dimensions of rhetorical scapegoating, we draw upon Jacques Derrida's exploration of the cultural foundations of the scapegoating reflex to reveal how an awareness of this reflex provides a useful mirror in which society can see itself in the face of crisis. Doing so may help journalists, health authorities, and the public recognize the constant risk that lies in the appeal of narratives that unwittingly enable the constabulary function by privileging symbolic magic bullets over mundane precautions in the policing of pandemic conditions.

DESCRIPTION OF CASE STUDY

In the early days of the H1N1 outbreak, amid the confusion and rising anxiety about the level of threat posed by the disease, significant tension existed between public expectations of action on the part of health authorities and the perception by public audiences of a lack of decisive action. As noted, the portrayal of health

authorities in a given journalistic text (including oral and visual texts) is mediated by the author of each text, with resulting impacts on audience perceptions of the ethos of those authorities, in terms of credibility to speak about the outbreak, ability to control the outbreak, and general competence in managing it. If the statements of officials do not align with the public's perceptions of exigence, the public's perceptions of the competence of those authorities will be affected, as will the likelihood that the public will follow suggested protective measures originating with the authorities.

Case study examples referenced here are taken from a larger study (Laidlaw, *The Rhetoric*), in which media articles were analysed via cluster-agon criticism in search of motivations unique to individual journalists. Cluster-agon criticism, as conceived by Kenneth Burke (*Attitudes* 232-4), requires identification of key terms in a text, followed by a search for additional words or images that occur with those key terms (composing "clusters"). The critic then searches for oppositions created in the text in the form of "agonistic" relationships between terms or entities. Key terms in this case study, for example, include individual journalists' descriptions of the disease or the portrayal of health officials. Articles were chosen for analysis based on date of publication, between 24 April to 29 April 2009, a period of profuse coverage in Canada and internationally (Duncan), via the search terms "swine flu" and "H1N1." Articles were required to be a minimum of 400 words, to address topics of threat or protection, and to have been written by a single author. Within these criteria, articles were chosen at random. At 21 articles, theoretical saturation was achieved.

With regard to how journalists portrayed risk, media texts were found to fall within three categories. (See Table 1 below and the

complete list of texts analysed in Appendix 1.) The first category of texts portrayed the outbreak as manageable and of little concern (labelled A for ease of reference). The second category portrayed the outbreak as likely to be severe, yet still manageable (B). The third category portrayed the outbreak as likely to be severe and impossible to manage; indeed, likely impacts were portrayed as catastrophic (C).

Where the actions of health authorities were highlighted in a manner inviting question, (Categories B and C), this tension was situated between public health authorities and travelers returning from Mexico (Category B; e.g., Skerritt), between the authorities and the virus itself (Category B; e.g., Fitzpatrick), between the need to conduct business as usual and the threat of the outbreak (Category B; e.g., Sibley), and between Canadian authorities, and Mexico and Mexicans (Category B; e.g., Rennie). Most notably, the fallibility of public health authorities also appears in this category (B), as authorities express their "concern" and admit their lack of knowledge regarding the developing threat. Several texts in Category C (e.g., Branswell "Swine"; Barrera; Branswell "Mild"; Akin) also feature tension between the beginning of a perceived pandemic and official reticence on the subject, and only one text features health authorities in an agonistic relationship with the disease itself (Nicholson), which is surprising given the context.

The processes of constabulary rhetoric, described in more detail below, are evident in Category B texts. In the offering of "vigilance" as protective (e.g., "The public health agency has asked health professionals across the country to increase their vigilance" (Fitzpatrick)), there is a re-direction of attention from the potential for the disease's spread and the need for individual behavioural changes. The entire concept of contagion may be absent, as when

travelers are encouraged to continue visiting Mexico, protected by "common sense precautions" (Skerritt). Similarly, the medical system's response launches in full force against "potential" cases of H1N1, placing these people in medical isolation, but allowing them to move freely in their communities prior to the time at which their identities morph into potential H1N1 cases. And, the monitoring of Mexican migrant workers in Canada is portrayed as protective (Rennie). While medical doctors appear as sources of authority in Fitzpatrick (a profession which would be considered to have a great deal of authority in the context of a pandemic), they are notably absent from the texts as a whole—again, perhaps due to the de-emphasis in general of the notion of contagion: it is difficult to recognize medical expertise in the absence of concepts of disease.

The constabulary function manifests in Category C texts as the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) engages in portraying itself as "concerned" while refraining from taking protective measures. As Caroline Alphonso notes, "Canada's chief public health officer expressed deep concern about a swine influenza outbreak", stating that "'This is very concerning, clearly. That's why we're all paying attention'" (Alphonso). In the same text, the Mexican government is portrayed as taking drastic measures, placing public attention on Mexico's ability to control the outbreak and dissociating from the epidemiological significance of continued travel and tourism to Mexico: "There is no reason Canadians shouldn't travel to Mexico, as long as the usual travel precautions are taken, Dr. Butler-Jones said." The constabulary function is evident in Branswell ("Mild") as well, in which preparation consists of preparing for the "idea" of additional cases and deaths (Branswell "Mild" A3).

Table 1: Rhetorical stances identified via cluster analyses of media

articles on H1N1, published between 24 April and 29 April 2009 (see Appendix 1 for full citations).

Category	Texts	Scene descriptor: Likely severity of influenza A H1N1	Suggested/invited interpretation of consequence
A	Giroday		
	Cooper		
	Crawford	Of little concern	Manageable
	Brean		
	Talaga		
	Fayerman		
	Skerritt		
B	Fitzpatrick	Severe	Manageable
	Sibley		
	Rennie		
	Branswell "Swine"		
	Nicholson		
C	Alphonso		
	Barrera	Severe	Impossible to manage: catastrophic
	Branswell "Mild"		
	Akin		
	Deveau		

The constabulary function in H1N1 media discourse

Communicating facts, dispelling fear, and maintaining order are all elements of the imposition of control. Official statements surrounding the H1N1 pandemic threat unambiguously impose control by "coaching an attitude" (Burke *Attitudes* 322) in the public

toward the pursuit of appropriate behaviour. However, such discourse (as mediated here by journalists) may also impose control through unintended symbolic means, thus opening other dimensions to control. As Burke observes,

> When we wish to influence a man's response, for instance, we emphasize factors which he had understressed or neglected, and minimize factors which he had laid great weight upon. This amounts to nothing other than an attempt to redefine the situation itself. (*Permanence* 220)

Constabulary rhetoric, as initially described by Burke in his early book *Attitudes Toward History* (originally published in 1937), is a function that may be observed to motivate the rhetoric of authority figures when the actual responses to an exigence fail to function in the resolution of that exigence. Burke argues that rhetoric applied by authorities to shield issues not being addressed from the public's view, while maintaining the established social order, fulfills a "constabulary function" (Burke *Attitudes* 137). Over time, according to Burke's theory, the degree to which the response is employed increases in proportion to the urgency of the "actual" issue. A rhetor strategically directs audience focus toward one element of a situation, while drawing notice away from another. An infectious disease outbreak by nature implies contagion, illness, and possibly death, particularly in the case of a hitherto unknown disease for which vaccines do not exist. Yet in Category A texts, the concept of contagion is managed via protocol and ethos. For example, Dave Cooper and Tiffany Crawford each provide the same quotation from then-Health Minister Leona Aglukkaq: "Aglukkaq said health officials were 'following plans and protocols prepared in advance for events like this'" (Cooper A1; Crawford A1). Cooper further notes, paraphrasing

Dr. David Butler-Jones, then chief public health officer, "Canadians had to practice good basic flu-prevention techniques to lower risks of infection" (A1).

Interpreting Burke, Jordynn Jack describes the "constabulary function" as arising from a context in which a "deteriorating social order" is strategically reinforced by "political and economic elites" in order to simultaneously draw attention away from "broader, systemic" issues (66). Jack further suggests that "the constabulary function and its attendant terms provide a vocabulary for sociorhetorical critique" (67), a call that we explore in this study. In this case, a potential pandemic generates fears of deterioration in social order, fears which prove to be a major motivational factor for a number of journalists and public health authorities alike. (See Category A texts in particular.) The "elites" featured in these texts are politicians and health authorities who prevent public focus from settling upon the concept of contagion. Continuing the analogy, we note that this aspect reflects Jack's "broader, systemic problem" (6), a remarkable feat given the nature of this particular threat to social order.

The application of constabulary rhetoric occurs in the face of "alienation or cultural lag," which arises due to a divergence between "socioeconomic systems" and actual "social conditions" (Jack 71). In Burke's terms, "[w]e use [the term alienation] to designate that state of affairs wherein a man no longer 'owns' his world because, for one reason or another, it seems *basically unreasonable*" (*Attitudes* 216; emphasis in original). Burke continues, "He 'repossesses the world' somewhat by forming allegiance to a new rationale of purpose" (216). On the face of it, the relation between a socioeconomic system and the rhetorical situation posed by a pandemic may not appear

intimately related. Yet by tracing correspondences between the terms of a constabulary rhetorical system and the rhetorical situation examined here, motivations rooted in a constabulary function appear.

Within the context of a pandemic, elements of a lagging cultural order may be seen in changes in how publics value expertise, changes in how publics interact with traditional media, and the erosion of borders, to name a few. Yet, a "lagging cultural order maintains itself through rhetorical acts" (Jack 72). In Burke's terms, these rhetorical acts are "secular prayer" (*Attitudes* 321). Notes Burke: "Such parliamentary and dictatorial praying is also generally backed by the most drastic material reality, since the prayer is implemented by the constabulary resources" (324). Due to dissonance between the cultural order and actual social conditions, alienation occurs, which gives rise to "a range of social problems including crime" (Jack 72). Again, in the case of the H1N1 pandemic, the emphasis on "appropriate" behaviour or what may be termed "infection etiquette" leads, by deduction, to what is viewed by authorities as "crime": poor behaviour by the infected. An authority cited by Pamela Fayerman, Dr. Danuta Skowronski of the B.C. Centre for Disease Control, said that she

> hopes the current public health threat helps change the culture so that if healthy bystanders see someone sick in schools or workplaces, they will say to the ill person: "You don't look so good, maybe you should go home." (A4)

Authorities working to counter the threat of "crime" turn to "transcendence" or "symbolic bridging and merging" (Jack 72). Burke defines "bridging" as "[t]he symbolic structure whereby one 'transcends' a conflict in one way or another" (*Attitudes* 224). Symbolic processes are apparent in rhetors' emphasis of appropriate

infection etiquette and invitations to identify with those who behave appropriately (e.g., Dr. Skowronski, quoted in Crawford and Fayerman). These invitations, or "secular prayers," are extended by authorities in the aim of eradicating "crime." The "constabulary" then "enforces the law" (Jack 72)—the infected are passive, subject to the ministrations of the health system which enforces isolation, effectively punishing the failure to maintain health. As Jack observes, the response "seems to address the . . . crime, but does little to address . . . alienation" (72). Jack summarizes the situation as follows: "the law, propaganda, and the constabulary are invested in preserving the existing regime, so they in fact support the crime they claim to eradicate" (72). As the symbolic constabulary targets the visibly ill, the unseen virus continues to circulate within the populace.

SCAPEGOATING AS VEHICLE OF TRANSCENDENCE

As a means of transcendence, underlying the constabulary rhetoric that appears in the public discourse surrounding H1N1 is another kind of motivating discourse, which poses a threat to the task of guiding the public toward effective standards of behaviour. Scapegoating is a rhetorical device of great antiquity, deeply engrained in human social practice and consciousness, which operates as a mechanism for asserting agency in the face of potentially overwhelming forces. Even removed from its original religious context, where a literal or symbolic victim is offered up for the good of the community, scapegoating as a discursive means of creating a collective identity in opposition to a perceived threat is a powerful tool for "coaching an attitude" through Burke's secular prayer (*Attitudes* 322). Given Burke's dictum that attitude is an "incipient act" (*Rhetoric* 42-43), an awareness of how scapegoating occurs in public health communication is important if the conscious goal of the

communication is to promote safe behaviour and proper precaution
on the part of the public. If such a message can be shown, on some
level at least, to misdirect the audience's perception of the health-care
authorities' management of the crisis, then it becomes necessary for
health-care authorities to recognize the points at which unconscious
scapegoating may present itself as a substitute for other kinds of
agency.

Medical ethics scholar Norbert Gilmore and bioethics scholar
Margaret Somerville observe that a population under threat has
several avenues of redress open to it: physical escape from the threat,
control or incapacitation, denial, or "[displacement of] the fear it
engenders such that its impact is eliminated or minimized" (1339).
Of these, denial and displacement lead naturally to symbolic processes
of scapegoating (1339). Those members of society targeted by the
scapegoating process are characterized in ways that enable audiences
to identify those at risk as "not me": they are viewed as different due
to discrimination and audiences may also engage in attributing "fault,
guilt or blame" (1339-40).

Gilmore and Somerville focus on AIDS, a disease that in its origins
was tied to conceptions of the Other. However, in the association of
the H1N1 outbreak with Mexico, it was also possible for rhetors to
describe and identify an Other, which enabled audiences to perform
distancing functions (e.g., "it can't happen to me"). This othering,
itself a form of scapegoating, is transformative. The existence of a
scapegoat enables a person or community to re-identify themselves,
to *transcend* an undesirable symptom or state. In Burke's terms,
transcendence solves conflict via symbolic means ("Philosophy" 312).
In times of high drama (Carter 3), the redemptive capability of the
scapegoat increases. In the early days of a putative pandemic, what

needs redeeming? Health, in all senses—biological, social, and financial. One transcends risk of infection by knowing who or what is at risk and distancing oneself from them (e.g., tourists, Mexicans, agricultural products, industries). Redemption enables a hierarchical separation: from potentially ill to healthy.

Scapegoating is a recognizable symbolic means of maintaining social cohesion (Szasz 328). For human scapegoats to function effectively on behalf of the community, "they must be able to be dehumanized in order to be blamed, isolated, ostracized, or in some way separated from the scapegoating community in order to expel those 'sins,' and for the community to justify doing this to them but not to others" (Gilmore and Somerville 1346). This separation enables, in Burkeian terms, "perversions of the sacrificial principle (purgation by scapegoat, [or] congregation by segregation)" (Burke *On Symbols* 279). Consequently, infection (that which is identified as such by the medical establishment) becomes dehumanizing, a means of attributing Otherness to members of one's own community.

PHARMAKON AND PHARMAKOS: SCAPEGOATING AS OPIATE

Further differentiation between the symbolic mechanisms through which scapegoating contributes to the constabulary function occurs in Jacques Derrida's essay "Plato's Pharmacy" in his 1972 book *La Dissémination* (English translation *Dissemination*). The term for scapegoat in classical Greek is *pharmakos* (φαρμακός), and the semantic links between this term and *pharmakon* (φάρμακον), meaning *drug* or *medicine*, whence the English word pharmacy, are informative for our discussion. Derrida uses the concept of the *pharmakon* to explore Plato's critique in *Phaedrus* of written language

as a *pharmakon* for the failure of memory. While claiming to "heal" the imperfection of memory, writing actually undermines its substance. When information can be encoded independent of the context that constrained its "actual" meaning, it can be deployed in situations that invite multiple and conflicting interpretations (Derrida 75-102). Derrida sees Plato understanding writing as a *pharmakon*, not as legitimate medicine, but as a drug and even as poison (Derrida 130).

Evoking these attested meanings of the Greek term speaks strongly to deep-seated cultural anxiety, not only regarding written language taken out of context (an anxiety which digital media amplifies to an exponential degree), but also, in the present case, to the whole problem of addressing the general public on a health-care crisis. The logos of any advice reported to the public must rest on what Burke would call a "dialectical substance" or "*point of departure*" (*Grammar* 33) of scientific knowledge regarding the spread and control of disease. Deployed within the constabulary function, in the guise of science, "information" becomes an unstable entity, whose lack of substance makes its application volatile, thereby "poisoning" the host logos.

Derrida and Burke both distinguish two kinds of scapegoating impulses. Derrida's discussion of Plato's use of the motif implicitly contrasts the "constituted" *pharmakos*, whose existence is formally inscribed in the rituals of ancient Athens, with the *pharmakos*-as-*pharmakon*-as-poison, a condition that arises when the scapegoating attitude operates without the constraints of conscious ritual operating within a public consensus. Burke similarly distinguishes between "scientific" scapegoating, where, again, the act functions through overt and recognizable symbolism before an

audience, and "pseudoscientific" scapegoating, where the enthymematic nature of the attitude sublimates or overrides rational thinking in identifying a scapegoat in the public eye.

DERRIDA ON THE "CONSTITUTED" SCAPEGOAT

In Derrida's account, the otherness (as opposed to the guilt) of the victim becomes a "constituted" element in the consciousness of the community. He cites Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough* to illustrate how Otherness has historically been nurtured in the constituted reality of the community: "The Athenians regularly maintained a number of degraded and useless beings at the public expense; and when any calamity, such as plague, drought, or famine, befell the city, they sacrificed two of these outcasts as scapegoats" (133). Scapegoating thus addressed upheaval

> by violently excluding from [the community's] territory the representative of an external threat or aggression [who] represents the otherness of the evil that comes to affect or infect the inside by unpredictably breaking into it. Yet the representative of the outside is nonetheless constituted, regularly granted its place by the community…in the very heart of the inside. (133)

Here we have the "coaching of an attitude" in the public where the undesirable, devalued Other is understood to dwell inside the community, with the expectation that when calamity occurs, the mechanisms are in place to purge the Other as a response.

When such formal civic and religious rituals are no longer operative, the attitude lingers, with its expectation of the process society is psychologically conditioned to anticipate. Under such conditions, it is not surprising that communication practice, in the give-and-take of the rhetorical triangle of rhetors, public, and communication,

would be inclined to conform to the ancient pattern; Plato, as explicated by Derrida, would worry that written communication evoking a *pharmakos* without the constraints of conscious memory would empower a mob mentality and contribute to social upheaval, acting as *pharmakon*–as–poison (or social hallucinogen?). The social cohesion achieved by scapegoating (in what Burke calls "congregation by segregation" (*On Symbols* 281)) occurs at the cost of "poisoning" the public against individuals and groups who are not "constituted" as scapegoats, in a society that would not consciously embrace scapegoating as symbolic action. The result is what Burke criticizes as "pseudoscientific" scapegoating.

BURKE ON SCIENTIFIC SCAPEGOATING

Burke's distinction between scientific and pseudoscientific scapegoating addresses the *pharmakos* motif in modern terms. He argues that when scapegoating processes are clear to the audience, the audience is aware of the nature of the victim (e.g., the dismissal of a superior for an employee's crime, thereby cleansing the organization as a whole). Moreover, Burke argues that the ritualistic scapegoat "is felt both *to have* and *not to have* the character formally delegated to it" ("Philosophy" 45); this scapegoat is thus consubstantial to a degree with the evil that is symbolically cast out through the scapegoat's expulsion or destruction.

The ambiguity expressed in the constructions "*to have* and *not to have*" is important to understanding scapegoating as a rhetorical practice, where that very ambiguity may be deployed enthymematically to coach an attitude in an audience that would reject the same attitude were the connections made overt (as Plato would fear). The public might hesitate at the idea of all Mexico, all Mexicans, or all returning

tourists being implicitly "guilty" of contagion, and thus deserving of exclusion. However, the devaluing implicit in designating an individual or a collectivity as a scapegoat indicates an attitude at work in the communication between the authorities and the public, as delivered via the media, which is willing to accept the consubstantiality of the scapegoat with the destructive forces its expulsion is meant to avert. This enthymematic reliance on perceived consubstantiality is essential to the constabulary function as *pharmakon*; the public feels that the disease is being brought under control because the perceived pathogens are being dealt with on a symbolic level.

However, the problem/risk inherent in scapegoating as an attitude thus coached lies precisely in the capacity to override the "not guilty/ not to have" dimension that belongs to rational perception. If we are approaching this attitude in the specific sense of the *pharmakos*, and seeing the motif called into play by the exigence of this communication as a verbal *pharmakon*, then we must be conscious of how this override is integral to the operation of the "drug."

PSEUDOSCIENTIFIC SCAPEGOATING

When scapegoating occurs implicitly, the audience benefits unknowingly. This variant is what Burke names "pseudoscientific" scapegoating ("Philosophy" 45). Further, and significantly for communications such as those examined in this study, "the scapegoat is taken to possess intrinsically the qualities we assign to it" ("Philosophy" 46). When Burke distinguishes between the ritualistic scapegoat and the pseudoscientific scapegoat, he points out that when scapegoating occurs implicitly in rhetorical practice, the audience is not encouraged to perceive the symbolic nature of the practice. As he puts it,

> [I]n its concealed pseudoscientific variants, where one's vices are simply
> 'projected' upon the scapegoat, and taken literally to be an objective,
> absolute, nonfunctional intrinsic attribute . . . endowed by 'projection'
> without an explicit avowal of the process, [the pseudoscientific
> scapegoat] is felt purely and simply to have the assigned character.
> We may discount the ritualistic scapegoat by knowing that there is
> an element of mummery in the process of transference; but the
> pseudoscientific projection suggests no discount. ("Philosophy" 45-46)

When the information must be adapted to the general public, in
statements by officials reported by journalists, the information is
clearly intended as *medicine*, as a means to inform and thereby protect
the public. Obviously, neither the original spoken word nor the
digital or print captures of them in the media have the power to
treat infection or inoculate an individual, and no health practitioner
or health care official believes otherwise. However, Plato's anxiety
about written language, which, as Derrida indicates (106ff), was part
of his quarrel with the Sophists as enablers of communication in the
uninformed public, applies also to the audience's will to receive the
messages as something more than information on how to evade an
infection that has not yet touched them directly. Rather, raising the
spectre of contagious individuals invites the public to see potential
human vectors of disease as *constituted*, in Derrida's terms; if the
"contaminant" is already inside the social body, then the message is
open to interpretation as actual treatment of that infection through
the scapegoating process. The message thus changes its nature as a
pharmakon from a preventative to a purgative, from a *medicine* that
boosts immunity to a *poison* that seeks to expel a foreign contaminant.

This instability in the message-as-*pharmakon*, from immunity-
booster to poison, signals a parallel shift in the scapegoating.
Obviously, sound reasons exist for advising the public to exercise

precaution around individuals who have been at risk of exposure to H1N1. In identifying in the most general terms those who may have been exposed, a degree of scapegoating is inevitable, but remains "ritualistic" to the extent that warnings will point to common-sense measures, where ethos is grounded in practical understandings of how contagion is transmitted. The audience/public should understand that they are observing an established set of practices, and the degree to which an infected individual is seen as "guilty" can be managed rationally. However, once the *pharmakon*/message is perceived as an actual treatment by the public, then the door is open to Burke's unscientific scapegoating. The *pharmakon* as poison becomes consubstantial with the *pharmakos* as the poison to be expelled, and the rejection of the *pharmakos* can appear a more urgent priority in addressing a potential pandemic than the logical preventative measures that the public should take.

When it becomes impossible to distinguish the preventative message from its reception as treatment for an infection deemed to have already taken hold of the public "body," health-care communication inevitably risks falling into the constabulary mode. While such would not be the design of the rhetor, the situation in which the desire to address intense public anxiety by demonstrating a sound knowledge of where the risk lies (so it might be avoided) will inevitably stand on a threshold between the public's need for knowledge and its desire for actual protection. Health communicators therefore must consider how their rhetoric can on some unintended level be understood by the public as stressing "social cohesion" in the face of "invasion"/infection," and where an attitude of policing the dangerous elements outed in the scapegoating process draws attention away from the "broader, systemic problem" of

promoting effective preventative practice by individuals (Szasz 328; Jack 67).

CONCLUSION: MANAGING TRANSCENDENCE

This study has demonstrated how journalistic mediation can enact a constabulary function in healthcare discourse, implicitly promoting secular prayer in defence of a threatened social order. In Category A (see Table 1), which catalogues media texts describing the early days of the H1N1 outbreak, victims of the disease are portrayed by rhetors as being "managed" by the health care system. The public addressed in the texts is implicitly separate from these victims by virtue of not being subjected to the treatment described. As Gabrielle Giroday notes, quoting an unnamed official, "'The proper protocol was followed, which meant the patient is put in a single room and anyone who goes in and visits is gowned and masked'" (A3). Victims symbolically contain risk, and the ethos of the public health system is enhanced and reinforced via details of the treatment of these victims, allowing rhetorical transcendence to occur once the overarching threat is identified, not as a pandemic, but as the potential for attendant social disorder. Invitations to identify with "proper protocol," with the credibility inherent in the featured public health officials, align with arguments raised by Philip Alcabes: Any threat to civilization is greatly to be feared.

Audiences are invited to identify with rhetors' descriptions of appropriate behaviour to limit disease spread in an infectious disease outbreak. However, appropriate behaviour is increasingly not described in terms of steps individuals can take to protect themselves; rather, it is portrayed in how suspected cases are dealt with by the health system and by bystanders, who are urged to "police" apparently ill people (e.g., Fayerman). Audience members are

provided with an alignment offering redemptive power. Contagion is symbolically exorcised through the observance of behaviours sanctioned by the public health officials to whom the power to interpret the nature of the outbreak is attributed. Constabulary "protocol" functions in transcendence by enabling the audience to conceive of a response strategy that will be effective regardless of the nature of the threat. Protocol transcends situations—it conquers all challenges. Protocol also transcends individuality—the nature of protocol diminishes individual agency and represents an "ultimate" term—a term of absolute authority. It is a containing force against social disorder. As a result, the fight against infection is raised from mundane but tangible precaution to a symbolic plane focused on the ethos of the players.

In contrast to Category A texts, Category B texts present the new virus as deadly, but still portray the threat as manageable, albeit through less tangible means. In other words, if mechanisms of protection via health authorities are not evident, rhetors here convey protective reassurance through another entity, usually of a purely symbolic nature. Here, public health authorities do not dominate the scene of the outbreak; rather, they profess "concern" (e.g., Fitzpatrick; Sibley). The functional hierarchy structuring texts in this section is a hierarchy of susceptibility: It features the relative immunity (symbolic only) of Canadians to the disease as compared to Mexicans. This relative immunity enables Canadian tourists to continue to travel to Mexico while Mexican citizens engage in the stockpiling of emergency supplies, and authorities close public places (as described in Alphonso). However, despite the risk it poses, the disease still does not qualify for a travel advisory, and in some texts, is denied the term "pandemic" (Skerritt; Rennie). What does occupy the apex of a hierarchy of "threat" is Mexico itself—for example, the "Mexican

swine flu" (Rennie), and the reassurance offered through the physical control of Mexican seasonal labourers in Canada.

These texts portray Mexico as the vehicle of threat. The processes of viral contagion are subverted in order to contain the threat to Mexico, Mexicans, or travelers returning to Canada from Mexico. (Discourses of containment appear rarely in this last category, however, and these travelers are not portrayed as a threat to other Canadians (Branswell "Mild"; Rennie). Despite identified cases in the United States, these states are not suggested to be sources of threat. Even Canadian tourists to Mexico are symbolically distanced from infection by the "purity" of the Mexican resort environment and its separation from Mexico "proper" (Sibley). Mexico bears the burden of the threat on behalf of the readers of the texts, consequently containing and distancing risk, and so enabling audiences to locate reassurance that justifies a rejection of behavioural change to protect health.

Lastly, in Category C texts, the constabulary function is evident in an emphasis on "concern" on the part of the Public Health Agency of Canada in the absence of action (e.g., Alphonso). The drastic actions of the Mexican government are also presented as reassuring (Alphonso).

Transcendence offers a symbolic means of resolving conflict, a "symbolic cure" ("Philosophy" 312; "Fact" 67). Conflict arises here through the threat posed to health and social order. In sum, vehicles of transcendence are provided via the implicit "immunity" of Canadians combined with the scapegoating of Mexico. Both approaches enable a "not me" stance with regard to the threat.

As we have argued, Jack has indicated that an understanding of the

constabulary function can facilitate sociorhetorical critique of public communication (67). Our study demonstrates how the language of journalistic mediation of health-care information, in presenting that information as "news" for public consumption, risks causing a shift in how important facts are understood by the public. When the constabulary function evokes social order by the Othering processes involved in scapegoating as a form of "secular prayer," the effect is to blur the distinction between scientistic and dramatistic uses of language, until the dramatistic function overrides the scientistic. Not only have we shown how easily the constabulary function can "infect" discourse in times of crisis, but we have also demonstrated how the ancient tendency to scapegoat must be understood and resisted as a *pharmakon* in the negative sense, an opiate or poison that interferes with the public's capacity to look for a balance of ethos, logos, and pathos in messages that seek to mobilize efforts against a health crisis.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEDIA TEXTS ANALYZED IN LAIDLAW, 2013

Akin, David. "No need to panic, economists advise; Swine flu scare: 'Canada is very well prepared.'" *The Gazette*, 28 April 2009, p. B1.

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The Rhetoric of Malingering and the Management of Risk

SHURLI MAKMILLEN

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the professional writing of those medical practitioners who have taken a particular interest in malingering—i.e., the feigning or exaggeration of disease—and the interdependence between these writers' accounts of their strategies for the detection of malingering on the one hand, and the strategies of malingerers themselves on the other. A reading of four medico-legal texts dating back to the mid-nineteenth century and ending with a recent edited collection on this topic posits the causes and consequences of the shifts in this discourse over time. Because malingerers themselves do not typically leave records of how they use medical genres, I also look to the literary archive for an example of how the malingerer is constructed in the social consciousness. The analysis leads to a characterization of these shifts as a move from *detection* in the earliest texts, toward *diagnosis* in the early twentieth

century (as Freudian psychoanalysis gains a foothold), and finally back again toward *detection* as risks of malingering are increasingly actuarialized in twenty-first century contexts of risk management.

Keywords: rhetoric of health and medicine; genre; pentadic analysis (Burke); malingering; risk; Foucault

> *Within medical encounters, embodied rhetorical moves become particularly urgent and consequential, and the roles individuals assume as they negotiate their medical-rhetorical contexts—in addition to the roles of texts and genres within those contexts—provide clues to the construction of biomedical subjects. (Emmons 135)*

> *Where there is medical uncertainty rhetoric moves in to fill the gaps in knowledge. (Segal* Health *39)*

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A few years ago, I was rear-ended on my morning commute. The interaction that followed could be characterized as a genre unfolding as it should: the driver of the other car apologized with convincing earnestness and asked me if I was okay. I said I was, and we proceeded to assess the damage to my car and exchange the necessary details in case I decided to pursue my rear-ender for any repairs. As the day wore on, I began to experience some stiffness and pain in my neck but thought little of it. Upon returning home, however, I was advised by friends and family that a trip to the after-hours medical clinic was in order. Effects of even minor whiplash, some had heard, could without warning render you dead from a brain clot! At the clinic, the doctor on call examined me, asked a few questions, and told me that unless symptoms got worse over the next day or so, I had nothing to worry about. He also added that there was nothing in my presenting symptoms to suggest that there would be any basis for a compensation claim.

I left the doctor's office feeling both vaguely assured but also somewhat accused and dismissed. I had learned via the consultation that a neck injury might be the basis for monetary compensation, and that the doctor speculated that this might be on my mind. In the words of genre theorist Carolyn Miller, then, it would seem to illustrate her point that, through genre (in this case a doctor–patient interview), we can "learn … what ends we have" (165). Were there expectations about my motive, assigned by the genre?

"Motive" in this case emanated from a system of intersecting discursive regimes—familial, legal, medical, insurance—all seemingly structuring my embodied experience in the doctor–patient interview. Did the doctor suspect I was exaggerating my symptoms in the hope of acquiring some secondary gain, i.e., malingering? And was I, even slightly, exaggerating my symptoms to ensure the doctor would take me seriously, out of a half-conscious fear that I really was at risk of sudden death from a blood clot to the brain?

Using this narrative as what Kenneth Burke in a *Grammar of Motives* describes as a "representative anecdote," this paper takes a rhetorical approach to explore such questions. Burke reminds us that "rhetoric compris[es] both the *use* of persuasive resources, … and the *study* of them …" (560, italics in original). Specifically, I trace malingering historically through an archive of historical texts that confronts malingering for legal, actuarial, or medical reasons. Malingerers themselves do not typically leave records of how they use medical genres. For this reason, I include anecdotal and literary examples of how the malingerer is constructed in the social consciousness, allowing us to see malingering as a strategy of resistance to dominant power structures.

While malingering has received extensive focus in biomedical, psychological, and forensic disciplines (Halligan, Bass and Oakley; Rogers; Malleson), no accounts include a rhetorical approach. Building on groundwork in the rhetoric of health and medicine, most notably that of Judy Segal on migraines and hypochondria, the rhetorical approach taken here allows me to posit a claim about the interdependence between the various strategies for detecting malingering and the strategies of malingerers themselves. I trace the causes and consequences of the shifts in the rhetoric of malingering over time—from *detection* in the earliest texts toward *diagnosis* in the early twentieth century as Freudian psychoanalysis gains a foothold, and finally back again toward *detection* as risks of malingering are increasingly actuarialized in late-twentieth century contexts of risk management such as the insurance industry, which subjects the malingering body to actuarial regimes of probability and risk. In all cases, malingering as a category operates in various matrices of knowledge and power. As we will see below, the malingerer lies on the periphery of institutional encounters between soldiers and their commanding officers, doctors and patients, insurance adjusters and claimants, psychologists and clients, and even teachers and students. It is on these peripheries that social subjects enact truant roles.

MALINGERING AS RHETORICALLY STRUCTURED

Simply put, malingering is the pretension or exaggeration of illness in order to escape duty or work or to acquire some other external benefit. Many distinguish "frank feigning" from the exaggeration of symptoms; still others see malingering as on a continuum "that varies according to the extent of conscious awareness" (Halligan, Bass and Oakley 12). In the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of*

Mental Disorders: Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) malingering is listed in the appendix as a term under consideration and needing elucidation. There it is distinguished from "factitious disorders," which are those disorders via which the dissembler supposedly derives no extrinsic benefit, meaning their rewards are either intrinsic (psychological) or nonexistent. In a clinical setting, this would be the difference between feigning or exaggerating symptoms to receive compensation via an insurance claim, or doing so to receive sympathy or reassurance from a physician.

From the sociological viewpoint of Talcott Parsons, illness is not simply a condition, but also a social role, operating in a "motivational economy" (101), placing both the material conditions and the motives of individuals within social and institutional structures. In these terms, malingering is the pursuit of the benefits of "the sick role," for example the exemption from societal obligations, without the presence of actual illness. Because understanding motive seems crucial to understanding malingering, Kenneth Burke's dramatism—or "the attributing of motives" (*On Symbols* 139)—lends itself to a rhetorical understanding of how institutional discourses help formulate the category "malingerer."

Burkean rhetoric and its uptake in rhetorical genre studies provide a framework for understanding the rhetorical embodiment of a medical condition that by definition has no material evidence, but which has material origins and consequences. All of the authors in the array of texts under consideration in this paper are grappling with the same body/mind dichotomy that confronts not just the medical community but also those who would theorize the rhetorical body rhetorical genre studies. Carolyn R. Miller's observation that through genres "we learn … what ends we may

have" (38) suggests that genres are not simply strategies taken up
according to consciously perceived social exigencies; they also
structure and shape those social exigencies, and the identifications
they entail, by defining them according to the discourses provided
by the genre. Since Miller's ground-breaking work, others have
shown how identity performances are shaped by genres in various
settings and not always with ideal consequences (e.g., Fuller and
Lee; Emmons; Segal *Health*; Segal "Breast"). Most relevant to this
study are the observations from Segal about how genres shape
answers to the question "How shall one be ill?" ("Breast" 16). The
breast cancer narrative, for example, limits women to certain roles as
agents, both feminine and a "fighter" of the disease. It is impossible,
it seems, to just *be* ill. We cannot do so without metaphor (here
Segal is alluding to Susan Sontag's *Illness as Metaphor*) and without
narration, which suggests, of course, that one cannot be ill without
rhetoric.

For Kenneth Burke, these ways of looking at language in use
constitute an extension of "the range of rhetoric" to include
conscious and unconscious identifications that are linked to contexts.
(See Bruner for a recent discussion of the "rhetorical unconscious.")
"Identification" is not a one-time event as much as a diffuse aspect of
being languaged beings. In *A Grammar of Motives* Burke introduces
dramatism as his "generating principle" for understanding human
motivation, utilizing ratios of five elements associated with drama,
namely scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose (xviii). These are not
rigid nor necessarily discrete categories for Burke: "What we want,"
he says, "is not terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that reveal the
strategic spots at which ambiguities necessarily arise" (xx). Various
elements in a field can be assigned various motives even in the same
situation. Dramatism calls for analyses based on a range of

dramatistic ratios, in particular the scene/act ratio and the scene/agent ratio, which for Burke are "at the very centre of motivational assumptions" (11). A patient, as the term suggests, is often scenic in the doctor–patient encounter (xxii). And the patient-as-body may be the scene not only for the doctor, but also for the disease. In her rhetorical analysis of medical reports of the Tuskegee Syphilis Project, Martha Solomon notes how readers in the medical profession can "regard the subjects as 'scenes' or 'agencies' in [the doctors'] own endeavours" (244). This dehumanization of African American men left them to suffer as unknowing subjects of a study to trace the trajectory of untreated syphilis longitudinally.

Within the rhetoric of malingering, the medical profession—which may have originally held the malinger up as a purposeful agent posing a challenge to the rigors of scientific medicine from the outside—has since encompassed the malingering body as both a scene for diagnosis, and the agency, instrument, or means via which knowledge of the subject is pursued.

Burke notes how scenes do not so much change people's essential character as bring forth appropriate types of people, or "appropriate voices" (19). Extending Burke's claim, we could also argue that particular scenes also bring forth "appropriate bodies." To posit such fluidity between the materiality and the sociality of the body is to acknowledge how the body both *is* and *is not* "text," and illustrates more generally, I think, how a rhetorical approach mediates between empiricism and post-structuralism. It is a paradox prefigured and portended in Burke's "paradox of substance," which is, as he describes it, that a "given subject both is and is not the same as the character with which and by which it is identified" (32). The paradox of substance recognises identity as relational as opposed to

essential, as social subjects gain their identity through
consubstantiality with others. The paradox of substance is also the
paradox of the body, a Burkean "scene" or stage upon which a
variety of knowledge making enterprises are enacted, but also an
agent in the motivational economies of other scenes, notably those
of detection or diagnosis.

Once malingering has been ascertained, there are consequences, and
while diagnosis infers treatment, detection infers punishment. In
Discipline and Punish, Foucault elucidates how seventeenth- and
eighteenth- century tactics of social control involved public
spectacles such as torture and execution, which were eventually
replaced by institutional vigilance via the modern prison system and
by self-monitoring via an internalized panopticon. This shift
heralded an extensive knowledge-making venture in which
"knowledge of the offence, knowledge of the offender, knowledge
of the law … made it possible to ground a judgement in truth" (19).
The soul of the criminal became the object of a discourse, and the
desired outcome of punishment became not revenge but prevention,
treatment and cure, thus heralding a shift from the "vengeance of
the sovereign" to the "defence of society" (90). Done under the guise
of "humanizing" the treatment of criminals, it had the effect of
generalizing judiciary power. Using the penal system as an example,
Foucault is able to argue that knowledge itself is a product of power
relations, as self and institutional surveillance merge in an all-
encompassing continuum of knowledge making and subjection.

In light of Foucault's work, it is on the boundary between the body
and the social where motives of institutions and those of individuals
come together in institutionalised medico-psychiatric and forensic
genres.[1] It is in these genres that malingering is "rhetorically

constructed," which does not deny the presence of the body or its disease (Segal *Health* 39, drawing from Hacking). Rhetorical genre theory also enables me to suggest that between varying degrees of minimization and exaggeration of symptoms there really can be no neutral assessment of one's own condition, a dilemma that continues to haunt medical genres in clinical and other professional settings today.

DETECTION AND THE "VENGEANCE OF THE SOVEREIGN"

If to feign illness requires medical rhetoric, so too does its detection. In his 1834 *On Feigned and Factitious Diseases*, Hector Gavin created a diagnostic tool in the form of a listing of all the complicated ways in which "the honourable physician" could be made the dupe of an "artful impostor" (vii). With its goal of categorizing those soldiers and sailors who were shirking military and other life-threatening duties, it is one of the earliest examples of addressing malingering as an object of scholarly attention.[2] Gavin was responding to the concerns of his day about the incidence of malingering and exaggeration by soldiers in a context of Britain's increased involvement in wars and growing actuarial concerns about the increase in military pensions resulting from doctors being too easily duped and too free with medical certificates.

Gavin acknowledges "the difficulty of distinguishing the feigned from the real" in medical diagnosis (iii) and recounts various detection strategies to catch out the culprit . These strategies often included taking advantage of the element of surprise: "There are circumstances in which it is necessary to visit the patient at intervals,

and unexpectedly, and to have him watched by persons whom he
does not suspect" (40). Surveillance would be necessary only
because of costs incurred. The malingerer is seeking benefits; the
military is seeking to project unity and conserve resources (both
financial and embodied), positioning the institution of the military
and the allied pension system as motivating scenes upon which these
acts gain meaning. In his discussion of "the paradox of substance,"
Burke ascertains four directional "nuances" to the term motivation
(motion, movement, emotion, and moment). Moments "are
directional in that, being led up to and away from, they summarize
the foregoing and seminally contain the subsequent" (*On Symbols*
245). The physician alerted to the possibility of malingering, as one
could imagine, was very much shaped by previous discourse. As
Segal notes of patients with migraines, "the headache patient . . . is
helplessly exposed before he or she has said anything at all" (49).
Over the twenthieth-century, the biomedical subjectivity of
migraineurs shifted in terms of gender, first as a man who was
described as ambitious, over-achieving and in accord with other
positive male stereotypes, and then to the negatively valanced
(needy, uncompromising, overly fussy) female sufferer (Segal 49).

It was initially also a male prerogative to malinger, and men made
up the bulk of case studies by far in Gavin. Women did, however,
figure as he increased his purview to general practice, saying

> one or other mode of feigning is often resorted to in civil life, especially
> among indulged females, in order to obtain compliance with their
> wishes, or to excite interest, or for the pleasure of deceiving; and, in such
> cases, the practitioner may lower himself in the estimation of the person
> attempting to impose upon him, by not detecting the cheat. (16)

To be successfully duped by a woman was especially degrading, and

female patients were subject to particular scrutiny. In John Collie's
Fraud in Medico-Legal Practice, first published in 1913, there is a
chapter on "Malingering in Skin Affections" in which he describes
cases of the mysterious wounds and scars presented on the bodies of
young women. Once these wounds were determined as self-
inflicted, they fell into the category of "dermatitis artefacta," and
became of little medical or for that matter psychological
consequence, unless it fit "with the class of case in which pecuniary
advantage is likely to be gained" (361). It turns out there had been a
rash of such cases after one maidservant had been paid five pounds as
"compensation for dermatitis, alleged to be caused by irritant soap
and alkalies" (361). Other than catching the culprits, Collie's interest
did not venture beyond comments about "hysterical girls who injure
themselves to attract attention" (352), ignoring other potential
explanations of why young girls would repeatedly present such self-
mutilations.[3] That which first presents itself as an amorphous
embodied symptom becomes intransigent once signification
happens in a particular gendered discourse, moral regime, or scene
of arbitration.

Gavin also drew from available stereotypes in characterizing those
with both real and malingered conditions. The French, for example,
were more likely than the British to suffer from nostalgia, due to
their "gaiety of heart . . ., which unfits him to bear disasters" (176).
But nostalgia is hard to feign, apparently:

> The nostalgic has no appetite, and often obstinately refuses to take food,
> he wastes into a marasmus, which leads him to the tomb, while the
> simulator preserves his appearance of health and stoutness; he has no
> inclination for prolonged fasting, and however obstinate in remaining
> in bed, and affecting to be morose, sorrowful, absent, or taciturn, he
> always returns to the demand of "something to eat." (177)

And the British, of course, were praised for being less likely than
others to feign disease in general: "The Irish are the most numerous
and expert at counterfeiting disease. The Lowland Scotchman comes
next to the Irishman, and what he wants in address, he makes up in
obstinacy"(23). This is not to say the labouring class in Britain
escaped criticism: Collie commented at length on the propensity of
the British working man who would lose his "honest desire to work,
hav[ing] become gradually mentally and morally debased" from
having taken some time off work due to illness (3).

Gavin lists historical examples of the times when what was first
artfully feigned eventually became seriously real. In the case of Pope
Julius III, so the story goes, the eventual reality of a malingered
condition led to his unfortunate death via gout (iii). Gavin also
acknowledges the distressing possibility of physicians "unjustly
punishing the innocent" with a false charge of malingering (iii). The
disposition of doctors here is paramount. Not only do they need to
be experts in knowing the etiology of all conditions that are
susceptible to malingering, they must also reign in any enthusiasm
for the chase. Any "degree of éclat attending the detection of a
fraud" (42) is "likely to lead the practitioner astray" such that "the
innocence of the party has been compromised by the vanity of the
inquisitor" (43). After listing a few examples whereby those falsely
charged with malingering have gone on to suffer or even die, care is
then taken to protect the morale of the medical professional who
might get disheartened by reading of too many such accounts: "I
could illustrate the statements which have just been made by
reference to many cases, but for the honour of medicine it were
more advisable they should be forgotten, except for the lessons of
caution which they contain, and which should be ever remembered"
(43-4).

The honour of medicine was also protected, as it is today, by physicians limiting themselves to judging the presenting symptoms, and not concerning themselves with "judgments about intentional deception", leaving the latter up to the judiciary (Malle 83). But Gavin did have some things to say about appropriate punishments, exemplifying what Foucault calls "the transparency of the sign to that which it signifies" (104). Punishments, in other words, were devised to fit the crime, and to signal that crime succinctly to others. For example, if a soldier or sailor were to demonstrate his cowardice through malingering, then he would be made to perform that cowardice in public. The Greek stratagem for dealing with those who avoided going to war, for example, involved placing them "for three days on the scaffold, in women's habiliments" (Gavin v).

This impulse to use shame continued into the nineteenth century. Sailors in the British Army who were caught out as malingerers, Gavin advised, were to be lined up outside the captain's cabin, "there to be admonished by him, . . . as the captain's addressing them in a language calculated to operate on their minds as British sailors" (42). Here, the "vengeance of the sovereign" has taken on what Foucault calls "the gentle way in punishment," with a new impetus to reduce crime "with ridicule and shame," rather than public torture, execution, or branding (Bacarria, qtd. in Foucault 107).

Bodily symptoms that are suspected to be surreptitiously self-inflicted or exaggerated complicate the doctor–patient relationship by countering a medical ethos based on "assumptions of honesty and self-disclosure" (Rogers 1). Tensions ensue when doctors cannot make confident predictions on the intentionality of their patients, and, as Malle recently points out, it is intentionality that makes malingering "more blameworthy" than related disorders such as

hypochondria (81). In Bassett-Jones and Llewellyn's day, it was "the duty of the medical man to protect the State from *imposition*" (40, emphasis in original), even though "[t]o abdicate the title of doctor, to assume that of detective, is to contravene the absolute rule that every examination ought to be impartial" (Sand, qtd. in Bassett-Jones and Llewellyn 85).[4]

As well as occasionally being duped by malingerers, the medical profession also has a history of being complicit in their formation. Doctors treating soldiers during the U.S. Civil War would, for various reasons, "conspir[e] with the malingerer", aiding and abetting his deception (Lande 151). Some would do so out of sympathy; but also, it was in the interests of overworked doctors and nurses to keep recovering soldiers—referred to as "hospital birds"—for as long as possible in return for their efforts helping with day-to-day operations; hospitals were so understaffed and entreaties for more staffing so often went unheard (Lande 147). Similarly, by 1917, Bassett Jones and Llewellyn warned of this "temptation to the medical man," saying that "the refusal of a certificate to a member of standing among his fellows may mean the eventual loss of [the business of other members of his club], a substantial loss of income" (42).[5]

Mostly confining itself to the detection of malingerers in military contexts, Gavin's is one of the earliest examples of a systematic account of all the diseases for which there are records of simulation. Morality figured strongly as a basis for detection. For example, for Gavin, the truly insane demonstrated no moral attachments to family, whereas the malingerer "openly shows his ordinary fondness for his immediate relations" (142). Similarly, Bassett-Jones and & Llewellyn write it is "in the moral and ethical sphere that the

ultimate origins of malingering are to be sought" (11). The emerging discipline of psychology re-encompasses the immoral malingerer by positing the essentially moral disposition as a psychologically healthy one.

Thus diagnosis would help ameliorate the medical establishment's discomfort with detection (and punishment), and replace it with objective biomedical observation. Doctors could turn their attention away from the detection and exposure of the immoral malingerer, to focus instead on the (intellectually interesting) psychological foundations for such behaviours, constituting a shift from acting as moral and ethical arbiters of behaviour to a more diligently scientific approach.[6] In Foucauldian terms, then, we see a shift from the judgement of a sovereign power to a concern with "the defence of society" through the medicalization of social deviance. "In the old system," says Foucault, "the body of the condemned man became the King's property, on which the sovereign left his mark and brought down the effects of his power. Now he will be rather the property of society, the object of a collective and useful appropriation" (109).

DIAGNOSIS AND THE "DEFENSE OF SOCIETY"

In their history of the precedents for Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP), David Allison and Mark Roberts argue that the impulse for books such as Gavin's was not medico-scientific or etiological, but rather "a practical matter, one governed by financial concerns, social control, the coherence of medical models, and questions of legal and professional responsibility and status" (80). In other words, the whole diagnostic drive can be seen not just as the

exercise of medical power, a discursive process of scientification in the face of uncertainty over the vagaries of human behaviour and motivation, but one that was driven by "cost–conscious industrial productivity, the efficient use and effective punishment in the military services, and the restoration of proper morality and behaviour within the social order" (79).

As mentioned above, the developing disciplines in the area of psychology would provide a new focus on both the diagnosis of malingering, and on treatment (Allison and Roberts xxvi). Debates about "war neuroses" that waged up to, during, and as a result of World War One exemplify the tensions between a mostly conservative medical profession and the emerging welfare state, heralding a time when, according to Wessely, "malingering moved from the political to the medical sphere" as a mental health issue (31).

According to an overview by Rogers, there are three models through which malingering has been understood in the area of mental health: pathogenically, as the result of an underlying mental disorder; criminologically, based in DSM understandings of anti-social behaviour; and adaptationally, based on predicted utility in contexts (8). Rogers critiques the first two approaches on empirical grounds, and because of the underlying assumptions of "madness" or "badness" of each paradigm respectively. Empirical work leads him to favour the adaptational model, whose attention to context allows for a range of presentations from outright deception to the sort of impression management that we could argue approaches normal interpersonal self-fashioning. As a forensic psychologist, Rogers (and the other authors in his edited collection) sought the standardization of criteria for the purposes of developing and testing multi-scale inventories and other statistical measures, useful, for

example, in determining defendants' fitness to stand trial, in sentencing hearings, or in insurance claims.

Definitions are important in these forensic settings, especially between malingering, for which there are supposed external incentives such as money or rest, and factitious disorders for which there are not. Allison and Roberts dispute that this distinction can be maintained at all, or that they are merely "a pretext for physicians … to exercise punitive power over those people who happen to deceive them" (Allison and Roberts, 68, drawing on Satz). Similarly, psychiatrist Alan Cunnien, makes the point that whereas the DSM makes a distinction between malingering as understandable in terms of the extrinsic goals of the individual and "factitious disorders" where goals are intra–psychic, "clinical experience demonstrates that various levels of intention can coexist" (qtd. in Rogers 24), and that "the mere presence of external gains cannot negate in every case the primacy of psychological motives" (25).

Keeping these categories under control is no easy task. From a rhetorical perspective, Stuart Kirk and Herb Kutchins point out that such ongoing processes of negotiation and revision are the hallmark of the DSM, "keep[ing] critics off balance [struggling] to criticize a constantly moving target" (15). We also know from rhetoric that naming a category is accompanied by a loss of information. Kenneth Burke tells us that vocabularies are by nature a selection of reality, and therefore a deflection of reality too, which renders definitions of medical conditions so amenable to rhetorical study.

Segal, for example, sees hypochondria as "a rhetorical disease if ever there was one" ("Breast" 18). Both hypochondriac and malingerer need to persuade the doctor that they are ill, but the hypochondriac

has already persuaded themselves—or they have been persuaded by others, in the form of "external elements" such as advertisements (Segal *Health* 74). Both the hypochondriac and the malingerer seek the benefits of the sick role—the hypochondriac for the purposes of treatment, and the other for material benefits. Both create a situation for doctors that requires, in the words of Halligan, Bass & Oakley, "the seemingly impossible task of inferring the level of conscious awareness, the degree of consciously mediated intention, and the motivations that accompany the symptoms presented by their patients!" (9). Although seemingly defeated by the task here, the general trend of current research still seems to be to proceed with the goal of thoroughly teasing out and distinguishing psycho-medical causes for malingering (which to varying degrees absolve moral responsibility) from those rooted in conscious deception and free will (which do not). As Segal writes about hypochondria—"Rhetoric reframes the problem. Discursive elements of hypochondria are rhetorical, and bodily actions are rhetorical as well" *(Health* 76)—so we can say about malingering.

To sum up thus far, most of the early attention given to malingering came from its explanatory potential in regard to shirking military duty; framed as a sin of going against God's will, it betrays a focus on morality. Malingering was therefore a crime, whereby would-be malingerers risked prosecution and punishment. It then becomes a diagnosis, a psychiatric condition needing treatment. We could say that concerns over the detection and diagnosis of factitious disorders and malingering range, as Allison and Roberts put it, from being "politically inspired" to being economically so (xxiii). Detection worked for underwriting a nationalistic and patriotic military concerned with actuarial costs; diagnosis emerged at the point when therapeutic approaches were claiming efficacy in "getting soldiers

back to the front" and maintaining a diligent and uncomplaining workforce.

"DISCIPLINING UNCERTAINTY": DETECTION REVISITED

I now return to the trajectory that emerges in discourses *responding* to malingering, which displays a shift toward modes of governance characteristic of late modern society, and consists of a return towards detection, this time within the insurance industry and forensic psychiatry, as doctors are finding themselves testifying as expert witnesses in compensation lawsuits, or in cases determining fitness to stand trial. In this paradigm, doctors can once again end up engaging in deceptions of their own, supposedly in order to catch malingers out. In the early twentieth century Bassett-Jones and Llewellyn extrapolated on many such strategies, from "method[s] of surprise" (84) to "lay[ing] espionage" (92). Similarly, Gregory Lande talks of Civil War doctors' "clever diagnostic manoeuvres and aggressive almost sadistic, conventions" (133). Today, an entire sub-field of forensic psychology lists "malingering" as its first concern of practice on Wikipedia, and numerous experts now weigh in on insurance fraud. One industry magazine lists strategies for detecting malingerers from psychometric testing, to simple physical tests to determine if claimants complaining of mobility problems are "putting forth [their] best effort": "Can the patient put on his overcoat unaided, while reporting an inability to raise his arms above shoulder height?" (Young and Doyle 35). Richard Ericson, Dean Barry and Aaron Doyle describe the training that insurance adjusters get as aimed at converting them to a "routine distrust" (318); meantime, the public discourse on insurance fraud is aimed at

converting members of the public at large "into agents of fraud prevention who will refrain from exaggeration themselves and serve as informants on other fraudsters" (318).

Interestingly, it was with knowledge of the frequency and success with which soldiers were malingering that Gavin originally devised a scheme to actuarialize the losses associated with malingering during and after World War One, stating as his aim to write "a correct history of the modes of fraudulently simulating disease" (v), as well as a "formulation of such a classification" for the purposes of assessing pension claims (v-vi). He wanted to come up with pension rates based on such frequencies, or as he put it whether or not "the disease on account of which [soldiers] are discharged was or was not capable of simulation" (vi). Recognising the injustice inherent in his proposed system—that "such a rule might (and probably would) be attended with individual injustice"—he nonetheless declared that "its practical advantages would counterbalance such a minor grievance" (vi). Thus, those who legitimately suffered from a condition that might otherwise be easily malingered would receive less compensation as a result. Here we see an early instance of the ways insurers today pass off the costs of fraud onto the consumer, not evenly, but according to various forms of what we call today risk assessment, or, as Nikolas Rose puts it, "disciplin[ing] uncertainty" (214).

In the assessment of mental patients' real risks to themselves and others if released into the community, Rose notes how strategies become more "managerial" the higher the risk, from the "voluntary and self managed" efforts involving therapy in low risk cases through to the highest risk cases wherein "the professional vocation of therapy is replaced by that of administration" (217). It becomes

increasingly harder, says Rose, for the state "to articulate its reciprocal obligations," i.e., protecting individuals from the "actual and symbolic violence" they face as a result of being subjected to these institutional power arrangements (217).

Rose's account shows how risk classifications enter and become stabilized in organisations such as psychiatric wards and the criminal justice system. The risks of malingering and fraud are similarly institutionalised in the insurance industry. In fact, one could argue that Gavin's strategy for passing on the costs of diseases that are at a higher risk of being malingered to those suffering from the condition finds its parallel in an idea afoot in the insurance industry to reward those who agree beforehand to comply with surveillance in the event of a claim with lower insurance premiums. Organisations are subjecting workplaces to "medical surveillance" to increase workplace safely, but also to decrease the costs of insurance (Amacher). Ericson, Doyle and Barry describe the situation as follows:

> Categories that discriminate actuarially can establish differences in cost related to risk. …. Market forces therefore drive all companies in the direction of finer risk rating. This results in more money being spent on surveillance for knowledge of risks, which escalates administrative costs and therefore premiums, leading to further unpooling. (51)

The authors draw on Foucault here, noting that while his focus was on the state and its regimes of discourse and power, "the same techniques are part of private institutions" (30). In Burkean terms, "risk" is now an objectively determined signifier in actuarial contexts, deflecting attention away from the potentially ailing body, with real risks of suffering, sickness, or work place injury, whether in the military, the workforce, or the school. This larger context for

the institutional management of malingering–as–risk can be
characterised by "a decline of innocence as every member of the
population is suspected to the degree that they might contribute to
risk" (*Insurance as Governance* 56). The need for diagnosis and
detection is thereby disembodied and diffused, replaced with systems
of disaggregated risk based on characteristics of populations. Within
this system, denials or affirmations are made for insurance claims
and/or workplace accommodations in ways that suggest a clear
demarcation is possible. The momentum for detection has been
subsumed in managerial systems of risk assessment, where
"malingerer" need only be an implicit category.[7]

What is missing from the account thus far are the perspectives of the
malingerers themselves. These could come only through those very
rare first–hand accounts of how members of subordinate groups
resist their domination, or via literary representations. Such accounts
could bring forth more humanistic understandings than can be
garnered via the otherwise pathological accounts in medico–legal
texts. Below, I illustrate how, alongside these dominant discourses in
the history of malingering, a counter–discourse is emerging that is, if
not counterhegemonic, at least carnivalesque.

THE "HIDDEN TRANSCRIPT"

While wartime scenarios generated early definitions and diagnoses
for malingering, accounts of malingerers themselves were almost
non–existent. Letters and narratives written by conscripts might be a
place to turn, but these are complicated by low levels of literacy, and
both institutional and self–censorship (Doherty). As for fiction,
Corporal Klinger from the long–running TV series *M.A.S.H.* is

probably the most well-known figure from pop culture who fits the category of malingerer. Klinger is determined to get out of the military via a Section VIII discharge, which determines unsuitability on the basis of, for example, "habits or traits [included acting out behavioral disorders, alcoholism, and sexual perversions as homosexuality] which serve to render his retention in the service undesirable" (Bernucci n.p.). Klinger dresses as a woman, although never identifying as a transsexual or a homosexual.

Because of the nature of World War One in particular, during which a lot of the current bases for the definition, diagnosis, and detection of malingering got their start, and where unranked soldiers were in many cases subjected to terrifying coercion, one can imagine and look for other examples. While frontline soldiers were working-class conscripts, their officers and generals came from the ruling and privileged classes of England, which enabled them to stand back from the front. World War One accounts of commanding officers forcing their men at gunpoint to go "over the top" illustrate this dynamic. Morale was often at a very low ebb, as many questioned their rulers' decisions to continue the war in the face of heavy losses and dubious outcomes.

The U.S. Civil War was also rampant with social inequalities; many soldiers were fighting by virtue of a system of draft substitution, whereby those who could afford it would pay another man to take their place in the war (Lande 132). First-hand accounts of resistance are hard to find, although some of the case studies reveal evidence of families conspiring with doctors to get a soldier home safely, or soldiers agreeing to shoot off each other's hands or fingers to be sent home from active duty. In 1913, Collie first published his *Fraud in Medico-Legal Practice,* which refers at length to the "science" that can

detect whether a hand or finger has been shot off at point blank
range. But it is very hard to detect without a witness when a
desperate soldier can simply raise his hand out of the trenches and
into the firing line, or when they conspire to oblige each other with
a well–aimed shot (252-4).

James C Scott coins the term "hidden transcript" to describe a
structured feature of discourse that manifests wherever dominant
groups exert inordinate power over their subordinates. It is
counterpoised with the "public transcript" of subordinate groups,
which enables members to assemble in public a surface attitude of
compliance and respect. The hidden transcript "consists of those
offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or
inflect the public transcript" (4-5). Scott is careful to differentiate his
focus from Foucault's, which takes as its object "impersonal,
'scientific' disciplining forms of the modern state," saying he is
"concerned with structures of *personal* domination" (62, italics in
original). His examples include hospitalized slaves in Trinidad, and
he recounts how, upon their emancipation, "[t]he hospitals were
emptied; the sick were cured, the lame healed, the blind were
restored to sight, and the insane to their senses" (46). Such is "the
miraculous result of the sanatory effects of freedom" (46).

In order to know for sure if there is a hidden transcript, we would
"need to peek backstage" (Scott 4), something that is not easy to do.
Scott offers numerous literary accounts of how the hidden transcript
finds expression, and in that spirit, I turn to Roch Carrier's *La
Guerre, Yes Sir*!, which opens with the character Joseph chopping off
his own hand with an axe to avoid conscription into the war
Canadians were at the time fighting in Europe. Joseph's practical
resistance comes with it a carnivalesque mad glee; after his bloody

hand falls to the ground, he "burst into a great laugh. . . . he hadn't had so much fun since the beginning of the war" (5). Readers may be simultaneously amused and horrified at this scene.

That we can know a hidden transcript only through its effects undergirds Scott's definitional statement that it is not just the discourse, but it is also the practical gains: "*It would be more accurate, in short, to think of the hidden transcript as a condition of practical resistance rather than a substitute for it*" (191, italics in original). For Joseph, the practical resistance is to chop off his hand, and the practical reward is self-preservation. In the words of one of his countryman, who decides to hide and wait the war out, "I'm not going to lose a single hair in their goddam war. . . . The big guys have decided to make their war. Let them do it alone, without us" (8). This fictional account of a hidden transcript illustrates both personal and desperate sacrifices, but also the humour with which resistance can be enacted and recounted.

CONCLUSION

Roch Carrier's Joseph expresses delight at his gruesome self-mutilation, bringing to mind Spivak's "fearful pleasure of a truant world" (lxxii). A rhetoric of malingering would allow for such pleasure, beyond what transpires in the doctor-patient interview, and in the conscious and intentional duping of medical professionals. In a modern world where uncertainty is tamed "by gridding the free and liberal space of community with surveillance, calculation, communication, and control" (Rose 228), malingering can be seen at least in part as a response to such gridding. As Foucault explains, during the Ancien Régime the less privileged in society looked for

ways to defy or avoid restrictions placed upon them. At that time, a person's run in with the law was a random misfortune, a matter of engaging in some activity at the wrong place at the wrong time. We don't live in that world anymore. But regardless of the sophistication of rhetorical and technological strategies for detecting malingering and other "moral hazards," such strategies can only "structure, shape, and manage moral hazards rather than eliminate them" (Ericson, Barry, and Doyle 549).

As for Burke, his "ambiguity of substance" can give the material body its due, while his contention that processes of identification can "operate without conscious direction" (559) supports a view of malingering as in part motivated substructurally by institutional genres and discourses. Rhetoric's imperative is to see the social world as both materially and discursively situated. In his own discussion of malingering, Burke speculates that people can persuade themselves that they are ill so that they can "claim the attention and privileges of the ill (their feigned illness itself becoming, at one remove, genuine)" (560). Malingering draws on the same discursive resources available to those who are really ill. All sides, it seems—patients, doctors, insurance adjusters—can be implicated in a range of conspirational and institutionalised *pas de deux*. Those involved in malingering's performance, and those involved in its detection and diagnosis, can all draw upon, and even *study*, "persuasive resources," and are, thereby, *de facto* rhetoricians.

If both the ill and the feigning draw on the same rhetorical resources and genres to have their needs met as (pseudo) medical subjects, then they also face the same uncertainties. Similarly, in ambiguous cases, doctors' genres or routines of behaviour could be indistinguishable, whether they are responding to a patient's presenting symptoms or

their own suspicions, essentially acting according to two different scenes simultaneously. Catherine Schryer points to the distinction between patients' subjective symptoms and doctors' objective signs as an essential division in medical discourse, one she notes finds its way into the genre of insurance companies' claim rejection letters; in medicine, and therefore in rejection letters based on medical evidence, "signs have more ontological reality than symptoms" (67).Whether the illness is feigned or real the play of signs goes on.

Rhetorically, the medical profession strives to eliminate any ambiguity of substance that interferes with the scientific momentum motivating medicine. But despite its medicalization and criminalization, malingering can be artful and pleasure-ridden, and, from Gavin's era to insurance adjusters of today, so can its detection. This broad account of a shifting rhetoric of malingering can point to opportunities and sites for the "further empirical refinement" posited by Bazerman (2008) in his overview of methods and questions for writing studies (302). One could also speculate, for example, that the rhetorical construction of malingering was shifting as more and more raced, classed and gendered individuals wanted access to medical care, insurance and other social benefits over the course of the century, perhaps just as the discourses of psychosomatics and hysterics may have increased as women sought representation in the public sphere.

Apart from my own anecdote, this discussion has focussed only on secondary genres, but I have tried to show another side to those patients, soldiers, and workers who have otherwise only been made visible via the suspicious accounts of institutional actors. Chavez argues that rhetorical scholarship itself often "surveils and disciplines bodies" (246), and betrays, perhaps, a problem of ableism: "with rare

exception, only when actual bodies are *not* white, cisgender, able-bodies, heterosexual and male do they come into view as sites of inquiry" (246, italics in original). Future research would wisely pay attention.

A rhetoric of malingering is not designed to catch out malingerers by understanding their persuasive strategies; the detection and diagnosis of malingering is not a solution to a problem as much as a justification for a course of action. And that course of action usually includes more structures of surveillance and risk management, occasionally accompanied by more fearful pleasures.

NOTES

1. See Sharon Crowley ("Afterword") for an overview of the fluidity between mind and body, inside and outside, normal body and not normal body. The distinction between the insides and outsides of bodies is even difficult to maintain physiologically. About all the ways in which discourses would attempt to demarcate such boundaries, Crowley says they "are never disinterested" (363).

2. The difficulties Gavin posed for physicians in the nineteenth Century have remained, creating copious amounts of recent professional discourse on the topic. For example, in their introduction to *Malingering and Illness Deception*, the editors describe a similar problem for doctors in terms of a conflict between their duties toward the patient and to society as a whole, "a confusing problem which in the legal profession has been solved by separating the advocate from the judge" (Halligan et al., citing Berney

5).

3. Today, of course, such symptomatology would catapult the case into a completely different realm of possibilities, seeing "cutting" behaviour as some form of acting out, potentially in response to abuse or deprivation.

4. Burke warns against such blanket assertions of impartiality; speaking of the pursuit of science during times of war he writes: "The liberal ideal of autonomy is denied [scientists], except insofar as they can contrive to conceal from themselves the true implications of their role" (*Rhetoric* 35).

5. Collusion today might more likely take the form of GPs signing sickness certificates, or manipulating codes so that patients will qualify for insurance reimbursements (See Wynia for a complete account; see Malleson for an account of whiplash).

6. Collie makes mention of how "malingering" was a term to be avoided in a legal settings: "nothing I find pleases the plaintiff's counsel better than to get a medical witness to use the word 'malingerer,' for he knows he can then appeal to prejudice" (63).

7. I would like to thank one of the reviewers for taking me down this line of thinking.

★

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Michael Fox teaches language and writing at Western University. He spent seven years at the University of Alberta, teaching and writing in the field of medieval studies (mostly Old English and mostly Beowulf) before moving into Western's writing program, where he teaches mainly professional communication courses and the history of the English language. He has published on Old English and Latin, including the co-edited collection *Old English Literature and the Old Testament* (University of Toronto Press) and the forthcoming *Following the Formula in Beowulf, Örvar-Odds saga, and Tolkien* (Palgrave Macmillan). He also has work forthcoming in *Writing in Practice* and in a collection on Canadian rhetoric.

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Shurli Makmillen lives in South Carolina and works at Claflin University as an Assistant Professor in English. Her research and publications continue to reflect her interest in how rhetorical genre theory and linguistic pragmatics can help us understand legal,

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John Moffatt holds degrees from the University of Toronto (BA) and Queen's University (MA and PhD). He taught at several universities in Ontario, Québec, Alberta, and British Columbia before joining the faculty at the University of Saskatchewan, where he is an Associate Professor in the Ron and Jane Graham School of Professional Development, College of Engineering. There, he teaches courses focused on the rhetorical dimensions of public and professional communication. His research centres on rhetorics of identity in Canadian popular and professional culture, especially in historical contexts. He is particularly interested in changing perceptions of ethos and in the construction of credible witness in the interpretation of historical documents.

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