Proceedings of the Canadian Society for the History of Rhetoric

Edited by
John Stephen Martin
and
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The engraving on the cover is by Hendrik Goltzius and is dated 1592. It shows Polyhymnia, the muse of sacred song and rhetoric. The engraving is reproduced here by kind permission of the publishers of Hendrik Goltzius: The Complete Engravings and Woodcuts. New York: Abaris Books, 1977.

PROCEEDINGS

of the

CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE HISTORY OF RHETORIC

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Calgary, 1986

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

This collection brings together some of the more important papers given at the conferences of the Canadian Society for the History of Rhetoric between 1983 and 1985. It bears witness to the growing interest in rhetoric in Canada, and to the diversity of approaches of the scholars whose work is here represented.

The collection is in two parts. Part I consists of four papers on the 1985 special topic of "sacred rhetoric." Debora Shuger crisply elucidates the background of sacred rhetoric during the Renaissance and suggests its uniqueness. Mirela Saim discusses the subtle patterning of Michelangelo's religious sonnets which bespeak rhetorical arrangements among the author, the audience, and the poetry. André S. Michalski explains the importance of a Mexican nun-poetess of the late seventeenth century by reference to the rhetorical tradition in which she wrote. John Stephen Martin examines how the logos had a changing rhetorical function in defining the moment of regenerative grace for the seventeenth century New England divine, Thomas Shepard.

Part II consists of four papers on the teaching of rhetoric in Canada. Anne Tayler discusses some of the text books used for the teaching of rhetoric in nineteenth-century Canada. Nan Johnson clarifies the various recent alternatives to the current-traditional paradigm—now widely discredited—which confined rhetoric to the teaching of mere technical competence in writing. Andrea A. Lunsford, in a survey of various developments in the teaching of rhetoric in North America since the eighteenth century, offers an explanation for the emergence of that paradigm. Christine Mason Sutherland shows how the insights of scholars

such as Lunsford and Johnson are being put to practical use in the creation

of an interdisciplinary course at the University of Calgary.

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PART I: SACRED RHETORIC

PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SACRED REHTORIC
IN THE RENAISSANCE
Debora Shuger

Since the Greeks, most thinkers and scholars have viewed rhetoric primarily in relation to philosophy--i.e., as competitive epistemologies, one offering probable and popular arguments, the other certain and scientific ones. This contrast has generally operated to the benefit of philosophy, except during the epistemic crises of the sophistic period and post-scholasticism. To view rhetoric as simplified and pragmatic reasoning, however, overlooks its distinctive characteristic. Like all forms of argument, rhetoric attempts to teach and persuade. But only rhetoric (and poetry) also attempt to move. Rhetoric therefore is not only grounded in epistemology but also in psychology. From Plato's attack on rhetoric as _psychagogia_--the enchantment of the soul by subrational, affective language--the history of rhetoric has been bound up with the psychology of the emotions. Attitudes towards rhetoric, whether positive or negative, largely reflect a prior assessment of the nature and value of affective experience, its relation to truth and virtue, its connection to animal appetite and spirituality.

As Book II of Aristotle's _Rhetoric_ makes evident, the connection between affective psychology and rhetoric has always been very close. This is especially true in the Renaissance. From the sixteenth century on, rhetoric was defined as passionate discourse and most of the major rhetorics, particularly those concerned with sacred discourse, contain

detailed analyses of the emotions, while psychology texts during the same period discuss rhetoric.[1] This connection has never been adequately explored. What I therefore want to do is briefly review shifting views of the emotions from antiquity to the Renaissance and look at their influence on rhetorical theory.

The view of emotion in Plato and Aristotle is significantly ambiguous. Plato's treatment of emotional experience is largely negative. In the tripartite psychology of the Phaedrus, emotion is confined to the lower, spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, primarily to the latter, the dark and disobedient horse (253-54; see also Gardiner 21-22). Plato associates emotion with physiological appetite, the desires for food, drink, and sex. The Republic condemns poetry not only because it is an imitation of an imitation (the epistemic criticism) but also because it arouses subrational and dangerous passions, obscuring knowledge and disturbing the settled virtues of the soul (10.605-606). Yet, for Plato, love, which begins in the sensual desire for physical contact, is the daimon that can draw man to the intelligible realm of ideas (Phaedrus 246-56; see also Symposium 202-203). Plato never calls such intellectual love an emotion (he does not have the concept of emotion), but its close relation to sensual love suggests that appetite and desire are not only the black horse of the soul but also the power that guides the charioteer from within; that appetite is not opposed to reason but potentially its dynamic and motive force. Thus Plato presents in inchoate form two radically different views of the emotions. The first leads naturally to Stoicism, the second to Saint Augustine.

Aristotle's view of the emotions is more favorable than his predecessor's.[2] Emotion is clearly differentiated from bodily appetite and

placed in the lower part of the soul, which, though itself alogical, is capable of reason. That is, emotion is not oblivious to reasoning, the way thirst and hunger are, but arises from belief and is therefore capable of being altered by rational argument: if you can prove to me that someone is planning to poison my dinner, I will probably hate and fear him. For this reason, Aristotle can raise _pathos_ to one of the three types of rhetorical proof and treat the emotions as the material of moral virtue. The good man is the one whose emotions accord with right reason, who feels the way he should, when and where he should. Yet Aristotle shares with Plato a strong intellectualist bent. Throughout the _Rhetoric_ the emotions are regarded with distrust as deceptive and unreliable. He thus insists that "we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts . . . ." (1404a) and that "the arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with essential facts . . . . If the rules for trials which are now laid down in some states—especially in well-governed states—were applied everywhere, such people would have nothing to say" (1354a). Aristotle thus prefers a rhetoric based exclusively on rational argument, although he recognizes the effectiveness of emotional appeal.

Aristotle's relatively balanced position on the emotions collapses in the Hellenistic period. Stoicism, Scepticism, and Epicureanism all set up some form of passionlessness (_apatheia_, _ataraxia_) as a psychological ideal; all are openly hostile to the emotions as perturbations and diseases of the soul, infecting its tranquillity with turbulent desires, pains, and fears. The absence of any positive analysis of the emotions led to the failure in the post-Aristotelian rhetorics to find an adequate theoretical ground for the grand style and the greatest rhetoric. Treatment of emotion drops out of Hellenistic rhetoric and leads to some surprising discontinuities in

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Latin. Thus in his rhetorics Cicero defends the pragmatic, social utility of _movere_; but when he turns to philosophical psychology in the _Tusculan Disputations_ his position is Stoic: the emotions are diseases. Similarly, in Quintilian, _moving_ is discussed in the context of how to deceive the judges. Emotional appeals are useful when all the hard evidence is against you. In the sixth book of the _Institutes_, he writes,

> But the peculiar task of the orator arises when the minds of the judges require force to move them, and their thoughts have actually to be led away from the contemplation of the truth . . . The judge, when overcome by his emotions, abandons all attempt to enquire into the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the tide of passion, and yields himself unquestioning to the torrent.
> (6.2.5-6)

Except in the work of Longinus, ancient rhetoric never divested itself of the intellectualist assumptions of Classical philosophy and as a result had a difficult time legitimating its functions on anything other than pragmatic grounds--i.e., logical argument simply cannot persuade a popular, mixed audience.

The real break with Classical intellectualism comes in the last centuries of the ancient world.[3] In his _City of God_ St. Augustine offers a radically new evaluation of emotional experience, which becomes the basis for the revival of rhetoric a millennium later. He jettisons the hierarchical faculty psychology of the Classical tradition in favor of a more unified picture of mental activity, one in which feeling, willing, and loving become tightly interrelated. The emotions, he writes, "are all essentially acts of the will," for as the will is attracted or repelled by different objects, "so it changes and turns into feelings of various kinds"

(14.6). Volition, subjectively experienced, is emotion, and Augustine borrows the Platonic concept of love to denote this affective and volitional orientation of the self towards the desired object (14.7). Affectivity, instead of being an irrational perturbation, thus moves into the center of spiritual experience. The emotions springing from a rightly directed will--love of God and neighbor, the desire for eternal life, penitential sorrow--are inseparable from holiness (9.5, 14.9). Angels and saints, even Christ Himself, feel joy, sorrow, love, and compassion. Affectivity thus suffuses Christian existence. Love and knowledge are also interconnected, since the noetic quest is born out of love for its object; yet we can only love that which, in some sense, we already know. Hence, rather than undermining rational judgement, love wings the mind's search for God and truth. As Augustine writes in the Confessions: "my weight is my love; wherever I am carried, it is my love that carries me there. By your gift we are set on fire and are carried upward; we are red hot and we go" (13.9).

Although Augustine himself never relates this psychology to rhetorical issues, his interpenetration of feeling, willing, and loving strongly influences Renaissance rhetoric. Before jumping ahead more than a thousand years, however, we should look briefly at Saint Thomas, since Renaissance psychology is largely an "Augustinianization" of Thomist concepts and terminology. It will not surprise anyone to discover that Thomas modifies Augustine with a strong Aristotelian bent. What this means in terms of Thomas' psychology is a firm division between emotion and volition, what Thomas calls sensitive and intellective appetite. Emotion properly pertains only to sensitive appetite, the part physiological, part spiritual conation towards particular sensible goods. For Thomas the love of God is

therefore not an emotion, and in fact he discusses the emotions only in context of the moral virtues, never the theological. Aquinas accepts the Aristotelian position that the emotions are not inherently evil but the material of moral virtue, yet he locates them in the lower part of the soul and thus breaks the Augustinian connection between man's highest spiritual and contemplative ends and his emotional experiences, between his appetite and his will (Summa 1a. 2ae. 22, 1-3; 26, 1-2; 30, 1-2; see also Gardiner 106-7, 114).

To a large extent the Renaissance returns to Augustine, although modifed by Thomist and neo-Platonic elements. In addition, the Renaissance appropriates this Augustinian psychology for rhetorical theory, restoring the connection between the emotions and rhetoric fundamental to Aristotle but thereafter largely abandoned. This is particularly true for the sacred rhetorics, since Renaissance Augustinianism belongs to the history of the great religious renewal, both Catholic and Protestant, that took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[4]

Following Augustine, Renaissance psychology mitigates the distinction between the will and the sensitive appetite (Gardiner 126-28, 135). In the Thomistic commentators, Medina and Soarez (Levi 23-33, 117-18), and in Melanchthon, emotion is no longer restricted to the particular goods of sense but embraces the love of God, repentance, longing for beatitude—all the acts of what Thomas had called the intellective appetite. Melanchthon, for example, writes, in his Loci Communes:

> I shall not listen to the Sophists [i.e., scholastics] if they deny
> that the human affections—love, hate, joy, sadness, envy, ambition,
> and the like—pertain to the will (voluntas). . . . For what is will
> (voluntas) if it is not the fount of the affections? And why do we

not use the word "heart" instead of "will" (<u>voluntas</u>) . . . . For

since God judges hearts, the heart and its affections must be the

highest and most powerful part of man. (27-29)

A century later, the English priest and psychologist, William Fenner,

writes: "As the affections are motions, so they are the motions of the

will. I know Aristotle. . . place[s] the affections in the sensitive part

of the Soul, and not in the will . . . But this cannot be so. . . . How

could the Apostle command us to set our affections on God. . . if the

affections were in the sensitive and unreasonable part?" (4). Another

seventeenth-century English psychologist, Edward Reynolds, divides the

emotions into three categories: the spiritual, rational, and sensitive.

The first includes mystical ecstacy, the second love of God and virtue;

only the last overlaps with what Aristotle and Aquinas would have called

emotion (36-39). For Melanchthon, Fenner, and Reynolds--and the list could

be extended to cover most Renaissance psychologists--the emotions are in or

of the will and therefore spiritual conation belongs to the realm of

affectivity. Whereas Aquinas had differentiated feeling and willing on the

basis of differences in their respective objects (sensory as opposed to

spiritual), the Renaissance links them on the basis of the similarity of

the subjective experience--a shift from an ontological to a psychological

perspective characteristic of the Renaissance.

This psychology pervades Renaissance rhetoric. In the ecclesiastical

rhetorics, <u>movere</u> assumes a more prominent role than it possessed in

antiquity. It is no longer one of three possible functions of discourse

(teach, delight, move) but the primary function of all sacred rhetoric.[5]

This, in turn, often led to an emphasis on the grand style (which is not

equivalent to Ciceronianism). Thus the great Spanish preacher of the

sixteenth century, Luis de Granada, notes that "because the grand style has the sublimity and power able to move souls (which is indeed the foremost and singular duty of a preacher) it is necessary that in every sermon he choose one or even many subjects that can be treated in this genus" (328). The justification for this emphasis on passionate discourse appears in the lists of emotions found for the first time since Aristotle in most comprehensive rhetorics. Almost always, the list begins with love, and the first subcategory under love is the love of God. Hope, and sometimes even faith, the two remaining theological virtues, are also treated as emotions, along with spiritual joy, contrition, and desire for God, as well as "secular" emotions like desire for fame or shame at disgraces.[6] Preaching can become sublime and passionate because the whole view of the emotions has changed and broadened to include the upper reaches of distinctively human experience.

The distance between Ancient and Renaissance views of emotion can be measured by looking at a revision of the Platonic tripartite soul in Johann-Heinrich Alstead's Orator, an early seventeenth-century general rhetoric (i.e., covering both secular and sacred discourse). Alstead starts out, like Plato, by dividing the soul into intellective, concupiscible, and irascible components--Plato's charioteer, black horse, and white horse. The passage begins normally enough: "In the intellective faculty is the mind itself," to which Alstead attributes wisdom, prudence, and eloquence. But then the analysis takes a surprising turn: in the concupiscible part of the soul one finds the love of God and men, love of virtue, zeal and desire for divine glory and the salvation of men, contempt of this world, and so on. In the irascible part, Alstead continues, are hope and faith (fiducia) in God and Christ, fear of God, fortitude,

constancy, magnanimity, and (curiously) outspokenness (208-9). If we might call Plato's model of the psyche polytheistic, with its internal hierarchical subordinations, then Alstead's is trinitarian—three co-equal faculties subsisting in a single nature.

The evaluation of passionate discourse in Renaissance rhetoric (what is traditionally called the grand style) follows from this assimilation of spiritual and affective experience. Movere is no longer thought of as deceptive and subrational obfuscation or dangerous enchantment. Rather, emotional persuasion aims at the transformation of moral and spiritual life by awakening a rightly-ordered love, by redirecting the self from corporeal objects to spiritual ones. The author of the immensely popular Clavis Scripturae Sacrae, a sixteen-hundred page study of biblical philology steadily reprinted from 1562 to 1719, Flacius Illyricus writes: "with the exception of the historical books, Holy Scriptures are primarily composed in the grand, sublime, or lofty genus. . . . They teach and exhort and dissuade and accuse and terrify; and again console their hearers and move, form, and reform their hearts in every way; until finally Christ is formed in them" (2.459-60).

Emotion plays a crucial role in Renaissance rhetoric and psychology not only because inner, spiritual life comes to be perceived in largely affective terms but also because feeling is closely related to cognition. This too goes back to Augustine, who, in the opening chapter of the Confessions, affirms the mutual interconnection of love and knowledge. Renaissance psychologies spell out this connection. The noetic quest begins in inchoate knowledge, in a dim and partially realized faith; that faith, in turn, stirs up love and a desire to grasp more fully the faintly glimpsed object. Impelled by desire, the person attempts to see and

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understand the beloved object, which achieved, creates the ardent love of full union. In his De anima, Juan Luis Vives thus writes,

> The object must be known so that it may be loved, but the knowledge need only be so much as is sufficient to elicit love. Where we are truly connected to the desired object, we know it better and more intimately; and then we rejoice. Our first knowledge leads us to believe that object is good; in the latter knowledge we feel (experimur) that it is so. . . . Thus love is the middle point between inchoate knowledge and the full knowledge of union, in which desire disappears but not love. This rather burns more fiercely, the more and greater goods are found in that union. (178)

In A Treatise of the Passions, Edward Reynolds likewise writes,

> Love and Knowledge have mutuall sharpening and causalitie each on other: for as Knowledge doth generate Love, so Love doth nourish and exercise Knowledge. The reason whereof is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the Truth and Good of them . . . . the more Appetite enjoyeth of [the Good], the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it seek with [the Truth]. (103-4)

In Renaissance rhetorics these arguments belong to the defense of movere. In his last major work, the Ecclesiastes, a study of sacred rhetoric, Erasmus notes,

> What Augustine, following Plato, said is true: nothing is loved unless known at least to some degree, and again nothing is known unless loved in some respect. . . . In the Hortensius, Cicero praised philosophy and aroused love for it, before he taught it.

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> And who undertakes to teach a subject, first inflames his students,
>
> showing through amplification how noble it is . . . . what great
>
> things is promises, and how useful it will be. (925B)

The allusion to the Hortensius is significant, because this was the book
that first stirred St. Augustine to embrace philosophy. It was not so much
Cicero's philosophic position that mattered, as his evident and eloquent
praise which moved Augustine's love for a subject he barely knew.
Eloquence is not philosophy, but both are parts of the journey towards
truth. This sense of the inseparability of love and knowledge was
reinforced by the biblical anthropology of the Renaissance. Both the major
studies of scriptural philology of the period, Flacius' Clavis and Salomon
Glassius' Philologia sacra, point out that the Bible does not differentiate
knowing and feeling, as Classical philosophy did. Glassius comments that
in Hebrew "to know or to think does not denote simply gnosis but also
emotion and effect . . . or what is the same, it signifies a living and
efficacious knowledge. . . . Thus [in Hebrew] to know is the same as to
love, to care for" (1053-54). Flacius makes the same point: "the Hebrews
attribute the whole psychic life of man to the heart and appear to place
the rational soul completely in the heart . . . ascribing to it the power
both of thought and choice, of wishing and doing. . . . On the other hand,
the philosophers locate the rational soul . . . in the head or brain;
leaving only emotion in the heart" (1.178). Both Classical and biblical
anthropology coexist throughout the Renaissance, sometimes causing no small
inconsistencies.[7] The biblical, however, dominates what Bouwsma has called
the Augustinian Renaissance, to which belong most of the period's
rhetorical theory and whose ideal was not Swift's stoical horses but a
passionate and unitive knowledge. The rhetorics and psychologies written

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in this tradition treat emotion as part of man's cognitive as well as appetitive perfection. Rhetoric, in particular, belongs to the noetic quest; its emotional power does not subvert reason but animates it, drawing heart and mind towards union with the desired object. As Adam says in his conversation with Raphael, ". . . Love thou say'st/Leads up to heav'n, is both the way and guide" (Paradise Lost 8.612-3).

Thus, the positive evaluation of emotion provides the theoretical ground for Renaissance rhetoric. In antiquity, the lack of such a ground always proved problematic—as seen in the reservations Plato, and to a lesser extent, Aristotle, share concerning emotional appeals. The problem appears more subtly in the discontinuities and reticences of Cicero and Quintilian. How can the vir bonus deliberately deceive the judges by sending up a smokescreen of pathos? One of the major achievements of Renaissance rhetoric, then, was to provide a credible basis for passionate discourse by drawing on concepts from Saint Augustine and the Bible, whether directly or via contemporary psychology. Renaissance rhetoric is based on a view of human nature in which emotion forms part of man's spiritual and noetic excellence. Rhetoric is not popular philosophy, decorative ornament, or "self-satisfying" commonplaces, but specifically affective discourse. It thus has a unique role in the economy of human existence—to transform the heart, turning it towards moral and spiritual truth. The decline of rhetoric in the late seventeenth century, then, results in part from the collapse of Augustinianism under the weight of empiricism and rationalism, in part from the marginalization of Christianity and the consequent loss of the last significant arena for popular, oral discourse. Many of the issues and concepts, however, developed within the rhetorical tradition, quietly slide over into poetics,

as imaginative literature rather than sermons and speeches becomes the locus of passionate rhetoric.

NOTES

[1] For discussion of rhetoric in psychology texts see Fenner 90-104; Senault 171-172; Reynolds 20-21.

[2] More extended treatment of Aristotle's theory of emotions can be found in Gardiner 31-45; Fortenbaugh 9, 17, 26, 45, 63-83.

[3] See Bouwsma 10-11, 38-41; Gardiner 97-98; Levi 17-18.

[4] The neo-Stoic rhetorical theories of Marc-Antoine Murer and Justus Lipsius which form the basis of Croll's still famous studies of Renaissance rhetoric belong to a different tradition. See Bouwsma for the contrast between Stoicism and Augustinianism in the Renaissance. In general, the Augustinian viewpoint is reflected in rhetorical theory.

[5] Melanchthon, _Elementorum_ 420; Alsted 85; Erasmus 861E; Soarez 1, 87; Hyperius 41; Valades 160; de Estella 8; Carbo 162; Keckermann, _Rhetoricae_ 15; Vossius 117; Fenelon 83.

[6] Caussin 459-512; Keckermann, _Systema_ 2:1615-31; Keckermann, _Rhetoricae_ 43; Carbo 211-27; de Granada 83-87, 161-66; Dietrich 29.

[7] Carbo and Caussin, for example, preserve the Thomist equation of sensitive appetite with emotion, while nevertheless listing love of God as an emotion. The most flagrant instance of such inconsistency appears in Wright, who begins by arguing that emotions unsettle reason and generally lead to sin (5-8), but when he comes to discuss specific emotions gives first place to the love of God (193).

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ELÉMENTS POUR UNE TYPOLOGIE TEXTUELLE

DANS LES SONNETS RELIGIEUX DE

MICHEL-ANGE

Mirela Saim

". . . la Rettorica è soavissima di tutte l'altre scienze," écrivait
déjà Dante (Convivio, II. 14), mais c'est le XVIème siècle, celui de
Michel-Ange, de Pietro Bembo, de Gerolamo Fracastoro et de Gian-Paolo
Lomazzo, le Cinquecento, qu'on peut vraiment désigner comme le siècle de la
Rhétorique. Le syncrétisme néoplatonique de perspective générale (dominant
au Quattrocento) sera maintenant intégré esthétiquement dans l'ensemble
d'un processus communicationnel de type analytique: c'est autant
l'héritage de la rhétorique cicéronienne que la tradition de la pensée
analytique aristotelicienne qui, à ce temps, mènent à une poétique du
discours littéraire rendu efficient par l'emprunt et l'adaptation des
structures persuasives. Il est donc probable qu'on va trouver au niveau du
discours littéraire le point de recontre des microstructures argumentatives
spécifiques au discours poétique religieux et des macrostructures
situationnelles déterminées par le Concile de Trent--le concile de la
Contre-Réforme. C'est pour cette raison que seulement en étudiant le
contexte idéologique du Concile de Trent on peut comprendre pleinement les
dimensions persuasives du poème religieux ayant pour but l'obtention du
salut par la grâce divine. La persuasivité discursive caractérise d'une
façon décisive l'art religieux du XVIème siècle: tandis que le poète du
Moyen Age (Saint-François, Jacopone da Todi et même Dante) ne conçoit pas
qu'on puisse engager un dialogue avec le Seigneur et se contente de chanter
les merveilleuses bontés divines en exprimant une humble adoration, les

poètes de la Rennaissance semblent toujours conscients de la possibilité et même de l'obligation de s'adresser, par le poème, au Seigneur. C'est pour cette raison que le XVIème siècle réussit à former une technique particulière du discours sacré efficient—c'est à dire un art de la persuasion consacré au dialogue poétique avec la divinité.

L'époque qui s'achève dans le Concile de Trente (1545-1563) est un temps de crise aiguë de la pensée: la crise des valeurs humanistes se manifeste par des incertitudes troublantes et des graves anxiétés (Delumeau 281-95, 259-77) qui connaîtront une solution religieuse précise seulement par l'acceptation d'un dogmatisme rigoureux. En perspective historique on peut concevoir l'étape du Concile de Trente comme l'aboutissement logique de l'humanisme néoplatonicien idéalisant mis à l'épreuve de la réalité. La grande fierté humaine d'un Marcile Ficin, d'un Pic de la Mirandole ou d'un Laurent de Médicis est, par les débats du Concile de Trent restituée à l'hypostase humaine du divin—le Christ crucifié—tandis que l'homme reste doué de la faculté du libre arbitre—liberté, néanmoins, refusée aux protestants. Par conséquent la poésie religieuse de cette époque reste l'expression complexe et riche des profonds bouleversements de la conscience collective: liée aux structures institutionnalisées de l'imaginaire la poésie révèle des structures discoursives de type argumentatif ayant des valeurs et des significations propres.

La persuasivité du poème religieux a pour modèle argumentatif la rhétorique judiciaire, ce qui impose une utilisation accrue des procédées modalisants: c'est donc par une modalisation manifeste du discours poétique que s'exprime le but persuasif de la poésie sacrée de cet âge. Et en analysant les traits spécifiques de l'articulation du discours religieux de Michel-Ange au deux niveaux de la linguistique et de l'idéologie je me

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propose de reconstituter le mécanisme délicat transformant toute expérience subjective de l'artiste en un événement à portée universelle, participant à une vision totalisante.

Pour ce faire, j'ai poursuivi mon étude à l'aide des outils forgés par les théories de la communication, perspective épistémologique englobant autant la "rhétorique nouvelle" (les travaux de Chaîm Perelman et de Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca) que les concepts de la linguistique des "speech-acts" de John Austin, théories tournés vers l'analyse de la fonction pratique des procédées littéraires et offrant une possibilité d'interprétation psychologique des valeurs discursives. On suivra, donc, les modalités performatives de l'acte du discours (illocutoires et perlocutoires) en leur qualité d'éléments composant la stratégie argumentative dans le discours persuasif religieux de Michel-Ange.

En tant qu'"universaux pragmatiques" ces valeurs tendraient à se confondre avec les bien-connues distinctions philosophiques: existence—apparence, essence—phénomène, être—devoir (J. Habermas). A niveau grammatical on suivra, donc, les éléments susceptibles de montrer explicitement les relations intersubjectives (dialogales) établies par le discours entre l'énonciateur et le destinataire du message sacré. On essayera ainsi à observer, par l'analyse du texte poétique, la façon dont les structures verbales expriment ces rapports énonciateur/destinataire par les modalités de type déontique, manîpulatif, impératif, interrogatif, etc. Car c'est précisément la typologie des modalités qui serait en mesure d'indiquer la manière par laquelle le discours poétique religieux reçoit son caractère illocutoire-perlocutoire.

Par modalité on entend "la manifestation implicite de l'option de l'énonciateur: tout ce qui fait l'objet d'une option de la part de

l'énonciateur tombe dans l'incidence de la modalité" (Cristea 9). L'idée de modalité discoursive implique donc une focalisation sur l'enonciateur et sur les relations que celui-ci entretient avec le monde.

Pour raisons de simplicité théorique j'ai préféré utiliser le schéma des fonctions de l'acte linguistique de Karl Bühler—schéma facilement raccordable autant aux fonctions de Roman Jakobson qu'à la division des faits de langage de Austin.

Suivant Bühler tout acte de communication linguistique comporte trois fonctions: la représentation (qui concerne le contenu à communiquer), l'appel au destinataire et l'expression individuelle de l'émetteur (où, dans notre cas, l'énonciateur, le "je" du discours poétique).

Formé à la cour de Laurent le Magnifique à côté des futurs papes Léon X et Clément VII, adepte de Savonarola, ami des papes et des cardinaux, Michel-Ange (1475-1564) est la personnalité artistique qui révèle pleinement l'anxiété trouble du "siècle des réformes" (Chaunu 304-541). Et si l'on pense que ses oeuvres plastiques et architectoniques obéissent toujours à la commande officielle, c'est dans son oeuvre poétique, conçue en dehors de toute restriction formelle qu'il me semble plus passionnant de chercher les particularités de l'expression artistique et du devenir idéologique de l'âge conciliaire. C'est ainsi qu'on remarquera que la poésie religieuse de Michel-Ange comporte deux étapes distinctes: la première est antérieure aux années 1545-47, l'autre postérieure à ces dates. Pour la première période la plus frappante caractéristique est l'utilisation d'un langage poétique de type néoplatonisant ficinien, à une figurativité compliquée et d'une rare virtuosité, virtuosité verbale néanmoins tourné vers l'hermétisme et le difficile. La plupart des poèmes religieux de cette période ont une facture obsécratoire, l'artiste

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suppliant le Seigneur de l'aider et de le fortifier dans sa foi pour bien mériter le salut. Après 1547, l'année qui commence par la promulgation, en janvier, du décret tridentin de la justification par la grâce (Dickens 114) Michel-Ange n'écrira que des poèmes à contenu religieux, ainsi qu'on peut parler d'une "séquence tridentine" dans sa poésie. J'ai donc puisé dans l'ensemble des poèmes (la plupart des sonnets) religieux pour dégager quelques éléments délimitant la typologie de la discursivité sacrée de Michel-Ange, en illustrant mes remarques par un sonnet de la première période ("Vorrei voler . . .") et deux de la dernière ("Giunto é già il corso della vita mia" et "Carico d'anni e di peccati pieno").[1]

En tant que intégrés dans le processus communicationel les poèmes ont un destinataire et, qui plus est, un destinataire divin, explicitement nommé comme le "Toi" privilégié de la communication. Les moyens de souligner cette adresse formelle sont nombreuses: les embrayeurs de la deuxième personne apparaissent autant aux niveaux nominal et pronominal qu'au niveau prédicatif. Ainsi les éléments du discours qui désignent l'interlocuteur-allocuteur divin sont—dans le sonnet "Vorrei voler": Te, Tu, Signor, Signor mie car, mais aussi manda, squarcia, ammezi—des verbes performatifs impliquant par l'impératif et par le subjonctif le désir, l'attente, l'espoir. Mais Dieu est seulement le destinataire explicite, car Michel-Ange a communiqué ses sonnets sacrés à quelques uns de ses amis (L. Beccadelli, Giorgio Vasari, etc.) de façon qu'on parlerait, dans ces sonnets, d'un destinataire second, qui, comme le lecteur contemporain, assiste à l'acte de la communication. C'est donc une manière de concevoir un auditoire à paliers, une sorte de "mise en abyme" de l'adresse-dédoublement des structures communicationnelles qu'on retrouvera à d'autres niveaux du discours.

En effet, les poèmes religieux ont, surtout, une fonction expressive: puisque le poète s'analyse en analysant ses chances au salut, le discours poématique devient un objet représentatif, autant message et preuve de dévotion qu'expression des transformations spirituelles. C'est donc le facteur subjectif qui prime dans ce type de discours, même en ce qui concerne les éléments d'appel. En regardant les embrayeurs on s'apperçoit de la fréquence nettement supérieure des éléments désignant la personne de l'énonciateur ainsi que leur distribution inégale. Pour les sonnet "Vorrei voler," par exemple, on a un commencement dominé par le "Je" énonciateur, même si le premier vers comprend aussi l'adresse au Seigneur. C'est une façon de distribuer les embrayeurs du discours qui indique la diagonalisation progressive de l'adresse toujours plus forte vers le final. Car le discours est, à la fois, signe et témoignage. Penché sur lui même l'artiste se regarde et se retrouve dans le texte, le discours ayant ainsi une dimension auto-réflexive spécifique. Voilà l'extraordinaire assertion du premier sonnet cité ici: "Vorrei voler, Signor, quel ch'io non voglio"--vers formé par un "miroir inverse" nié dans le deuxième membre et entraînant une chaîne de formes modalisantes du "volere" (vouloir). Le poète rassemble dans la même structure, de type paradoxale, autant les modalités désidératives que les modalités réflexives impliquées dans la zone de volition[2] propre au verbe. Le vers a donc une dimension spéculaire obtenue avec des moyens modalisants--et par une construction syntactique permettant d'établir un énoncé sur soi-même. Enoncé qui, d'après Wittgenstein, serait le seul qui soit doué d'une valeur de vérité (truth-value) car le référent est toujours la réalité du vécu.

C'est précisément cette réalité du vécu confirmée par un désir inassouvi de dépasser les limites, d'experimenter l'absolu, qui semble être

la caractéristique tensionelle de la poésie de Michel-Ange. La diagonalité syntactique visant à structurer textuellement l'énoncé sur soi-même et la spécularité discoursive révèlent la même manière de concevoir la subjectivité du poète, de se regarder de très loin pour trouver une signification éthique à son vécu psychologique, à sa méditation religieuse.

On sait que, d'après Platon (Phaedrus 259e-262c, 270c-272b) la rhétorique du discours philosophique devrait être dominée par le souci de la vérité. Ce qui dans le cas du discours éthique devient un souci d'autenticité personnelle, donc de sincérité. Et c'est par une sincérité extrême, découvrant les plus intimes secrets de son âme (biographiquement, mais aussi comme tendances spirituelles inachevées) que se déroule le discours des sonnets religieux de Michel-Ange. On peut aussi reconnaître dans le schéma argumentatif de ces sonnets sacrés une stratégie anticipative centrée sur la confession biographique et très proche de la défense préventive dont parlait Quintilien (Institutio oratoriae, IX. 2. 14-18), aspect argumentatif du discours poétique indiquant la perspective rhétorique adéquate à l'exégèse. Entre l'argumentation des poèmes sacrés et la typologie du registre rhétorique judiciaire s'établit une correspondance. Car le poète s'addresse toujours à une divinité conçue comme justiciaire—même bienveillante, en tant que dispensatrice de grâce: si le commencement du poème est, de règle, méditatif ou confessif, le final est toujours une projection vers le futur—le jugement divin conçu soit comme l'Apocalypse, soit la propre mort. Considérée comme confession (soit délibérative, soit par défense anticipée) à fonction persuasive, le poème se déroule d'une manière argumentative. Dialogal ou simplement confessif le poème sera articulé par raisonnement de façon qu'on puisse suivre à l'aide des connectives, la manière de raisonner qui forme la discursivité

"logique" du poème. Par exemple, on pourrait citer l'utilisation polysémantique de "onde," de "accioché," de "percioché," de "né. . . né," etc.—indiquant soit causalité, soit finalité, sous aspect conjonctif ou disjonctif. A une lecture attentive s'impose encore le rapport de modalité qui domine les relations principales, subordonnées et les rapports déterminants, déterminés. Chaque sonnet semble se structurer autour d'un verbe performatif à de fortes charges et divers emplois modaux. Après le "Vorrei voler" qu'on a déjà commenté, voilà que "Giunto è già il cosso della vita mia" se place dans la sphère ontologique d'"être," tandis que le troisième sonnet cité ici—"Carico d'anni e di peccati pieno"—parraît "englobé" dans la sphère déontique du verbe pouvoir—passant par toutes les nuances des significations: le déontique, l'alétique, et même l'épisthémique.[3]

Au point de vue de l'argumentation persuasive on remarquera qu'autant les prédicats performatifs que la progression des éléments des connexion pourraient bien satisfaire les requis de la démonstration par des entymèmes—modèles syllogistiques transformés esthétiquement et faisant appel à une normativité idéologique commune au poète et à son public: rhétorisation qui, en transformant par analogie l'individuel en général, montre le mécanisme intime de la pensée du poète. Et, si l'on ajoute que toute la séquence tridentine est dominée par l'image du sacrifice exemplaire du Christ, on a, déjà, les deux grandes coordonnées de la rhétorisation empyrique[4] du texte poétique sacré de Michel-Ange: la structure argumentative (progression raisonnée en entymème) du discours et l'évocation en exemplum du sacrifice christique.

Le discours abrite donc un mouvement affectif exprimé rationnellement par des procédés argumentatifs à progression intensionnelle et qui s'arrête

sur un "sommet": la paradigme christique ou l'invocation du salut par la grâce. On pourrait, peut-être, voir dans ce paradime du sacrifice christique, revenant obsessivement dans les poèmes tridentins, une signification théophanique. En évoquant le moment de la Crucifixion--soit par le synecdoque, soit par allusion métaphorique, soit par image emblématique--le poète s'assure le salut par la grâce divine. C'est de cette manière que Michel-Ange arrive à dépasser "il timor de la morte" qui s'exprime dans les poésies de la "prémière période." Et si l'idée de salut mérité par le sacrifice christique a été au "coeur religieux" des débats tridentins, c'est aussi aux débats tridentins sur les sacrements qu'on peut rattacher l'obsession théophanique du poète. Voilà, peut-être, une autre face cachée de la pensée d'un artiste étroitement lié aux institutions ecclesiastiques, pensée qui tout en suivant la norme dogmatique institutionalisée fait preuve d'une liberté créatrice hors du commun.

Enfin, on peut encore dégager une observation concernant un trait général de la conception esthétique de Michel-Ange: c'est une préoccupation accrue pour la partie structurante, relationnelle, de l'oeuvre. Et si les contemporains et les épigones ont parlé souvent d'un déséquilibre de son art en lui reprochant un manque d'inventio, c'est aussi dans l'art des derniers poèmes qu'on retrouvera une plus grande attention accordée aux éléments de stratégie discursive--au disposition (concept d'une plus étroite signification technique que la concinnitas).

Quant à la conscience théorétique, on peut citer les deux lettres de Michel-Ange (une datant de 1544 et adressée au Pape Paul III, l'autre écrite pour son exégète aristotelicien Benedetto Varchi en 1549)[5]--textes attestant le grand intérêt de l'artiste pour la qualités proportionnelles et relationnelles de l'art. Ainsi, peut-on penser que même la célèbre

composition en spirale ("figura serpentinata") qui donne le trait spécifique de sa "maniera" plastique a un correspondent discursif dans sa technique argumentative des va-et-vient, des variations sur un même mot ou sur une seule figure, ressort spiral qu'on retrouve dans l'évolution argumentative des sonnets religieux. A un niveau plus général on verrait dans la spirale le mécanisme d'un retour répété de l'artiste sur soi-même, le symbole-image dominant sa pensée esthétique et son experiénce religieuse: la figure en hélice (spira mirabilis) signifie, toujours, l'espoir de l'éternité: eadem mutata resurgo.

C'est donc par la méditation religieuse, conçue comme argumentation que Michel-Ange arrive à dépasser la brisure sujet/objet: en se pensant soi-même, en retournant ses pensées sur sa propre vie conçue comme destinée--donc phénomène significatif à l'échelle de l'infini--l'artiste se retrouve, entre le néant et l'éternité, face à Dieu. Rassuré par la doctrine tridentine du salut, Michel-Ange prend le pari de l'éternité. Et c'est à ce Dieu du salut éternel, à cette image rédemptrice que s'adresse le discours poétique: n'étant plus le Vengeur, Dieu est, pour l'artiste, l'interlocuteur prédestiné, l'être qui reçoit du poète le don de sa confession sincère--bien argumentée, pour capter son attention bienveillante.

L'étude du discours poétique des sonnets religieux de Michel-Ange révèle donc un dispositif élaboré mais direct du message persuasif. Fondée sur l'idéologie tridentine de la justification par la grâce (méritée par le sacrifice exemplaire du Christ et par les bonnes oeuvres) l'argumentation du poète fait preuve d'une rhétorisation poussée du texte poétique--expression de la volonté de l'artiste d'établir et de poursuivre le dialogue Homme-Dieu.

NOTES

[1] Respectivement les sonnets numérotés: 87, 285, 293 dans l'édition de _Rime_, de Michelangelo Buonarroti.

[2] Le verbe "vouloir" désigne une "volition virtualisante" qui comporte deux modalités: désir et volonté. A une analyse plus poussée le sens désidératif comporte une dimension réflexive et une dimension translative, tandis que la "volonté" implique, elle aussi, des modalités propres réflexives et translatives (Cristea 62).

[3] D'après T. Cristea 114, B. Migliorini 218-230, M. Regula-J. Jernej 212-217, 266-268.

[4] Pour la très complexe tradition de la rhétorisation de la poésie italienne au XVIème siècle voir Barilli 74-8.

[5] _Lettere di Michelangelo Buonarroti_ à Paus Paul III, Roma, 1544 et à Benedetto Varchi, Roma, 1549.

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THE PERENNIAL CHALLENGE OF RHETORIC:

THE MEXICAN NUN'S VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF EFFICTIO

André Michalski

I am not all sure that my paper really belongs in the section devoted to Sacred Rhetoric. True, the author that I am dealing with is a Catholic nun who spent her entire adult life in a convent, and roughly half of her work was written to be performed in a liturgical context. But, as I think will be ,obvious upon closer examination, her literary models and her artistic concerns are not in the least religious. She is as far removed from Saint Theresa as she possibly could be and still wear a habit.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, Sor Juana Inés de Cruz, whose secular name was Juana Inés de Asbaje y Ramírez, and who is known in English as the Mexican Nun, was without the slightest doubt the most important poet writing in Spanish on either side of the Atlantic. In Mexico itself, her position was that of a semi-official poet laureate, to whom both the civilian and the ecclesiastical authorities appealed frequently and regularly to compose secular and religious poems, songs, and plays that were lavishly produced on festive occasions of Church and State.

It is precisely because she wrote mainly on command—roughly two-thirds of her entire production was commissioned in order to be recited or sung before an assembly, in a mood of celebration—that such a large segment of Sor Juana's literary production, be it secular or religious, is so unasbashedly rhetorical, so openly epideictic. Moreover, it would appear that Sor Juana, who by reason of her sex was denied entry to schools and universities and was entirely self-taught, considered rhetoric as the most important of the Liberal Arts, though she dabbled in all of them.

How, otherwise, would she have written the following villancico, or carol, whose first line is "La Retorica Nueva‾" ("the New Rhetoric"), and which pictures the Virgin Mary as a professor of rhetoric, surpassing Demosthenes and Cicero? (210, No. 223). This villancico was one of a series, some serious, some humorous, that were performed in the Metropolitan Cathedral of Mexico City on the Feast of the Assumption, 1676. In it Sor Juana interprets, somewhat facetiously, the Motherhood of Mary and her position as an intercessor between mankind and her Divine Son, and in particular her rôle as the Defender of sinners, as an exercise in rhetoric, or ars suasoria.

Thus, the first stanza:

Para quien quisiera oír,

o aprender a bien hablar,

y lo quiere conseguir,

María sabe enseñar,

el arte de bien decir.

Or, in English:

For whoever wants to hear,

or learn how to discourse,

and wants to attain it,

Mary knows how to teach,

the art of speaking well.

As to the structure of the villancico, it views Mary's entire life as a progression through the various tropes of rhetoric, from her Conception to the Assumption.

In another carol from the same festive occasion, the Virgin Mary is depicted as an epic warrior who compares favourably with the heroic

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characters of Ariosto's <u>Orlando Furioso</u>. Notwithstanding the fact that in Sor Juana's native Mexico, on the very outskirts of the viceregal capital, the Virgin Mary was venerated since the first half of the 16th century—as she is to this day—in the figure of a native woman (I am referring to the famous effigy of Mary imprinted on an Indian cape and venerated in the Villa de Guadalupe, just outside Mexico City, where she appears with black hair and very dark skin), in this <u>villancico</u> Sor Juana ignores the local hagiographic tradition of Mexico and remains faithful to the rhetorical, courtly, and mythical tradition of Europe, alluding to the Virgin's blonde hair:

> La que si desprende al aire
>
> la siempre madeja rubia
>
> tantos Roldanes la cercan
>
> cuantos cabellos la inundan (209; No. 222, st. 5)

which I have rendered in English thus:

> <u>the one who</u>, if she unclasps and lets flow in the air
>
> her forever blonde mane,
>
> gets surrounded by as many Rolands
>
> as the strands of hair cascading down her body.

As we can see, this image is above all literary. Actually, at first glance it would appear that the image contained in the quatrain here quoted is somewhat ambiguous and refers not to Mary, but to Ariosto's heroine, Angelica, or simultaneously to both Mary and Angelica, thus placing both, the Virgin Mother of God and the sexually frivolous female protagonist of Ariosto's poem, on the same plane. Upon closer examination, however, it seems that Sor Juana does indeed intend it to refer to Mary: it is one of a series of stanzas, each of them characterizing the Virgin and beginning

with _la que_ (_the one who_). The comparison with Angelica, possibly sacrilegious even at that, is limited to collating the physical perfection of both women. It also would seem that the public for whose benefit these _villancicos_ were written must have been very select and quite erudite, or else they would have missed all the learned allusions.

A more complete description of the Virgin is contained in another _villancico_, one of a series composed for the Cathedral of Mexico City for the Feast of the Assumption of 1679. This _villancico_ has the form and the style of a _jacara_, a folksy ballad. First, the Virgin's dress is described as surpassing the glory of the starry sky. Her detailed physical portraiture, itemized in the usual rhetorical order, from the head down to the feet, begins in stanza 9:

> 9. ¡No es nada! De sus mejillas
>
>   están, de miedo temblando,
>
>   tamañitos los Abriles,
>
>   descoloridos los Mayos.
>
> 10. ¡Los ojos! Ahí quiero verte.
>
>   ¡Solecito arrebolado!
>
>   Por la menor de sus luces
>
>   dieras caballos y carro.
>
> 11. Pues a la boca, no hay símil
>
>   que venga con quince palmos:
>
>   que es un pobrete el Oriente
>
>   y el Occidente un menguado.
>
> 12. ¿Qué más quisiera el jazmín
>
>   que andarse, paso a paso,
>
>   apropiándose en su rostro

entre lo rojo y lo blanco?

13. De las demás perfecciones

al inmenso Mare Magnum,

cíñalas la admiración,

si hay ceñidor para tanto.   (239: No.256)

Or, in English:

9. This is nothing! Trembling with fear before

her colourful cheeks,

the Aprils are shrunken to nothingness.

The Mays have lost all their hues.

10. And the eyes! I want you to stand next to Her,

my little ruddy Sun!

For the least one of Her lights,

you would gladly give up chariot and horses.

11. As far as the mouth goes, there is no simile

that may come near it within fifteen measured spans:

by comparison the Orient is in a terible pinch,

and the Occident a real starveling.

12. What else could jasmine wish for

than to go and, step by step,

steal from Her face

the reds and the whites?

13. And, as far as the other perfections are concerned,

let us measure them by the immense Mare magnum,

if such a measuring tape

will ever reach far enough.

As we can see, this portrait of the Virgin is not just another effictio. It also is a commentary on the art of rhetoric and its shortcomings. Sor Juana is writing for an audience familiar with rhetorical theory and practice and alludes to the limitations of this art form. In each of the stanzas here cited, she points out that the traditional rhetorical trope associated with the particular physical feature to be characterized does not go far enough to do justice to the Virgin's beauty. Already here, we have the first manifestation of the attitude that will be fully developed in the ovillejos to Lisarda (which we shall examine further on). The difference between the two consists in the fact that in the villancico to the Virgin, the art of rhetoric is inadequate to the subject, whereas in the case of the ovillejos, where Lisarda is a beautiful but ordinary girl, rhetoric is no longer fit to describe her. It is a worn-out art form. It is also worth noticing that here and elsewhere Sor Juana takes delight in displaying the stitches that hold her artwork together.

Baby Jesus, too, is portrayed according to the rhetorical precepts of effictio, in a carol Sor Juana wrote for the Christmas celebration of 1689 (267; No. 288). The entire villancico is nothing but a rhetorical portrait of the Divine Child, with commonplace terms of comparison: His hair is a skein of gold forming rings, His eyes are two emeralds or two sapphires, His mouth is a ruby split in two, with the interspace filled with tiny pearls, and so on. In still another villancico the entire Holy Family is portrayed according to rhetorical tenets.

One of Sor Juana's most ambitious works is the auto sacramental or mystery play titled El Divino Narciso (The Divine Narcissus), which combines Christian and classical mythological elements, and whose central

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character is Narcissus-Christ. In the following scene Narcissus is looking
into a spring and admiring the reflection of his own beauty, or--to explain
the allegory--Jesus is looking into the spring and falling in love with the
Human Nature that he sees reflected there:

> Recién abierta granada
>
> sus mejillas sonrosea;
>
> sus dos labios hermosea
>
> partida cinta rosada,
>
> por quien la voz delicada,
>
> haciendo al coral agravio,
>
> despide el aliento sabio
>
> que así a sus claveles toca;
>
> leche y miel vierte la boca,
>
> panales destila el labio.
>
>
> Las perlas que en concha breve
>
> guarda, se han asimilado
>
> al rebaño, que apiñado
>
> desciende en copos de nieve;
>
> el cuerpo, que gentil mueve,
>
> el aire a la palma toma;
>
> los ojos, por quien asoma
>
> el alma, entre su arrebol
>
> muestran, con luces del Sol,
>
> benignidad de paloma.

Terso el bulto delicado,

en lo que a la vista ofrece,

parva de trigo parece,

con azucenas vallado:

de marfil es torneado

el cuello, gentil coluna.

No puede igualar ninguna

hermosura a su arrebol:

escogida como el Sol

y hermosa como la Luna.   (409; IV, ix)

Or, in a literal translation into English:

A freshly split pomegranate blushes the cheeks. The two lips are
beautified by a parted rose-coloured ribbon, through which a
delicate voice, in an affront to coral, sends forth a wise breath
skimming over carnations. The mouth distills milk and honey, flow-
ing from the lips as from a honeycomb.

The pearls that are contained in a compact shell resemble a herd of
sheep coming down like snowflakes; the body, gently swaying in the
breeze, looks like a palm tree; the eyes, through which the soul is
looking out, show, in the midst of pink surroundings, both the
brilliance of the Sun and the gentleness of a dove.

Smooth and polished the delicate face, as it shows itself to the
eyes. It seems a heap of freshly mowed grain, surrounded by a hedge
of white lilies; the neck is a gentle pillar sculpted in ivory. No

splendour may ever equate with the rosy cheek: as unique as the Sun and as beautiful as the Moon.

The Mexican priest and scholar Alfonso Méndez Plancarte has shown in detail how the delicate similes of this portrait are derived from the Song of Songs and its descriptions of the Bride (3: 538-539). There is another portrait of Narcissus in the play, this one proferred by Human Nature, who is looking for her beloved and asks the nymphs of the woods to help her in the search (402; III, vi). This portrait also is inspired by the Song of Songs (Méndez Plancarte 3: 529-530). These portrayals of Narcissus depart considerably from the other rhetorical portraits in Sor Juana's writings. First of all, their inspiration is mostly Biblical: the order in which the various features are enumerated is much freer than the usual head-to-foot sequence, and the similes employed also are quite different from those of the traditional effictio. Rather than purely visual, these descriptions are lyrical, mystical and erotic at the same time, as in the Song of Songs. It also is striking that Narcissus, looking at himself in the spring, sees a female face, or rather an androgynous one, that of Human Nature. Nowhere does Sor Juana pen a portrait, rhetorical or otherwise, of grown men. With the exception of Baby Jesus, and the hermaphroditic Narcissus, all her detailed portraits are of females. As Octavio Paz points out (299), the description of a male body was indecent, and would have been scandalous if it were depicted by a woman, and much more so by a nun.

One of the religious plays written by Sor Juana is El cetro de José (Joseph's Sceptre). In the Biblical story which gave the inspiration to Sor Juana's auto, Joseph is portrayed as an extremely handsome young man (Genesis 39:7), and one would expect that in Sor Juana's play there would be a description of his physical beauty, which drives Potiphar's wife to

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declare her adulterous intentions to him. Instead, what we have in the
play is a self-portrayal by Potiphar's wife. She is calling out to Joseph
and describing herself to him, trying to entice him into her arms with
words of rhetorical self-praise:

> ¡Espera, galán Hebreo;
>
> si a obligarte no bastan
>
> las prendas de mi belleza,
>
> los adornos de mi gracia;
>
> si en los rizos de mi pelo,
>
> los tesoros de la Arabia
>
> no te aprisionan, porque
>
> son, en fin, cadenas blandas;
>
> si de mis ojos los rayos,
>
> si de mi frente la plata,
>
> si de mi boca los rubíes,
>
> si en mis mejillas el nácar,
>
> no te mueven ni te incitan,
>
> ni a que te enamores bastan,
>
> porque son prendas caducas,
>
> que pagan al tiempo parias,
>
> muévate un alma rendida:
>
> que los tesoros del alma
>
> no pagan pensión al tiempo,
>
> ni tributo a las mudanzas! (479-480; II, vii)

Here is my English version of the romance:

Wait, handsome Hebrew! For, if you cannot be swayed

by the ornaments of my beauty, the graceful parts

of my comeliness,

if the ringlets of my hair, the treasures of

Arabia do not ensnare you, that must be because

they are after all, such soft chains.

If the sparkle of my eyes, the silver of my brow,

the rubies of my mouth, my cheeks' mother-of-pearl,

do not move or incite you, or suffice

to make you fall in love,

that is because they are but perishable gems,

and pay their dues to time.

But then, you must be moved by my enslaved soul:

since the treasures of the soul do not pay rent

to time, nor tribute to mutation.

What is striking about this _effictio_ is, first of all, the enumeration
of precious stones and metals traditionally used as similes in rhetorical
portraits, so that the appeal seems to be directed more at one's sense of
greed than that of lasciviousness. Secondly, the portrait conforms in
every detail to the traditional tenets of beauty, so that Potiphar's wife
is as crystal-white and as golden-haired as any Northern-European beauty,
which, of course, would be unusual in an Egyptian. Father Méndez
Plancarte, bent on proving that Sor Juana does not steer too far from
realism, documents two cases of historical Egyptian princesses who were
blond (3: 617). But it must be obvious that Sor Juana did not care in the

least whether she was being realistic or not, especially in an allegorical auto, where human characters appear on stage together with such others as Intelligence, Envy, Prophecy, Conjecture, the Morning Star, etc. The tenets of rhetoric were the only norm that she felt had to apply when describing a person.

Sor Juana's inventiveness, within the narrow confines of rhetorical effictio, is even more spectacular in her secular poetry. The following excerpt is a portrait of María Luisa Manrique de Lara y Gonzaga, Countess of Paredes, Marchioness of La Laguna, and Vicereine of New Spain from 1680 to 1686. She became Sor Juana's intimate friend during her stay in Mexico City, and remained her patronness after her return to Spain. It is she who collected the Mexican Nun's manuscripts and had them published in Madrid in 1689. Other editions were to follow almost immediately. The second volume of Sor Juana's works appeared in Seville (María Luisá's home town) in 1692, with two more editions in the following year. The Countess of Paredes was the moving force behind all these editions, but in each case the actual editorial responsibility befell to someone else (Paz 557-562). The poem's unusual, though not entirely original, verse form is that of a romance decasílabo, a ballad with ten syllables per line, with the first word of every line, a palabra esdrújula, here a three-syllable word stressed on the first syllable. The over-all effect of reading such a poem aloud is reminiscent of classical quantitative poetry, with each line beginning with a dactyl and ending in a trochee. Even more than by its metric virtuosity, the romance stands out by virtue of its elaborately stylized similes and metaphors, and a choice of vocabulary which carefully avoids everyday words. In this Sor Juana closely emulates Góngora and his school. The portrait of María Luisa, consisting of seventeen four-line stanzas, is too

long to be quoted here in its entirety, but it is worthwhile to examine its general structure, as well as that of its individual quatrains. Except for the first and the last quatrain, which constitute the "frame" of the portrait, each of the remaining fifteen is devoted to depicting, by means of superlative comparisons, just one feature of the Countess's appearance. In the conventional descending order, the second quatrain describes María Luisa's hair, the third her forehead, the fourth the eyebrows, the fifth the eyes, and so on to the fifteenth, extolling the minuteness of María's feet, that shun solid ground and intoxicate the winds that they tread with magic philters of love. The sixteenth stanza views the entire figure of the Vicereine, comparing its graceful suppleness to that of a banana tree, or a flame fluttering in the wind, as it spreads perfume all around.

Let us examine some of the stanzas of this, probably the most ambitious of Sor Juana's exercises in rhetorical portraiture. Here is the second quatrain of the romance decasílabo (79, No. 61):

Cárceles tu madeja fabrica:
dédalo que sutilmente forma
vínculos de dorados Ofires,
Tíbares de prisiones gustosas.

Or, in a literal translation:

Your mane constructs prisons,
a labyrinth subtly forming
bonds of golden Ophirs,
pleasurable dungeons of Tibar.

This actually is a complicated way of saying that the Countess's hair is golden and curly, most appealing to the beholder, whose eyes get lost—imprisoned—in its ringlets (Ophir and Tibar, mentioned in the Bible

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as the faraway sources of gold, in Sor Juana's time had become poetic clichés signifying "gold").

Now, stanza three:

Hécate, no triforme, mas llena,
pródiga de candores asoma;
trémula no en tu frente se oculta,
fúlgida su esplendor desemboza.

Or, in English:

Hekate, not three-shaped but full,
a prodigy of whiteness, shows her face;
she does not timorously hide in your forehead,
but uncovers her refulgent splendour.

In simple language, María Luisa's forehead is ample, white and shiny, like the full moon (Hekate, who in Greek mythology is usually identified with Artemis or Diana, the moon-goddess, was often figured by a three-faced statue).

And stanza four:

Círculo dividido en dos arcos,
Pérsica forman lid belicosa
áspides que por flechas disparan,
víboras de halagüeña ponzoña.

Or, in translation:

A circle divided in two arcs
makes up a Persian battle line:
two asps shooting arrows,
vipers of alluring venom.

Again here, the basic idea is quite simple: María Luisa has arched eyebrows. They are in turn compared to geometrical arcs, to the classical battle line of ancient Persia, to bows shooting arrows, and to poisonous snakes. The allusions are classical throughout, and the metaphors easily flow one into the next. Not content to say that the Countess has arched eyebrows, Sor Juana makes them out to be geometrically perfect: half circles or arcs. But in Spanish arco almost means "bow." Hence the image of archery, which naturally alludes to Cupid: here María Luisa shoots deadly arrows from her eyes (the shooting imagery is continued in the next stanza, where the eyes discharge incendiary missiles that set souls on fire). But the eyebrows are also snakes—asps, naturally—with the inevitable hint at Cleopatra's classical beauty and her domination of powerful men.

The warlike imagery of this and the following stanza might be an echo of Ovid's dictum, militiae species amor est. One would not expect this kind of erotic imagery from the pen of a cloistered nun writing in her cell. The reader receives the impression that this effictio is not just another exercise in rhetoric, but that it does convey feeling, stylized to be sure, but nevertheless strong. The nature of Sor Juana's relationship with her friend and patroness, the Countess of Paredes, is, and always has been, an enigma. The great Mexican poet, Octavio Paz, devotes a whole chapter of his book on Sor Juana to the analysis of that relationship, and, despite his great erudition and intimate knowledge of Mexican history, his literary sensibility and psychological acumen, he declares himself incapable of solving this enigma entirely to his satisfaction (260-303). He is probably correct in referring throughout his book to the very complex

relationship between the two women as an _amistad amorosa,_ or loving friendship.

According to Paz, of all the poems that Sor Juana wrote to celebrate the face and the body of the Countess of Paredes, the _romance decasílabo_ is the most brilliant and the most imaginative (298). We must not believe, however, that the _romance_ necessarily offers an accurate description of María Luisa's _physical appearance._ The portrait conforms in its entirety to the traditional canons of feminine beauty from the blonde hair and the straight nose, to the thin waist, slender fingers and tiny feet. In actuality, the Vicereine may, or may not, have come close to the ideal. None of the features mentioned in the portrait is individualized in the sense that it could set María Luisa apart from other women. That precisely is the idea of the epideictic portrait: not only is each feature described in a traditionally consecrated manner, but also it is made to conform in every detail to what is generally perceived as the commonly held ideal of physical beauty. That is why all those beautiful damsels, be their names Lysi, Galatea, Angelica, or Phyllis, always look like exact replicas of one another.

María Luisa Gonzaga, even though she is the only subject of a portrait by Sor Juana that can be readily identified as a living model, is no exception to that rule. As we shall see further on, Sor Juana protests against the constraints of _effictio,_ but nowhere does she attempt to throw away those constraints and paint a portrait that would be truly individualized, if not true to life. Her variations on the theme of _effictio,_ as we can see, display an unbelievable range of virtuosity, considering the limitations of the _topos,_ but they never stray outside the accepted boundaries of rhetoric.

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The romance decasílabo, with its unusual verse form, its erudite classical and Biblical allusions, and euphuistic metaphors and similes, is a masterpiece of baroque style, unsurpassed by any other of Sor Juana's poetic compositions. It has its counterpart in another rhetorical portrait, a brief décima (a poem of ten octosyllabic lines with a rigid rhyme scheme), whose subject apparently also is the Countess of Paredes (Paz 294 and 298):

> Tersa frente, oro el cabello,
>
> cejas arcos, zafir ojos,
>
> bruñida tez, labios rojos,
>
> nariz recta, ebúrneo cuello;
>
> talle airoso, cuerpo bello,
>
> cándidas manos en que
>
> el cetro de amor se ve,
>
> tiene Fili; en oro engasta
>
> pie tan breve, que no gasta
>
> ni un pie. (125; No. 132)

I have translated it thus:

> A polished forehead, hair of gold,
>
> arched eyebrows, sapphire eyes,
>
> smooth complexion, the lips red,
>
> a straight nose, ivory neck,
>
> graceful figure, the body beautiful,
>
> pure white hands, in which
>
> the sceptre of love is seen,
>
> Fili has; in gold encased,
>
> her foot is so brief that,

it does not even take

a foot (of verse).

It would appear that the contrast between this décima and the romance decasílabo that we have seen is indeed intentional. In the décima, each physical feature is characterized by only one adjective, or adjectival noun, for the most part drawn from everyday vocabulary (the exceptions are cándido, instead of blanco, to mean "white," and ebúrneo, rather than de marfil, to mean "ivory-like"). Terseness and brevity, of the entire poem, of each line, of each idea, are de rigueur. This décima is the most concise rhetorical portrait in Sor Juana's repertory. Its first word is terso, which applied to the forehead is most appropriate, as it means "smooth," "shiny," "without wrinkles." But applied to literary style, terso means "smooth," "simple," "facile." Quite obviously, Sor Juana, in this little gem of a poem, not only is trying to execute an effictio that would stand out by its conciseness, but simultaneously she is commenting on her own artistry. This is particularly evident at the end of the poem, with its conceit based on the double meaning of the word foot, in anatomy and prosody. Thus the smallness of Fili's foot is illustrated by the brevity of the last line, which has only two syllables, as against the eight which are the rule for a décima. Thus, in a most ingenious manner, the décima not only is a rhetorical portrait remarkable for its conciseness, but it also is a portrait of a portrait, a commentary upon itself.

In a further development of the topos of the rhetorical portrait, Sor Juana adopts a theme and adapts it to the frame of the portrait. We thus have an effictio whose symmetrical construction is compared to that of a musical composition, and where the similes, metaphors, and other points of

comparison are drawn, from beginning to end, from the vocabulary of music (105; No. 87). In a somewhat similar vein, two of the *effictiones* are folk dances: they are *romancillos exasílabos*, or hexasyllabic ballads, written to the beat of a regional folk dance, and undoubtedly intended to be sung at a festival, such as the one organized by Sor Juana's convent in honour of the Viceroy and the Vicereine, the Count and Countess of Paredes (84-89; Nos. 64-69). Of the two *romancillos*, the one numbered 71 (91) is to be sung to the music of a regional dance, the *cardador*, i.e., a wool carder. All the similes in the itemized portrait are drawn from the care of sheep, their wool, and their milk. Number 72 (92), likewise, is built around the name of the dance to the beat of which it is written, the *San Juan de Lima*. Lima, naturally, is a city, the then capital of the viceroyalty encompassing all of Spanish South America. But *lima* also is a *lime*, the green-coloured and sour-tasting fruit, whose juice is an essential element in Mexican salad dressings. All the similes in this rhetorical portrait thus point to citrus and to a bittersour taste in the mouth, beginning with the first word, *Agrísima*, meaning *very sour*, *very sharp*. Octavio Paz states that this little poem is a caricature (298). It obviously is, that of a girl of a sour mien. But in my opinion, the main purpose of this composition, as well as of numbers 87 and 92, is to serve as exercises in rhetoric, as variations on the theme of *effictio*, a search for new and fresh similes to describe the features of face and body.

This search for fresh images is the theme of Sor Juana's poem number 214 (172-179), the longest (396 lines) rhetorical portrait that she, and probably anyone else, ever wrote. The poem, a portrait of a certain Lisarda, follows the usual head-to-toe sequence, but with a difference: each feature being considered in its turn provides a platform for the

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reiteration of the statement that all the possibilities of rhetoric are
exhausted. Let us see just the first part of stanza 3 of the ovillejos in
question:

> ¡Oh siglo desdichado y desvalido
>
> en que todo lo hallamas ya servido,
>
> pues no hay voz, equívoco ni frase
>
> que por común no pase
>
> y digan los censores:
>
> ¿Eso? ¡Ya lo pensaron los mayores!
>
> Dichosos los antiguos que tuvieron
>
> paño de que cortar, y así vistieron
>
> sus conceptos de albores,
>
> de luces, de reflejos y de flores!
>
> Que entonces era el Sol nuevo, flamante,
>
> y andaba tan valido lo brillante,
>
> que el decir que el cabello era un tesoro,
>
> valía otro tanto oro.
>
> Pues las Estrellas, con sus rayos rojos,
>
> que aun no estaban cansadas de ser ojos . . . . . (173)

Or, in English:

> Oh, unhappy and desolate age, when everything
>
> we come upon has already been said, when there
>
> is no voice, no pun, no phrase that is not a
>
> a commonplace, and critics will decry: This?
>
> But our forefathers said that already!
>
> Happy were the ancients who had ample cloth
>
> to cut, and so were able to dress up their

tropes with dawns, with lights, with reflec-

tions, with flowers. Then the Sun was brand-

new and smashing, and anything shiny was truly

appreciated, so that to say that the hair

was a treasure was worth its weight in

gold. And the Stars with their reddish

twinkle were not yet tired of being also eyes . . . .

I have to disagree with Georgina Sabat de Rivers (34-35), who says
that the intention of the ovillejos is to satirize bad poets. Neither do I
entirely agree with Octavio Paz (402-403), who states that the purpose of
the poem is to poke fun at the excesses of the culterano poets, while
remaining within the limits of culterano style. While the style of the
poem is obviously humorous, its intent is not. Throughout her life as a
writer, Sor Juana has been concerned with rhetoric, its power, and its
limitations. Evidently, in the ovillejos to Lisarda, Sor Juana fully states
what she had been hinting at throughout her work, that traditional rhetoric
is worn out as an art form. In a way, the ovillejos to Lisarda are an ars
poetica in reverse: instead of looking forward, pointing the way to a new
sensibility, a new way of saying things, its nostalgic gaze is directed at
the rhetorical past, a past that has lost its virginity forever, and she
deplores the fact.

Who knows? Perhaps the amazing "conversion" of Sor Juana in 1694,
when she gave up literature forever, divesting herself of the largest
private library in the New World and of her collection of musical and
scientific instruments, sold to give alms to the poor, and devoting the
last years of her life to penance, prayer, and works of charity, was due
less to a new spiritual awakening, as her hagiographers, such as Méndez

Plancarte (1: xxxi-xxxii) would have it, or to the persecution by religious authorities, as proposed by Paz (566-608), than to a feeling of mental fatigue, the realization of having reached the end of the road, a sort of a rhetorical surfeit. In the absence of an outburst of mystical or devotional poetry following Sor Juana's "conversion," which would point to a spontaneous religious rebirth, and with no external evidence that she was being "brainwashed" by her ecclesiastical superiors, in order to force her to abandon all intellectual activity, her total withdrawal into her cell, and the equally total silence that followed, might point in that direction.

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THE RHETORIC OF THE LOGOS

AND

THOMAS SHEPARD'S REGENERATION

John Stephen Martin

One of the major concerns of the Puritans of England and New England in the seventeenth century was the problem of determining the nature of regenerative grace (Holifield 140-41; Miller, The Seventeenth Century 281, 284, 287-90, 292-99; and Pettit). Grace, by definition, was a supernatural experience, and so there were no empirical proofs possible, in the modern sense of observing and analyzing phenomena. But the age was not without resources. By dividing the concept of grace into logical parts, the arrangement and sequence of these parts supposedly provided credible knowledge. That is, the Puritan theologian could demonstrate the presence and action of grace based on rhetorical considerations of argument, terms, and arrangement of the terms (White 75-94; Miller, The Seventeenth Century 340-45). There was a formal neatness to the experience of grace, as one key term balanced another, and each term modified the one idea of grace. On the one hand, grace was said to "justify" a man by giving him faith in Christ's Crucifixion when by nature a man did not have such faith; on the other hand, grace was also said to "sanctify" a man to do God's will in this world when most "natural" men would refuse it. The connection between justification and sanctification was apparently unified, as "justifying" faith made all acts and works attest to one's sanctification. Moreover, in inverted fashion, the good acts and works of sanctification confirmed the reality of the prior experience of justification. Puritans, however, were aware that even a damned sinner could do good acts and works, since a

sinner would do such acts and works in a vain attempt to bribe God to save his soul. Thus, justification, despite being the more indefinite state in the process of mankind's regeneration from the natural to the spiritual, was considered the central stage of the drama of salvation, for in that particular experience a blitheful, self-centered sinner was suddenly altered in his nature and adopted God's will for his own. In effect, the experience of "justifying" grace was cataclysmic even though the subsequent acts of "sanctifying" grace reflected a resolute, though calm spirit which was considered to be appropriate to the Elect. The point is, only the rhetoric of a logical arrangement could control this implicit dialectic of terms.[1]

There was a further complication for the Puritans of New England. For them, the determination of the experience of "justifying" grace was closely bound to one's articulation of the experience of justification to other persons. Peculiar to the New England churches was the ritual of public confession in which applicants for church membership had to present themselves to a congregation of God's Annointed to be certified that they indeed had had such an experience.[2]

This ritual was not known to the Puritans in England possibly because the Puritans there continued the practice of the established Church whereby baptism at birth made every person a church member, and one's faith was to be increased successively through each of the sacraments (Holifield 28-38). In New England, however, the void of an established church was filled by the Puritan covenanted church which made persons test their faith publicly before being admitted to membership, and this public confession was a ritualized means to be sure that only the Elect would govern God's mediation with his people (Miller, The Seventeenth Century 439-40). Historically,

such persons initially would come together and relate their experiences of regeneration, but by 1636--just six years after the founding of the Massachusetts colony at Boston--the General Court of the colony gave legal sanction to the prescription of Governor John Winthrop and the Reverend Thomas Shepard to have all applicants screened by the elders and minister in a preliminary interview (Morgan 101). Shepard was a major theologian of the colony who fostered this ritual of the so-called New England Way, but when he heard applicants ramble at length and search for words to describe their experience of justification, he was amazed that candidates made grace seem so indefinite:

> I confess . . . it is not fit that so holy and solemn an Assembly as a Church is, should be held long with Revelations of this odd thing and tother, nor hear of Revelations and groundless joyes, nor gather together the heap, and heap up all the particular passages of their lives, wherein they have got any good; nor Scriptures and Sermons, but such as may be of special use unto the people of God, such things as tend to shew, Thus I was humbled, then thus I was called, then thus I have walked, though with many weaknesses since, and such special providences of God I have seen, temptations gone through, and thus the Lord had delivered me, blessed be his Name etc.[3]

Shepard's sense of necessary concision makes the public confession into a symbolic act that might affect the audience rhetorically; but it has already been suggested how demanding it was to combine a notice of the cataclysm of "justifying" grace with the quietness of sanctification, which--in Shepard's words--is actually marked by special providences of God, such as recovery from illness, good harvests in bad climatic conditions, and an escape from danger. The point is, Shepard sought in the

ritual the equanimity of the two parts of regeneration which only rhetorical control might offer. In effect, Shepard believed that men who lacked the rhetorical graces might well be unconscious but dangerous hypocrites who would "defile a whole Church" as surely as the cunning hypocrites who sought church membership to gain social approbation and status.[4] For this reason, he encouraged and instituted the preliminary screening of a candidate by the elders and minister who would test him on church doctrine and query him about the specific experience which evidenced God's intervention of grace into his life. Of course, such a screening would filter out persons of known immoral behavior as well as persons who could not comprehend the articles of faith (Morgan 88); however, it did give a "dry run" rehearsal to the presentation of "justifying" and "sanctifying" grace before the entire congregation, and did thereby contribute to the concision that Shepard sought. Some historians might argue that only the better educated, and thus the social elite, could pass such a test. But the fact is, the test was hardly so rigorous, nor was meant to be; for if a candidate was hesitant or incoherent before the congregation, the minister would generally assist him by relating on his behalf what was told in the preliminary interview (Morgan 89). It was clear that although the entire congregation was the nominal jury, it was the minister and elders who wielded power. The conclusion comes to mind that if the candidate was acceptable in the preliminary interview, the presentation of the candidate before the congregation had a greater ritualistic and rhetorical purpose than historians hitherto have assumed.

Indeed, as we remember Shepard's objections to unscreened candidates, it would seem that the minister and elders welcomed individuals who could make the church's beliefs about grace be demonstrated in a direct

experience of "justifying faith." The ritual of public confession, by its rhetorical structure, was a form of Aristotelian "spectacle," "demonstration," or theatre. As such, its rhetoric held together justification and sanctification, and it prompted all uninitiated persons to examine their lives to find an occasion of "justifying" grace and instances of "sanctifying" grace. Because such able individuals could be found, the practised ritual gave empirical support to the reality of grace, the specific doctrines of the church, and--perhaps most important--the hierarchy of the church, especially the positions of the minister and the elders.

Thomas Shepard's attitude toward public confession, however, is intriguing for two reasons. Shepard had had his own experience of regeneration at Cambridge University in 1624, and yet had never participated in a public confession; as a minister in New England, he was called to witness the confession of laymen who either formed new congregations or were taken into existing churches. Further, the rhetorical arrangement and balance of purely personal experience that Shepard suggested for the ritual of the applicants of Massachusetts was strikingly absent from his awareness when he recorded his experience of "justifying" grace in his Autobiography written in 1646, three years before his death in the colony. True, the Autobiography structures his entire life into two parts coming before and coming after his 1624 regeneration: prior to that experience, his life is portrayed as one of naivity, confusion, riotous behavior and recurrent anguish of conscience; afterwards, he speaks of his assurances about God's purposes, exemplified in that same anguished conscience. In his Journal, dated between 1640 and 1644 (thus predating the Autobiography), Shepard uses the phrase "God's plot" for the redemption of the world that is unfolding as foreordained despite his personal tribulations (119, 141). Even

so, despite the ambiguity of a cataclysmic change and continuity, Shepard never defined the specific moment of "justifying" faith nor made a bold claim as to his personal "sanctification." Indeed, especially in the Journal, Shepard's depiction of "sanctification" is completely untypical of a "saint" who was to enjoy a quiet spirit, for his personal consciousness is ever in turmoil; and he characterizes acts of piety in such an absolute manner that few persons could be sure of their Election.

This underlying doubt extends throughout his life and is crucial in understanding his circumspective articulation of his experience of regeneration. Early in his Autobiography, Shepard gave notices of his early life as an orphan, a situation seemingly allied to his sinfulness. Innocuous as this connection might seem, it is a major referent for the Puritan metaphor of God as a father, and suggests that having God as a father will end the temporal conditions that make sin possible. Being an orphan, for example, Shepard at Cambridge was a "Sophister" who was "foolish and proud" in disputing the existence of God and the nature of life. But the surprising fact is that despite this apparent enthrallment to an imperviously sinful nature, Shepard's conscience was jarred from time to time by the sermons and lectures on theology that he heard at Cambridge. He noted that he was "affected" by the preachings but invariably broke loose and deliberately sought sinful companions and activities--lusting, gambling, bowling, and drinking--in order to fend off the words of the preacher (40-1). Over and over, Shepard went through the same cycle of hope ending in sin until in 1624, at the age of nineteen, he had a spiritual crisis, which in retrospect was the decisive one. After one Saturday night when he drank so much that he awakened only late on Sunday, the sabbath, he became "sick with [his] beastly carriage." He continues:

And when I awakened I went from [my friend] in shame and confusion, and went out into the fields and there spent that Sabbath lying hid in the cornfields where the Lord, who might justly have cut me off in the midst of my sin, did meet me with much sadness of heart and troubled my soul for this and other my sins which then I had cause and leisure to think of. And now when I was worst he began to be best unto me and made me resolve to set upon a course of daily meditation about the evil of sin and my own ways. Yet although I was troubled for this sin, I did not know my sinful nature all this while. (41)

A modern reader notes that Shepard was not troubled by his lack of specific phenomenal details aside from those noting the time of day and the place; God was not visible despite the use of the word meet. Further, because Shepard was an orphan, as I noted earlier, Shepard's description of God as a loving but disappointed father is an effective rhetorical metaphor which hides the absence of God's physical features. Thus, God the father is the Platonic Archetype of which an earthly father is only a type. Thus, too, by diction and by structure, Shepard might well consider this experience as a typical parallel to how God chose his Elect before the creation: in a sense all history was recapitulated through words just as Christ recapitulated the drama of salvation in the logos of Scripture.

But the process of Shepard's regeneration was certainly not complete at this moment in the cornfield. That it was not is suggested by Shepard's statement that God's mercy was extended in return for his "resolve . . . upon a course of daily meditation about the evil of sin and my own ways." If mercy was the instance of "justifying" grace giving Shepard faith, then the "meditations" corresponded to the onset of "sanctifying" grace. In the

very next paragraph, Shepard showed exactly what "meditation" meant. It was, he implied, a way of reading or hearing the Bible so that it could at any moment compel an awareness of sin and a need for a change of heart that was virtually a reduplication of the direct, special experience of "justifying" grace.

> The Lord therefore sent Doctor Preston to be Master of the [Emmanuel] College, and, Mr. Stone and others commending his preaching to be most spiritual and excellent, I began to listen unto what he said, and the first sermon he preached was Romans 12—to be renewed in the spirit of your mind—in opening which point, viz., the change of heart in a Christian, the Lord so bored my ears as that I understood what he spake and the secrets of my soul were laid upon [i.e., open] before me—the hypocrisy of all my good things I thought I had in me—as if one had told him of all that ever I did, of all the turnings and deceits of my heart, insomuch as that I thought he was the most searching preacher in the world. And I began to love him much and to bless God I did see my frame and my hypocrisy and self and secret sins . . . . (41-2)

To be sure, there was no end to "meditation" of this sort. Indeed, the passage concludes by noting that despite Dr. Preston's "boring," "I found a hard heart and could not be affected with them" (42). Even so, as the entire Autobiography shows from this point onwards, "sanctifying" grace was evidently present despite his apparent recalcitrance because its presence allowed Shepard to persist in such "meditations," all of which made him despair of acts of his personal will and thereby constantly threw him back upon the "justifying" mercy of God. Sanctification, in sum, was a cycle that began with the "meditation" of scripture—in this case, the text of

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Romans 12, proceeded to a matter of doctrine—that is, that a Christian will have a "change of heart," and then led through an analysis of the text and doctrine to a direct application to the spiritual life of the listener—specifically, the complex spiritual status of Shepard himself, in which the need for a "change of heart" met the resistance of "a hard heart." Moreover, the cycle of sanctification reversed the pattern present in Shepard's life before regeneration, when the Bible's words drove him to seek sin: now Scripture was inescapable and so "bored" his ears that he persisted in studying Scripture in spite of his anguish.

But more importantly, the cycle of sanctification became wonderfully ambiguous: Scripture brought him to such despair for his soul that he often doubted, he said, "whether the Scriptures were God's word," and he would consider if he "had not committed the impardonable sin" of ultimate despair (43). Over and over, the cycle repeated itself so that Shepard formulated a paradox that came to typify piety for later Puritans: in his Journal Shepard would assert that "God doth show his power by the much ado of our weakness to do anything" so that "the more weak I, the more fit I to to be used. . . . When I was most empty, then by faith I was most full" (117, 139). Thus, he concluded, God "brings contraries out of contraries; He makes darkness light Hell Heaven, guilt pardon, weakness strength . . ."[5]

The point is this: Shepard told his Massachusetts congregations not to recite phrases from Scripture and sermons when making a public confession that attested to one's "sanctification"; yet, as one recalls Shepard's "meditation," one must note that his "meditation" took its form from the sermon presented by Dr. Preston, and is virtually a mirror within the listener's spirit of the preacher's public words. The supposition in 1624 was that a Scriptural text leads to a doctrinal view of the text, and

the analysis that bridges the text to doctrine allows the words of the preacher to touch and stir the heart of a listener, to understand the logos of Scripture (see White 22). A knowing listener, such as Shepard, was familiar with the text and the doctrine, but like a layman, he was moved to understand the logos of the text by whatever application the preacher might make of the doctrine. In Shepard's case, Preston's doctrine of regeneration made the analytic awareness of a "change of heart" into an evidently urgent need for penitence by everyone, and Shepard was compelled to gauge how penitent he could be when his will was fully humbled. The sermon, in short, avoided the appearance of imposing external authority or dogma upon a text because it engaged both the logical and affective faculties of the audience; the doctrine ascribed to a text was valid partly because it was followed by a logical analysis of the terms of a text, focusing upon its linguistic and formal attributes, and partly because it then was capped off by the preacher's wit that surprised and engaged his listener in personal, common-sense experience.

Perry Miller has called this view of rhetoric "Ramist" because, as Petrus Ramus assumed, the rhetorical arrangement of arguments could suggest truths that the words individually could not convey (Miller, The Seventeenth Century 120, 132, 319-20. 328). A minister's sermon could artfully utilize the metaphors of experience to make spiritual sense to mortal man without insisting that such metaphors were Platonically "real," and so the sermon would not impinge upon the unfathomable sacred mysteries of God's mind. Such art was actually a paradox: the analysis of metaphoric language revealed God's truth through Scripture to all men, and yet such analysis presumed that only the Elect could have their ears "bored" by the words so as to pass beyond words to share God's mind and purposes. That

is, although the Bible was said to be the logos--the primal Word of God made flesh--it was, after all, the logical arrangement of the sermonal exegesis which unlocked the doctrine contained within the Word for the Elect. In this art, sermonal exegeses actually mirrored, duplicated, and ultimately replaced the primal logos itself, making the "application" to personal experience into the validation of doctrine. Consequently, as shown by Shepard's experience, it could be said that "sanctifying" grace drove a man to Scripture, but Scripture was revealed only through a personal experience of the "heart" engineered by the rhetoric of the sermon. One might further say that the art of rhetorical arrangement practiced by the preacher was as necessary as the raw logos of Scripture, and what was art in the hands of the minister was also a form of "sanctifying" grace by which God made the logos clear to the Elect: in this view, rhetoric provided "the keys of the Kingdom."

In conclusion, one might see the purpose of Thomas Shepard's prescription for the public confession despite his personal experience of regeneration. Life as a "saint" might seem lean fare after a meeting with the Divine, for it is hard for us today to imagine that Scriptural exegeses in the sermons could be a worthy substitute for a direct experience of the Holy. But one must remember that for the New England Puritans of the first generation, the sermons pointed to Scripture, and to comprehend the logos directly was virtually the same as meeting God. Indeed, the Puritans did not distinguish between the metaphoric and the phenomenal because they began with the authority of the Word of God which transcended all phenomena. Thus, as Scripture led one to the "meditation" on the "contraries" of doubt and assurance, the individual's response of piety virtually repeated and even enhanced the original moment of justification:

the experience of the Word recapitulated and clarified all experiences in time.

As a subtle contrast, however, the formal rhetoric of the public confession was intended to join the experience of "justifying" grace with the later experiences of "sanctifying" grace, and the confession was to demonstrate in a specific experience this union of time in a brief moment in the present, perhaps no longer than a quarter of an hour (Morgan 89). Shepard possibly thought that the demonstration of a public confession was the equivalent of his own experience of the cornfield and of his subsequent piety based on a "meditation" of Scripture. At bottom, the ritual of public confession prepared a member for Communion just as a sermon based on the Word prepared a member for Communion; but the ritual of confession had the extra dimension of making the individual relive his meeting with God, and this aspect by-passed the need to meditate on the logos and made the ritual into an instrument to evidence "a change of heart" directly.

The unity of God and the Elect was Shepard's pious endeavour. In reality, the ritual of public confession converted the metaphoric usage of the meeting with God into a specific experience of time and space, and such a shift in time altered the nature of sanctification for most men. As Shepard indicated, men from the very start of the practice were not sure if they had experienced a genuine "change of heart." Therefore, in their confessions they "heaped" in everything just to be inclusive of details. However, instead of being better prepared to hear the logos of Scripture or the logos of the sermon serving Scripture, such men could only take heart in the specific experiential acts that might demonstrate the metaphoric. This is not to say that they did not anguish over their doubts, but that

they experienced only rarely the subtle piety of belief and doubt that Shepard thought essential for salvation.

The result was that the ritual of public confession undermined the goals it initially was called upon to support. By 1662 there was a wholesale reduction of candidates willing to present themselves, as few could attain Shepard's anguish of piety. To prevent the total collapse of membership, as the first generation of "saints" died off, the churches adopted the compromise measure of the so-called Half-Way Covenant (Miller, From Colony to Province 95-104). By this Covenant, children of the Elect were baptised at birth as members and could later, in their early teens, enjoy the right to Communion even if they did not have an experience of "justifying" grace, provided that they evidenced good moral conduct in their daily lives. As a consequence, in those later confessions moral testimony encroached upon the testimony of grace, and the nature of the accompanying sermon was induced to change. The developing sermon might touch upon Scripture, but the key was to make Scripture underwrite moral behavior or the self-examination through which men chose personal beliefs. The first change led to the sermons of the faction of the "Old Lights" who saw Scripture as a handy-guide to daily living; the second change led first to the affective sermons of eighteenth-century Revivalism which sought spontaneous regeneration and then to the sermons of nineteenth-century Unitarianism whereby the audience self-created their own spiritual identity, doing thereby the work of the Holy Ghost.[6] By all measures, however, these factors undermined the unique status of Scripture as the logos; and sermons, fully realizing their new power, virtually became a substitute for the original logos. At that stage, sermons were not directed to explicating the doctrine that made the logos of Scripture authoritative but

to making doctrine reasonable in the light of phenomenal experience, particularly as the listener might inwardly consent to grace and regeneration. At that stage, when reason replaced authority, the sermon has been irreversibly altered by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century; that is, the religious revivalism of the Great Awakening (c. 1734-1742) accorded perfectly with the rise of ideological rationalists, for both streams would topple the citadels of tradition and external authority, either promulgated or enforced by institutions, and would make the affective responses of the audience confirm visionary perceptions of validating experiences. For both revivalists and ideologues of the age, experience would confirm the vision of those chosen men who knew the secrets of God or nature.

NOTES

[1] One of the most common metaphors to describe this ambiguous process of abrupt change into equanimity was that of the "birth" of the concerned self and the subsequent "weaning" of the self from the world (Caldwell 8-14).

[2] The chief source of such recorded confessions is Thomas Shepard's "Confessions"; Morgan 88-93 gives the formal stages of a typical conversion; Caldwell 163-84 analyzes numerous specific confessions.

[3] Thomas Shepard, The Parable of the Ten Virgins Opened and Applied (London, 1660), 2.200, qtd. in Morgan 92.

[4] Parable 2.198, qtd. in Morgan 114; see Morgan 93.

[5] Parable 1.145, qtd. in McGiffert, "Introduction" 24.

[6] Aspects of these two changes are found in Miller's three classic essays, "Jonathan Edwards and the Great Awakening," "The Rhetoric of Sensation," and "From Edwards to Emerson."

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PART II: RHETORIC IN CANADA

McCULLOCH TO deMILLE: SCOTTISH INFLUENCES ON THE TEACHING OF COMPOSITION

AND RHETORIC IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CANADA

Anne Tayler

The history of rhetoric and composition instruction in Canada is yet
to be written. Such a study will examine not only the curricula at various
levels of instruction, but also the textbooks used, along with the
traditions upon which courses and texts relied, and the various forces
which influenced the choice of texts and the shape of courses. Equally
important, such a study will examine the context in which rhetoric and
composition developed in Canada--for example, those social and political
conditions which encouraged belles-lettres rather than oratory.

One piece of this yet unassembled puzzle involves the influence, on
texts, curricula and context, of early Scottish Canadians. Virtually from
their arrival, Scottish immigrants became deeply and vitally involved in
every aspect of education--teaching, administration, curricula development,
patronage, and even the production of teaching materials--making many
significant contributions to Canada's emerging educational system. The
Scottish influence seems to have been particularly wide-ranging and
long-lasting, especially considering conditions in Canada--the vastness of
the country, the many different immigrant groups, gradual settlement over
three centuries, and lack of funding, and the many diverse influences on
the early education systems.

That the Scots moved quickly and surely, and with success, where the
English and French and even the Loyalists had not, is remarkable,

especially given that they arrived on the scene relatively late, were significantly outnumbered, and were generally poor and uneducated. Yet historians are quick to point out that Scots were excellent settlers. Most of the Scots who came to Canada were escaping extreme poverty, and were determined not to return to their homeland. In addition, the climate, geography and history of Scotland prepared them well for Canada. Fiercely independent and hard-working, they moved quickly into farming, business and trades, often succeeding where others failed (Reid 13). Moreover, the Scottish immigrants were not prepared to wait for the government to do something and they were willing to tackle the job themselves.

The Reverend Thomas McCulloch was just such an immigrant, and his arrival in Pictou, Nova Scotia, in 1803, signalled the beginning of a very important period for education in Canada, in particular for rhetoric and composition instruction. Over the next seventy-five years, thanks in no small measure to the work of McCulloch and other Canadian Scots, a public education system was created; most of Canada's major universities were established; and the publishing industry expanded, and started publishing textbooks. In addition, Canadian scholars began to do original work, rather than simply adapting, abridging or paraphrasing the work of others. Meanwhile, the teaching of composition and rhetoric developed from a discipline dependent on old world teachers, texts and methods, to one in which teachers were trained in Canada, methods and materials were adapted to local conditions, and texts were written and produced locally.

A very particular set of circumstances existed in 1803 which set the stage for the work McCulloch and other Scottish-Canadian educators would do. First, very little had been done, outside of Quebec. Early settlers and their governors alike had grown increasingly concerned about education,

and had discussed public education, non-sectarian schools, and higher education; yet little had been accomplished, and only a tiny percentage of immigrant children had access to any form of schooling. In some communities, enterprising individuals offered private instruction, but the Church of England, which was responsible for education throughout English Canada, had set up only a few small parish schools.[1] To make matters worse, most of the first teachers were no better educated than their students.[2] On arriving in Halifax, in 1787, Bishop Inglis remarked that "the country [was] destitute of the means of education--there was not even a good Grammar-school in the whole province."[3]

Second, the state of higher education was even worse. Until late in the century, post-secondary educational facilities existed only in Quebec, and those all but died when the British took over in 1763 (Harris 14-26). Canadian families seriously interested in educating their sons had to send them to Europe, or to the United States where colleges had been in existence for over a century (Harvard was founded in 1636, Yale in 1701).

Third, the first serious effort to improve the situation produced nothing more than an exclusive Loyalist-Anglican college. Five Loyalist clergymen in New York petitioned the governor-in-chief of British North America, arguing that without a college or seminary, Nova Scotian youth would be forced to go to the States where they would "soon imbibe principles . . . unfavourable to the British constitution."[4] In spite of the strong language, nothing happened until several Loyalists settlers in the province presented their own petition in 1785. That petition led to the establishment of two colleges--King's College at Fredericton (1787) and King's at Windsor, Nova Scotia (1789)--but the New Brunswick college did not offer advanced instruction for many years. King's at Windsor began to

operate as a college at once, largely because of the presence of Bishop Inglis. Inglis wanted "to prevent the importation of American Divines and American policies."[5] Predictably, the college was modelled after English universities, with instruction concentrating on Classics and Mathematics, and the administration went to great lengths in defense of the Church of England--the President was a Church of England clergyman, prayers were read morning and evening, and in 1803 the Board published Statutes requiring all students to sign The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. Consequently, admission to the only college in British North America, outside of Quebec, was effectively and severely limited.

Fourth, in addition to shortages of educational facilities, qualified teachers, and course offerings, there was also a serious lack of educational materials. The first press was set up in 1752; but by the time McCulloch arrived, the publishing industry had produced nothing more than government pamphlets and reports, and a few religious treatises. And it was virtually impossible to purchase a book in the provinces, even if one could afford it. Ministers and tutors alike turned to their churches, relatives and friends in England, Scotland and Ireland, asking them to send whatever they could. There are no official records to show what texts were used before 1803, only occasional references made in the letters of teachers and students, and a few copies of 18th-century texts held in private collections or university archives. The texts referred to here are contained in an uncatalogued collection of three hundred textbooks, in the University of British Columbia Library, Special Collections Division.

The collection contains five books dated prior to 1803, two by Englishmen, three by Scots, and all published in England or Scotland. All but one were issued in the last three years of the century, so probably

were not used in Canada until after the turn of the century. Nevertheless, they give some idea of what _kind_ of text was used. The earliest, _A Guide to the English Tongue_ (London, 1770), by Thomas Dyche, focuses on pronunciation, and offers a little information on punctuation and orthography, but none on grammar or composition. The other, George Fisher's _The Instructor: A Young Man's Best Companion_ (London, 1799), contains a little of everything except grammar and composition--spelling, reading, writing, arithmetic, "merchant's accompts," "practical gauger," geography, astronomy, and "interest tables"--a good all-purpose book for a settler to take to the colonies. The other three are grammars: _A Practical Grammar_ (Glasgow, 1797), by John Burn; Lindley Murray's famous _English Grammar_ (York, 1799), and an abridgement of Murray's text (York, 1799). First published in 1795, Murray's _Grammar_ was by far the best-known and most popular of several hundred texts published in the eighteenth century. So it is not surprising to find his texts among the first used in Canada.

Finally, the lack of basic educational facilities became intolerable after the 1763 British victory, when a sudden and rapid increase in the population occurred. In addition to thousands of British settlers, sent to back up the victory, full-scale Scottish and United Empire Loyalist immigrations began, with over 25,000 Scots and 30,000 Loyalists arriving in just three decades. The immigrants had no money and little time for education or recreation. Still, many were eager to have their spiritual needs attended to, and so they sent out urgent appeals for clergymen. The churches, equally eager to ensure that the Christian gospel was spread in the New World, responded quickly. And within a few years, the settlers and

clergy both began to consider the need to provide education for the future clergy and leaders of the colonies.

Into that environment came Thomas McCulloch. He left a comfortable parish near Glasgow, offered to go to British North America, and was sent to Prince Edward Island. He landed at Pictou, Nova Scotia, so late in the fall of 1803 that he had to winter over there. The residents, eager to have a minister, hastily built a house and church for McCulloch and his family, and convinced him not to move on in the spring. Within a few months he was tutoring the local children, and by 1808 was unofficially offering advanced instruction.

It was one thing for a teacher to set up a small private school in his home, quite another for a minister of the Secession Church to establish an academy that would give Presbyterian settlers educational opportunities comparable to those available at the nearby King's College. Also quite another matter to train Canadian youth for the Presbyterian ministry, when the official church was the Church of England. None of this would have mattered if McCulloch or the citizens of Pictou had been independently wealthy. But they were not, and the academy would need funding.

McCulloch and his colleagues made a humble, carefully phrased proposal to the government. They promised not to grant degrees, not to offer religious studies, to remain non-denominational, to have both Presbyterians and Anglicans on the board, and not to compete in any way with King's College. McCulloch's plan worked remarkably well: Pictou Academy was established in 1815, and granted a charter in 1816. The Academy turned out some exceptional graduates, many of whom will turn up later in this discussion. Students did not get Pictou degrees, but McCulloch had something better up his sleeve. They simply went to Scotland and took MA

exams at Glasgow, and did so with great success.[6] The Kirk and government officials eventually caught up to the Academy; various officials worked together, forcing the Academy to stick to the conditions of its charter, and then withdrawing all funding. As a result, Pictou Academy was transformed into a secondary school, in 1838, the same year that Lord Durham published his momentous Report.

While McCulloch charged ahead with Pictou Academy, major developments occurred elsewhere in elementary, secondary and college education. The government began to set up a public schooling system to replace the private and semi-private schools of the 18th century, and Public School Acts were instituted in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1811 and 1816 respectively--Acts which, if not effective immediately, did establish a framework. The demands on the elementary education system began to increase dramatically not only because the population continued to grow rapidly, but also because a greater percentage of settlers were sending their children to school, at least occasionally.

In the meantime, several other colleges struggled into existence, among them Dalhousie, McGill and King's College, Toronto. It is often quite difficult to sort out the first years of these universities. Usually they were established first on paper by their founders, then granted charters by the governor's office; next someone or some group lobbied for money and land, to set up the physical university. That done, curricula and programs were planned and staff hired. At every stage, politics, religion or personality clashes could bring the entire project to a standstill. For example, the cornerstone for Dalhousie was laid in 1820; but it took many years to plan and build the college, and teaching did not commence until 1838. McGill was planned in the teens and granted a charter

in 1821; but legal complications delayed the opening until 1829; meanwhile, in 1828 the Montreal Medical Institution (which had been operating for four years) was engrafted on to McGill as a medical faculty.

As academy and post-secondary facilities grew, more and more Scottish instructors were hired directly from Scotland. Although Scotsmen often served on the boards of the institutions, their hiring decisions were not mere favouritism. For it was generally believed that Scottish teachers would work harder for less money. Bishop Strachan, speaking of English teachers, said: "Learning they may have in abundance, but the industry, the labour (I may say drudgery) and accommodation to circumstances cannot be expected from them."[7] And a report on a newly appointed Scottish mathematics professor reads:

> [H]e is an intelligent, steady sort of man. . . of exceedingly good attainments and most successful in tuition. . . . We could not have expected to get anybody from an English University at the same rate.[8]

Those early Scottish-Canadian educators--teachers and administrators alike--along with the patrons, wanted to model Canadian universities on Scottish ones. Admission policies were perhaps the first thing affected. Scottish universities had long maintained open admission policies, and education generally was open to all, in theory if not in practice. Poor rural families--that is, most Scots--usually were unable to send their children to school. Nevertheless, the government experimented energetically and persistently, if not always successfully, with various types of rural education, for which admission was not restricted according to class or religion. So the immigrants brought with them at least the

idea of public schooling. Lord Dalhousie expressed this attitude clearly in a ceremonial address in 1820:

> This College of Halifax is founded for the instruction of youth. . .
> It is formed in imitation of the University of Edinburgh: its doors
> will be open to . . . all who may be disposed to devote a small part
> of their time to study. . . . It is founded upon the principles of
> religious toleration secured . . . by the laws (Harvey 19-20).[9]

Teaching methods and curricula at the early universities also bear the mark of the Scots. The lecture system still in use today is based on a system originally developed at Scottish universities early in the eighteenth century.[10] One of the strongest proponents for the lecture system, John Strachan, argued that "so much more can be done at one fourth of the expense."[11] But the Scots were not motivated only by frugality. They also believed that students would benefit from attending lectures given by mature, distinguished scholars and learn more than they would participating in tutorials supervised by young, inexperienced graduates. There were still relatively few teachers in Canada, certainly not enough to have distinguished scholars running tutorials.

Curricula at most of the first colleges were also based on those of the Scottish universities. At Pictou, Classics, Hebrew, Philosophy, History, Mathematics, Natural Philosophy and Theology were included. In contrast, the curriculum at King's (Windsor) appeared quite broad on paper, but was actually quite narrow; the principal, Dr. Edwin Jacob, an Oxford graduate, believed the aim of the college was to impart intellectual and moral culture, which could be achieved through the study of ancient classical languages and literature. In 1826, Strachan recommended the inclusion of Classical Literature (and English composition), Mathematics,

Natural History, Natural Philosophy and Chemistry, Moral Philosophy and Divinity, and Surgery and Anatomy in the curriculum at King's, Toronto. Still, it would be some time before curricula would reflect the extensive influence of Scottish educators.

While teachers continued to acquire texts from Scotland and England, they began also to import them from the United States. And in the 1820's Canadian publishers at last began to produce textbooks. Of the twenty-two books in the collection dated between 1803 and 1840, sixteen were published in the United States, four overseas, and two in Canada. Among the American and overseas books are seven later editions and versions of Murray's work, seven other basic grammars, five rhetoric texts (including an edition of Hugh Blair's Lectures), and an anonymous work called The Mental Guide: Being a Compend of the First Principles of Metaphysics and a System of Attaining an Easy and Correct Mode of Thought and Style in Composition by Transcription: Predicated on the Analysis of the Human Mind. This last one is particularly interesting inasmuch as the title and the contents point both to an increasing interest in the relationship between writing and thinking, and continuing concerns for correctness.

Of the Canadian publications, the earliest is an edition of William Lennie's Principles of English Grammar, published in Montreal in 1834. Next to Murray, Lennie is the name that appears most often in the collection--eighteen editions of his work in all. And there is considerable evidence in official and personal records to indicate that Lennie's book was widely used throughout the Maritimes for much of the nineteenth century. In the 1860's, county inspectors throughout Nova Scotia refer to its widespread use. The other Canadian book, A New Guide to the English Tongue, by Thomas Dilworth, published in 1836 in Halifax was

also very popular in elementary and preparatory schools of the Maritimes. One Nova Scotian of the time recalled that he had "begun school in Dilworth and graduated in Dilworth" (Perkins 86). Like Murray's and Lennie's, and most other grammar texts used in Canada at the time, Dilworth's text deals almost exclusively with detailed definition and complex classification of the elements of language.

The developments which occurred in the thirty-five years following McCulloch's arrival established the framework for Canada's educational system. And the closure of the Pictou Academy, while a battle loss for McCulloch and the Scottish Presbyterians of the Maritimes, was in many respects the real beginning of higher education in the colony. The most significant developments occurred over the next five decades. Attendance at school increased dramatically, becoming general rather than selective and occasional. More than a dozen universities opened, all of which survive today. The Canadian publishing industry became seriously involved in textbook publication. And Canadian Scots, including several Pictou graduates, were involved at every level.

Dalhousie University opened the same year that Pictou was closed, in 1838, and the authorities asked McCulloch to be the first principal there--they thought, quite rightly, that it was the best way to keep an eye on him. He served until his death in 1843, at which point Dalhousie ceased to act as a university and became a secondary school. Pictou graduate James Ross was largely responsible for re-opening the university in 1863. Meanwhile, another Pictou graduate, William Dawson, became the first Superintendent of Education in Nova Scotia in 1850. The work that he did as superintendent was crucial because school attendance in the province increased sharply while he was in office, then tripled soon after he left

the job.[12] In 1855, Dawson was asked to take over the principalship at McGill. The university had been stumbling badly since its opening in 1829, with only seven graduates in 25 years (outside of the medical faculty). As one scholar notes, "when he arrived at McGill the University's very survival was in doubt; when he retired its place as one of the important universities in the world was secure" (O'Brien 24). Almost the same situation occurred at Queen's University, which opened in 1841, but struggled ineffectively until the arrival, in 1877, of another Pictou graduate, George Munro Grant. Grant did an incredible job of fundraising, organizing and energizing the campus. Among the other colleges that opened were Acadia in 1838, Victoria in 1841, King's at Toronto in 1843, and Trinity in 1852.

The curricula at virtually every college plainly reflect the presence of Scots educators and administrators. When Dalhousie re-opened in 1863, the curriculum included Classics, Mathematics, Logic and Ethics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, and Metaphysics; with a course in modern languages added soon after. McGill's curriculum, shaped of course by Dawson, included a number of professional programs; its medical school bore the mark of the four Edinburgh graduates who founded it. Similarly, Queen's curriculum, almost an exact replica of Edinburgh's, was designed by several Edinburgh graduates involved in founding and reviving the university--among them, James Liddell, James Machar, John Watson, and Clark Murray. At Toronto, Scotsmen George Paxton Young, H. A. Nicholson, R. Wright, and Daniel Wilson helped shape the programs. And even at the Loyalist stronghold of King's College at Fredericton, a Scot--William Brydon Jack--worked to expand the curricula and create a professional school of engineering (Falconer 2.7-20).

Wherever there were Scottish teachers there was deep concern for the relevance of higher education to life in the colonies. The general feeling was that as much as possible the curriculum should prepare students not just for the clergy or leadership, but also for frontier colonial life and work. In 1838, McCulloch rejected a proposal to give special attention to classics, and argued that "[i]f Dalhousie College acquire usefulness and eminence it will be not by an imitation of Oxford, but as an institution of science and practical intelligence."[13] McCulloch was one of the first to advance the following argument:

> That boys should, in Halifax or elsewhere, spend six or seven years upon [Latin and Greek] and then four more in a college, partially occupied with the same studies, is a waste of human life adapted neither to the circumstances nor the prosperity of Nova Scotia . . . but should they direct attention to the real business of life, they will not have just cause to complain that they have spent their youth upon studies foreign to their success (McCulloch 172).

Thus, very early on, we find courses in surveying, piloting, engineering, commerce, agriculture, law and medicine.

Meanwhile, more texts (and a greater variety) became available, especially once Canadian publishers began to publish textbooks. Indeed, the UBC collection contains 130 books published between 1838 and 1888, compared to 21 published between 1800 and 1838, and most of them were published in Canada. The proportion of Canadian publications and Canadian authors is unexpectedly high. The little information that is available suggests that very few texts were published before 1900, which is simply not true.[14] However, texts are often held in private and archival collections, so the material is scattered and difficult to find.[15] Of the

130 texts, only nine were published overseas, and thirty-two in the United State; the other eighty-nine were produced in Canada.

These trends in textbook publishing correspond not only with growth and development of the education systems, but also with sudden and rapid growth in the publishing industry. In Ontario, two firms specializing in texts planted the seeds for firms well known to most teachers and students today--Gage, and Copp, Clark. In 1880, William J. Gage took over a shop originally established in 1860 by Adam Miller; Gage had trained with and worked for Miller for many years. In 1869, Walter and Henry Copp, along with Henry J. Clark, took over a bookstore originally run by Scottish immigrant, Hugh Scobie (Hulse) and by the end of the century had turned it into one of the most active textbook publishers. But A. W. Mackinlay (another Scot) was really the first publisher in Canada to get heavily involved with textbooks. The leading publisher and bookseller in Nova Scotia, and the only Maritime publisher to sell his books in Upper Canada, Mackinlay won first prize at the 1868 Nova Scotia Exhibition for "Educational Books and Apparatus, Superiority of Blanks Books, and Superiority of Printing and Binding."

Most of the Canadian publications dated between 1838 and 1888 are editions of standard works--including Murray, Lennie, Kirkham, Bullions, and Swinton. However, many of the standard works have prefaces or appendices directed at Canadian teachers and students, while others are labelled as recommended or required for use in a given school or district. There are also a number of Canadian versions of standard works--for example, Swinton's Language Lessons by J. MacMillan of Ottawa, and Grammar on the Basis of Bullions by T. G. Chestnut of Toronto. A number of the texts also include or append collections of exercises as well as sample

exam questions (written in Canada), and some contain nothing but exercises. Finally, there are a number of books written by Canadians, including some rather curious efforts such as A Series of Lectures on Etymology and Syntax, by James B. Lynn, published by the author in Ontario in 1842.

One set of texts in particular has a publishing record typical of many imported texts--Walter Scott Dalgleish's various texts. The earliest editions were published in Edinburgh, but subsequent ones bear dual imprints, and the latest ones bear only Canadian imprints. His Introductory Text-book of English Composition is particularly important as he intends it to serve as a preface to the study of the rhetorics of Blair, Campbell and Whately. There are several copies of this text in the collections, and records suggest that it was widely used.

If the Scots can be held accountable at all for the influx of traditional grammars and their abridged descendants, they were also responsible for introducing, writing and publishing a number of less traditional ones. And it seems that Canadian publishers were willing to publish texts that went against the grain. Several of the texts approach writing in terms of large units of language--phrases, clauses, and sentences--and then work up towards paragraphs. One unusual book, The Prompter: containing the principles of the English language, published in Montreal in 1844, is quite possibly the first grammar written in Canada by a woman. The author is identified only as Mrs. Fleming,[16] and she is, not surprisingly, a Scot. Her text is particularly interesting since in the final section she cites the theories of Murray and Lennie, side by side, and then comments on their work.

This section of the collection also contains the first rhetoric text that I know of written by a Canadian, A Class Book on Rhetoric, by the

Reverend D. F. Hutchinson, published in 1835 by the Canadian Christian Advocate Office in Hamilton. In his preface, Hutchinson says that "there are a few Rhetorics to be obtained in different sections of the Province, but they are so few in number and so rarely found as to most imperiously demand the present publication." He even goes so far as to claim that "the work, although small in size [98 pp.], is a practical one, and contains within the compass of a very few pages, every thing essential to written composition and public speaking (7).

While claiming to exhibit "the graces and style of English Composition and Public Oratory," the text nevertheless dwells on rules, including "rules for correct punctuation." Significantly, the work is not original—Hutchinson says that he "carefully consulted every text-book of any considerable note published in the British Empire of the American Continent, and whenever [he] found a known definition, or rule expressed in them all, [he] had no hesitation in adopting it" (6-7). Hutchinson's remark reflects a fairly common attitude to the instruction of rhetoric, grammar, and composition in Canada at the time—all was borrowed or adopted.

While Hutchinson was scavenging British North American texts for rules, and Dalgleish was preparing Canadian students for the rhetoric of Enlightenment Scots, another Canadian Scot, James deMille, was producing an original rhetoric text based on the work of Blair, Bain and Campbell. The Elements of Rhetoric is quite clearly not just an adaptation of some other popular work, and yet it is obviously modelled on the works of Scottish rhetoricians such as Hugh Blair and Alexander Bain. DeMille incorporates into his work the definitions and ideas of several Scottish rhetoricians, often citing their work. Even his table of contents reveals the extent to

which he is indebted to Blair and Campbell: he includes sections on Perspicuity, Persuasiveness in Style, Harmony in Style, Method, The Emotions, and The General Departments of Literature. Moreover, he advocates teaching rhetoric not only to the few orators of the world, but also to the many readers: rhetoric, he says, "affords a way towards a larger as well as a finer discernment of those beauties in which [readers] take delight" (iv). DeMille believes it has "a still higher value as a means of culture and educational discipline"--culture being "the refining and humanizing influence of art or letters through which one attains to a more delicate sensibility of taste, and a higher and purer stage of intellectual enjoyment" (iv). It will be interesting to see just how many universities used deMille's text, and in what context it was used; also to look at the relationship between his work and current approaches to literature and composition. Certainly the publication of deMille's Rhetoric marks well the seventy-fifth anniversary of Thomas McCulloch's arrival in Pictou.

The contributions made by Scottish-Canadian educators in the 75 years following McCulloch's arrival were many and various, and clearly far reaching. Of course, that is not to say they were universally accepted. In Hugh MacLennan: A Writer's Life, Elspeth Cameron considers some negative reactions, looking specifically at how MacLennan's father seemed determined to make him as English as possible, and to replace his Scottish heritage with an English education. Such a response undoubtedly was not uncommon, and should be considered in a larger study. Also to be considered is the relative paucity of Canadian editions or versions of Scottish and English rhetoric texts, such as Blair's Lectures. Finally, the full extent and relative significance of all the work done by

Scottish-Canadian teachers, administrators, patrons, textbook authors, and publishers will be more readily measured once full details of curricula, texts and exams are assembled, along with more general information about social and political conditions, and the history of rhetoric and composition instruction in Canada takes shape.

NOTES

[1] Only five schools were operating in Upper Canada by 1800, all grammar schools open only to those who could pay for both a teacher and a building (Phillips 97-114).

[2] It seems the best teachers were those supplied by The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, for they were at least trained to teach reading, writing and the catechism (Phillips 61-65).

[3] Letter to Lord Hawkesbury, cited in Vroom 20.

[4] Letter to Sir Guy Carleton, 8 March 1783, cited in Vroom 10.

[5] He also argued that "unless we have a seminary here, the youth of Nova Scotia will be sent to the Revolted Colonies--the inevitable consequences would be a corruption of their religious and political principles." Letter to Mr. Cumberland, cited in Vroom 21.

[6] To put McCulloch's accomplishments into perspective, consider the career of Bishop Strachan: he arrived in Upper Canada in 1799 expecting to find a university waiting, but found only uncleared forests; he began to lobby immediately for King's College, Toronto, yet could not procure a charter until 1827, and even then was unable to get the school operating.

[7] Letter from Strachan to S. Sherwood, Andrew Stewart and James Stewart, 14 February 1815, as cited in Masters (Reid 251).

[8] Letter from G. J. Mountain to Jasper Nicolls, 12 June 1845, Nicolls Papers, Bishop's University, as cited in Masters (Reid 251).

[9] "Religious toleration" was of course still limited to those "who profess the Christian religion." Nevertheless the policy did open the college doors to most Canadians.

[10] The universities there had changed from a program in which regents taught the entire curriculum, to one where specialists taught individual subjects (Grant 1. 182-263).

[11] Letter from Strachan to Sherwood, A Stewart and J. Stewart, 14 February 1815 (Spragge 67-68).

[12] From 33,000 to 93,000 between 1856 and 1880.

[13] Letter from McCulloch to Charles D. Archibald, 24 April 1838 as cited by William McCulloch (173).

[14] There is no national catalogue prior to 1900, and the few catalogues that do exist are incomplete.

[15] In contrast, much is known about texts in the United States. Andrew Hook gives a fine account of American publishing in the 18th and 19th centuries. Major publishing houses produced many editions of Campbell, Stewart, Blair, Hutcheson, Reid, Duncan, and Hume--56 editions of Blair's Lectures, for example, between 1805 and 1823. Small presses were equally active, with one in New Jersey publishing 74 of Blair's titles in just 22 years.

[16] Male authors have their names given in full, along with their degrees, positions, and other books they had written, no matter how irrelevant. Mrs. Ann Cuthbert Fleming came to Canada in 1815, after separating from her first husband. In addition to writing several texts and books of poetry, she also started a school for ladies in Montreal.

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INSTRUCTION IN RHETORIC: THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ART

Nan Johnson

What must be faced about our current efforts in the teaching of rhetoric in North America is that by and large, rhetorical education is still founded on an incomplete notion of what rhetoric is and could be as a subject of study. Teaching rhetoric solely as the craft of composition omits a theoretical interest in the principles of communication. The result of this significant omission is two fold:

First, the social and cultural effects of rhetoric are not being addressed, nor are they being impressed on students learning to use language informatively and persuasively; second, rhetorical principles are being taught in isolation, with little or no explanation of the compatibility of rhetorical studies with other aspects of language study, most significantly, with the study of literature. The absence of underlying philosophical and interdisciplinary understandings of rhetoric in rhetorical education continues to isolate the practice of rhetoric as taught in composition classes from rhetoric as a body of theory that explores human response to language and the social relevance of persuasion. Our greatest challenge as educators in the field of rhetoric in the 1980's must be to continue the work of scholars such as Edward Corbett, Wayne Booth, James Kinneavy, and W. Ross Winterowd who have revitalized the teaching of rhetoric by reminding us of the importance of rhetoric as an art of communication first and as the mastery of technical skills second.[1]

The important work of Corbett, Kinneavy, and the many who have followed their lead in composition theory in the last twenty years has established an alternative to the narrow goal of teaching rhetoric as

technical competence in writing.[2] This alternative mode features a basic principle revived from the classical tradition: the nature of rhetorical discourse is constituted by the interplay of a speaker, an audience, an intention, and a text. The incorporation of this principle into numerous rhetoric texts in the last ten years has eroded the wholesale domination of the narrow, stylistic or skills approach to a small degree. However, if we are frank with ourselves, we must admit that the success of such movements to restore scope to rhetorical education remains vulnerable to failure as long as the majority of those teaching rhetoric in English departments are convinced that the teaching of rhetoric is a relatively uncomplicated matter of getting students to write thesis sentences and cause-and-effect expository paragraphs. This assumption, that rhetoric is a one-dimensional subject, represents the core of the problem; it perpetuates the tendency to teach rhetoric as a subject governing stylistic skills, and encourages the view that rhetoric is less significant and scholarly a subject than the study of literature and criticism.

The authority of the skills-oriented approach to teaching rhetoric has simply been overwhelming in this century. I would like to characterize the nature of this strictly technical approach by describing in some detail the contents of a sampling of rhetoric texts slated for university use over the last sixty years. Until the 1960's, the domination of stylistic, technique-oriented texts went virtually unchecked.

The teaching of rhetoric during the first quarter of the century relied on texts that defined rhetoric as "effective writing" and treated the following as central topics: 1) grammatical conventions; usage and spelling; 2) forms or aims of writing, defined as description, exposition, definition, and argument; 3) diction, sentencing, and style; and 4)

paragraphing.[3] These texts continued normative practices of the late nineteenth century by leaving out invention and treating only two of the classical canons of rhetoric, arrangement and style. The emphasis of texts from this period, and of the majority of texts in the next three decades, was on writing as technique. There is little marked change in the texts used between 1925 and 1950, except for increasing attention to the modes of organization (cause and effect, comparison and contrast, definition, and classification). We recognize in the "modes," a feature which first appeared in North American rhetorics of the nineteenth century as an inventional issue, the remnants of the classical topics of invention.[4] In the twentieth-century texts, these modes are presented as issues in arrangement, not as topics of invention. By mid-century, the forms of writing (exposition, argumentation, narration, and description) and discussions of unity, diction, and sentence structure comprised the standard content in rhetoric texts. Treatments of style were abbreviated to discussions of diction and sentence structure except for the occasional text that treated a limited number of the figures such as metaphor, simile, allegory, and allusion.

The substance of rhetoric texts in the early 1950's could be summarized by looking at The Prentice-Hall Handbook for Writers (first published in 1951) and James McCrimmons' Writing with a Purpose (1950).[5] Both of these texts have been reprinted a number of times in the last thirty years and remain widely used as standard texts in freshman English all over North America. These rhetorics are what I think as multi-purpose texts: the authors attempt to deal with all possible writing and research problems in addition to treating grammar, usage, spelling, and punctuation. Major subjects for study in Writing with a Purpose are topic selection,

organization, outlining, paragraph structure, sentence style, and vocabulary. Similarly, the Prentice-Hall Handbook stresses selecting a subject, organization and development, and revisions. Both treat the research paper and the preparation of business letters as well.

The fact that texts like these two continue to be used so widely is the best evidence of how very standard such skill-based approaches to the teaching of rhetoric still are. Very contemporary examples of this approach can be seen in Sheridan Baker's The Practical Stylist (1983) and Winston Weathers' and Otis Winchester's The New Strategy of Style (1978). Baker's remarks sum up what I have been calling the one-dimensional view of rhetoric: "This is a rhetoric primarily for first-year English students . . . who have found themselves facing a blank page and the problems of exposition. . . .[T]he expository problems are always the same. Indeed, they all come down to two fundamental questions: one of form, one of style. . . .[W]riting well is writing with style" (ix). The very titles of these texts foreground the importance of style, which for Baker and Winchester seems to be a term that subsumes form, diction, vocabulary, and just about every other aspect of writing that can be defined as technique. The "writing well is writing with style" approach leads teachers and students alike to equate rhetoric with the study of stylistic and formal techniques and with a command of diction and syntax.

In the 1960's and 70's the formal stylistic approach to the teaching of rhetoric was challenged by two different camps; one I have already mentioned, those rhetoricians like Corbett and Kinneavy whose neoclassical texts and scholarship helped to redirect the teaching of composition toward a classical theoretical foundation.

The canon of invention and the importance of persuasive appeals were central to the concerns of texts like Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (1967), Kinneavy's A Theory of Discourse (1971), and Winterowd's Contemporary Rhetoric (1975). The interdisciplinary focus of Rhetoric: Discovery and Change (1970) by Richard Young, Alton Becker and Kenneth Pike brought together psychology, linguistics, English, and classical rhetoric. What these texts provided was an example of the breadth that rhetorical education could have.

Such texts also served to encourage teachers of rhetoric to take a more process-oriented and interactional approach to the teaching of writing, emphasizing invention more and stylistic technique less. This approach to rhetoric has had a steadily growing following; more and more texts have appeared in the last decade which emphasize the author/message/audience relationship and the complex processes of invention. These texts have tended to add to rather than supplant the standard topics of diction, organization, and grammar by discussing topics such as 1) the writing situation, 2) the writing process, 3) the view of writing as creative problem solving, 4) writing for different audiences, and 5) the purposes and goals of writing. More recent texts of this kind include Patrick Hartwell's Open to Language, Maxine Hairston's Successful Writing, Richard Coe's Form and Content.

Texts generated by this movement to revitalize the teaching of rhetoric by restoring classical precepts and theoretical foundations advocate the traditional view of rhetorical discourse as communication about a subject of relevance to both speaker and audience. The interactional aspects of rhetoric feature prominently in this approach to teaching. A second camp that has taken issue with the narrow skills

approach to rhetoric has moved in a very different direction from the neoclassical group. I am referring to the orientation of texts such as Ken Macrorie's Telling Writing, Peter Elbow's Writing Without Teachers, William Coles's Writing as a Self-Creating Process, and Ann Berthoff's Forming, Thinking, Writing. These texts reject the stylistic definition of rhetoric, but they also eschew the classical concept of rhetoric as persuasive communication. Macrorie places a great deal of importance on the "felt experience" of the writer and the importance of writing as a process which defines that experience. Coles and Berthoff have taken writing as self-expression a step further by arguing that the composing act is a mysterious process of self-creation generated by the powers of the individual imagination. The absence of traditional materials and precepts in these texts amounts to more than simply leaving out any formal treatment of exposition and persuasion: it reveals that these authors are attempting to reconstitute the nature of our traditional pedagogical enterprise. A pedagogy that presents self-knowledge through language as a primary goal subjugates both pragmatic and communicative goals to the experience of self-creation. This move turns both stylistic aims and interactional goals for rhetoric on end. What constitutes the aims and skills of composing in these texts is completely redefined in an approach to writing that equates self-discovery with integrity and reinterprets the aim of writing as the process of becoming oneself.

Despite the obvious differences in the substance of these two groups' approaches to rhetorical education, at least one similarity does exist. These educators have attempted to move beyond the limits of narrow definitions of rhetoric, definitions that stipulate only technical aims for rhetorical education. Their efforts have given us manoeuvring room as well

as impetus to continue and expand the enterprise of educating teachers and students alike to the personal and ideological wealth implicit in rhetorical study. Most significantly, these developments in the teaching of rhetoric have begun to restore to rhetorical education a certain body of theory, theory that provides a context in which to answer those questions so central to the philosophical foundations of rhetoric:

a. What is the relationship between language and thought?

b. What is the function of communication within society, and what are its cultural obligations?

c. How does the nature of human beings as psychological and social entities impinge on how we use language?

d. What is literacy, and what are the obligations of educational institutions to its development?

If we are to re-educate, and if we are to eradicate one-dimensional definitions of rhetoric, we must continue to introduce considerations such as these into our rhetoric classes and into professional discussions of the aims and substance of rhetorical education.

I have argued that a one-dimensional definition of rhetoric is partially the result of absence of underlying philosophical foundations in rhetorical education, foundations which would lead us to expand our understanding of the goals of teaching rhetoric. I have also suggested that rhetorical education is further limited by being taught in isolation, with little or no explanation of how rhetorical principles are compatible with, say, the appreciation of literary works. This is partially the result of the general attitude in English departments that the teaching of composition is just so much practical busywork, while the true province of English studies is literature. Such a climate cannot help making rhetoric,

as an applied art, a subject of low status. However, the persistence of narrow stylistic or technical approaches to the teaching of rhetoric has also served to reinforce the opinion of those in English departments who already equate rhetoric with the study of stylistic structures alone.

By defining rhetoric as a formal or technical craft, we have implied that learning to write has little or nothing to do with aesthetics or criticism and certainly nothing in common with the study of literature. Efforts to reintroduce rhetorical theory into the teaching of writing may go a long way toward establishing a common ground between rhetorical studies and literary studies.

A theoretically viable approach to rhetorical education would stress the compositional elements underlying the structure of all texts and the conditions under which certain texts would be received. In other words, if we expand our notion of rhetoric appropriately, to include all issues implicit in discussions of what texts mean, how they are constituted, and how we get meaning from them, we move rhetorical studies into close conjunction with the study of literature. In addition, we go a long way toward restoring the interdisciplinary basis of the classical rhetorical model. Certainly the work of modern rhetorical theorists such as Kenneth Burke and Wayne Booth demonstrates that the rhetorical paradigm of author/text/audience is an appropriate interpretive format for analyzing all texts, whatever their genre. However, if modern rhetorical education has been slow to reincorporate the theoretical inheritance of the rhetorical tradition in teaching rhetoric, it has been even slower to reunite the processes of writing and reading, a reunion clearly called for by critics like Burke and Booth and by many composition theorists who argue that our pedagogy in rhetoric is one-dimensional in this regard as well.

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What we fail to make explicit in rhetorical education is that the ability to understand and discuss what a text means implies an understanding of how that text is composed--and vice versa.

I have concentrated in these brief remarks on describing the current state of rhetorical education in departments of English. The displacement of all forms of one-dimensional definitions of rhetoric is crucial to developing comprehensive rhetorical education that can aspire to more than the caretaking of maintenance literacy. The key to effecting such a displacement on all fronts is the restoration of the theoretical and philosophical foundation appropriate to a comprehensive pedagogical approach to rhetorical studies.

NOTES

[1] The work of these rhetoricians revitalized rhetorical theory as well as composition pedagogy in the early 1970's by reintroducing classical principles to writing instruction and drawing new attention to rhetoric as the study of persuasive discourse in a social and cultural context. See Corbett, Kinneavy, and Winterowd.

[2] Significant contributions to this movement have also been made by Emig, Shaughnessy, and Young et al.

[3] See the following texts as examples of the rhetoric texts used in Canadian universities in the early twentieth century: Greever et al., Greenough and Hersey.

[4] A few nineteenth-century texts successfully competed with stylistic rhetorics in the 1850's. These texts focused attention on the classical canon of invention and presented the modes of writing as inventional processes for the composition of explanatory discourse.

[5] The 1951 edition of the <u>Prentice-Hall Handbook for Writers</u> is faithfully reproduced in later editions. See <u>The Prentice Hall Handbook</u> 7th edition.

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THE PAST--AND FUTURE--OF RHETORICAL INSTRUCTION

Andrea Lunsford

It has become almost a commonplace to speak today of a "revival of rhetoric" or of the "emergence of a new rhetoric" in reference to events of the two dozen years since Daniel Fogarty's Roots for a New Rhetoric appeared. Most often, this revival is described (borrowing from the work of Thomas Kuhn) as the attempt to gain acceptance for a new rhetorical paradigm, one needed because of the severe inadequacies of what is usually referred to as the "current-traditional paradigm," the one we inherited from the nineteenth century. Richard Young describes the current-traditional paradigm this way: "the overt features . . . are obvious enough: the emphasis on the composed product rather than the composing process; the analysis of discourse into description, narration, exposition, and argument; the strong concern with usage . . . and with style; the preoccupation with the informal essay and research paper; and so on" (31). Young's views have been echoed by many others, with the result that nineteenth-century rhetoric has generally become the whipping boy for our discipline. By accepting this position unquestioningly, however, I believe we do a disservice both to the nineteenth-century rhetoricians and to ourselves.

In this brief essay, I would like to sketch in some of the history of our field and, in doing so, I hope to argue that the usual charges leveled against the late nineteenth-century model or "paradigm" are, by and large, beside the point. In my view, the charges brought by Young and others are merely symptomatic of the genuine ills that beset the rhetorical model we inherited in the early twentieth century. And to a very large extent, in

spite of the "new rhetoric" with its emphasis on process and invention, those genuine ills still beset us today. Finally, I hope to suggest how this foray into the past may help us define the goals of future rhetorical studies.

The earliest rhetorical instruction and theory in North America were informed not by the classical tradition of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, but by that of Peter Ramus and Omer Talon. The work of these two curricular reformers, who assigned invention and arrangement to logic and left rhetoric only the study of style and delivery, formed the core of rhetorical instruction at Harvard, the first American university, whose laws indicated that the primary purpose of rhetoric was to perpetuate the study of Latin and that its primary parts were _elocutio_ and _pronunciatio_. Not until well into the eighteenth century did the works of Cicero and Quintilian become widely available--and influential--in colleges. When they did, however, the _first_ revival of rhetoric blossomed, though in the eighteenth rather than the twentieth century. This revival can perhaps best be associated with John Ward's _A System of Oratory_, which Warren Guthrie views as the most pervasive synthesis of Greek and Roman theory then available. Though Ward's book is by no means original, it did go beyond a narrow focus on style and delivery to discuss invention and arrangement as well, thus restoring to the province of rhetoric that which had been taken away by the Ramistic reformers. More importantly, Ward's book attempted a reunion of theory and practice which I believe to be the very hallmark of the classical system as worked out in the works of Cicero and Quintilian and which I believe must be at the heart of any viable rhetoric. _A System of Oratory_ was widely used until the late eighteenth century, along with the Port Royal _Art of Speaking_ (1696), which also

demonstrated a more complete classical understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric, with its marriage of theory and practice.

Accompanying this rediscovery of the classical tradition was the growing influence of rhetoric in American colleges. College or university presidents frequently delivered the lectures on rhetoric; in fact, the first American "rhetoric" was written by the President of Princeton, John Witherspoon. And the first Boylston Professor of Rhetoric at Harvard (1806)[1] was John Quincy Adams, future president of the United States, whose Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory (1810) thoroughly restated the classical doctrine.[2]

By the end of the eighteenth century, rhetoric was in full bloom. In a college curriculum which lacked rigid boundaries between subjects, rhetoric fulfilled its classical function as the art of communication, one which synthesized material from a wide variety of fields. The relatively small student bodies allowed the principles of rhetoric and dialectic to come into play in the classroom and in student tutorials. Furthermore, the increasing popularity of student debate societies, the use of oral examinations and recitations, and the public disputations associated with commencement at most colleges enhanced the position of rhetoric, which was at that time essentially classical in its aim to produce good citizens skilled in speaking. As Michael Halloran demonstrates convincingly in "Rhetoric in the American College Curriculum: The Decline of Public Discourse," at this time

> rhetoric in American colleges was the classical art of . . . public discourse that stood very near if not precisely at the center of pedagogical concerns. It provided students with an art, and more importantly with copious experience and with a tacit set of values

bearing directly on the use of language in managing public affairs (254).

This eighteenth-century model of rhetorical instruction is worth reconsidering at greater length, and Halloran's discussion in the article just cited provides us with a fine point of reference. The model was characterized by several distinctive features. First, Halloran argues, was the central place rhetoric held in the curriculum. Secondly, this model put major emphasis on oral, rather than written communication. And students spoke, in their class recitations and public disputations, on matters of personal, social, and political significance: their words held consequences. As Halloran points out, this emphasis on oral communication effected "a certain readiness of mind and speech, and a zest for rhetorical encounters" (254). In an 1838 Report on Examinations, William McGuffey praises the practice of classroom speaking, saying that it "cultivates the memory, the reasoning powers, the powers of extemporaneous expression, and the ability to defend views." Unless students can do all this, McGuffey warns, they are "not suitably educated for this country" (241). We should note, in passing, that this emphasis on orality carried certain implications for the evaluation of students. Here is how the system, and the evaluation, worked in our early colleges. Classroom activity was built, as I have indicated, around "oral disputation." One student chose and presented a thesis, often taken from reading or class discussion, and defended it against counterarguments offered by other students and the teacher. In addition, students regularly gave speeches publicly, on matters of importance to society, in forums open to the entire college and surrounding community. Reinforcing these curricular activities were the many student speaking societies where, as Scottish rhetorician Alexander

Bain was fond of pointing out, the students usually learned more from their peers than from their teachers. Bain recognized, incidentally, that this model of oral evaluation and the format of the student speaking societies provided a full rhetorical context and motivation for discourse, elements woefully lacking in later school set essays and written examinations.

The culmination of these activities was a three-or-four-week "visitation" held in the late Spring of each year. During these sessions, students who wished to advance or to graduate were to make themselves available for oral examination, by anyone who chose to attend, in all the subjects for which they were responsible and to present disputations and defend them in public. As we will see, this system is very close to one that University of Michigan's Fred Newton Scott 100 years later was to propose as an "organic" method of assessing the effectiveness of secondary schools.

The centrality of rhetorical studies in the curriculum and the primary emphasis on oral discourse presuppose a third characteristic of the eighteenth-century model: its interdisciplinary nature. Rhetoric was seen as that art capable of addressing complex problems in any field where certainty was unachievable. Indeed, the work of Quintilian, which so profoundly affected this model of instruction, presents rhetoric not only as a way of coming to knowledge in any field, but as a guide to action throughout a person's entire life. Rhetoric, then, ranged across all fields of study and brought all of its language skills--reading, speaking, and writing--to bear on public problems.

The strong interdisciplinary nature of eighteenth-century rhetorical instruction relates directly to what I see as one of its most important characteristics: the union of theory and practice. Aristotle's original

work on rhetoric established a theoretical relationship among language, belief, and action, and this relationship is adapted and acted out in the learned orator of Cicero and in the good man skilled in speaking of Quintilian. This relationship also informed the eighteenth-century instructional model. Students put the rhetorical principles and theories they were studying into immediate practice, and a major goal of the university was to produce graduates who could and would continue to put those principles into practice throughout their lives as citizens of a democracy.

The last characteristic I wish to discuss I can only describe in perhaps somewhat vague terms as an ethos of the classroom. As I read the late eighteenth-century lectures of John Witherspoon of Princeton, this ethos pervades every page: at their best, the teacher-student relationships are strong and clear, the teacher serving as a master or as what Gilbert Ryle calls a "connoisseur" for the student apprentices. As I read the lectures of Aytoun of Edinburgh, of Jardine of Glasgow, of Bain of Aberdeen, and later, of Scott of Michigan, as I read reminiscences of former students and anecdotal histories of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth-century universities, I am struck over and over again by the nature of this relationship and by its importance. Such a relationship, of course, depended upon small classes, on the long-term association possible when a professor normally taught students throughout their college careers, and on the understanding that what was being taught was not so much a subject as a way of life. As one late-eighteenth-century pupil reported, the object of his rhetoric classes seemed "not to fill the mind with facts, but to strengthen and discipline it." This model of learning is a dynamic,

collaborative one, based on learning by doing in association with a teacher who, along with peers, sets up a powerful dialogue or dialectic.

The characteristics of the rhetorical model I have been describing, then, are these: (1) it posited rhetoric as central to the college curriculum; (2) primary emphasis was an oral discourse, and evaluation was conducted through oral examinations, though reading and writing were also important; (3) it was strongly interdisciplinary; (4) it combined theory and practice; and (5) its classroom ethos built on a strong student-teacher relationship.

Perhaps the spirit of this system or model is best summed up by Henry Adams, who notes that throughout his college years he had been

> obliged to figure daily before dozens of young men who knew each other to the last fibre. [I] had done little but read papers to Societies or act in the Hasty Pudding, not to speak of all sorts of regular exercises and examinations, and no audience in future life would ever be so intimately and terribly intelligent as these."

As a result, Adams reports that "nothing seemed stranger than the paroxysms of terror before the public which often overcame the graduates of European universities." For his part, Adams declares himself "ready to stand up before any audience in America or Europe, with nerves rather steadier for the excitement"(69).

What—you may well be asking—happened to this model of rhetorical instruction? The answer to this question lies in the progress of rhetoric in the nineteenth century, a progress for which we as yet have no authoritative history (I have gathered together some of the most important articles and books on this subject and have included them on the selected bibliography attached to this paper). While I cannot pretend to offer

definitive answers in this brief paper, I do want to suggest that the sorry plight of rhetoric in the early twentieth century has far less to do with an emphasis on product-centered stylistic instruction or on adherence to the infamous four modes of discourse, and far more to do with the fragmentation of the model I have described and the loss of those features which characterized it.

Certainly, by the late nineteenth century, rhetoric had lost its central place in the college curriculum. This loss can, I believe, be related to four significant trends. The first trend I see as moving away from the strong interdisciplinary basis of the eighteenth-century instructional model. This shift is manifested in two ways, the first of which has to do with the rise of the belles-lettres movement, as in the lectures of both Adam Smith and Hugh Blair. Blair's Lectures, the enormously popular and dominant text in universities until around 1825, did not present a classical treatment of rhetoric. Instead, Blair devoted primary attention to style, viewing invention as beyond the scope of rhetoric. Blair also emphasized the importance of developing "taste" in reading literary works, particularly poetry. Hence, in his work the province of rhetoric was both truncated (to a narrow focus on style) and diffused (to emphasize the aesthetic appreciation of literature rather than the active production of public discourse.) Such a shift in focus, of course, tends to put oral discourse in the back seat, to ignore the importance of the speaking societies Bain and Henry Adams saw as so instrumental to rhetorical education, and to treat rhetoric more as a subject to be learned than as a means of gaining and sharing knowledge in any field.

Certainly the belles-lettres movement was by no means entirely negative, and I do not wish to present it in such a light. It was, after all, part of the long war waged on behalf of the vernacular in higher education. The journals of the time are full of intense and often bitter debate over whether classical language study should give way to "English" studies. By stressing the importance of instruction in the appreciation of literary works, the belles-lettres movement helped support the argument that the study of literature in English was a legitimate pursuit in colleges. Despite this positive effect, however, the belles-lettres movement also contributed to a major shift away from a focus on rhetoric as the productive art of public discourse on subjects of importance in any field, and hence weakened the interdisciplinary base of rhetoric.

The belles-lettres movement is inextricably linked to another major trend in nineteenth-century colleges: also chipping away at the interdisciplinary base of rhetoric were the increased specialization of disciplines and the concomitant rise of English departments (Parker). As we know, rhetoric is perhaps less suited than any other subject except philosophy to specialization. Its central function in the eighteenth-century instructional model described earlier was as a synthetic art which brought together knowledge in various fields with audiences of various kinds; its goal was the discovery and sharing of knowledge; and its tools were the three communicative arts of reading, writing, and speaking. The specialization of knowledge which took place in nineteenth-century universities is most often associated in the literature with American scholars' discovery of the German system and its subsequent influence on the curriculum. But an equally important contributor to departmentalization was the pressing and practical bureaucratic matter of

how to deal with the rapid expansion of scientific knowledge and with enrollments that actually doubled in the last twenty years of the century. Teachers had to contend not with a small group of students, whose progress they could closely guide and monitor through four years of study and with whom they could engage in daily dialogue, but with large and increasingly unwieldy classes.

By the 1890's, departments of instruction were vitally important to the bureaucratic organization of colleges. The trend toward specialization, steadily growing enrollments, and the continuing influence of "belles-lettres" led to what we now view as a permanent institution: the department of English. The first professors in the discipline fought hard to include the study of English literature in the curriculum. The figure who epitomizes their triumph is Francis Child, who was, ironically, Harvard's fourth Boylston Professor of Rhetoric (1851-76). In 1876, in a bid to keep him from moving to Johns Hopkins, Harvard created a new Chair of English Literature for Child, who immediately resigned the chair of Rhetoric. In his new capacity, Child built a powerful academic department, one based almost exclusively on literary scholarship and on reading, and hence one which denied the interdisciplinary nature of earlier rhetorical instruction as well as its emphasis on production--rather than consumption--of discourse. It was this Harvard model which was to predominate in North American higher education, in spite of attempts by such teachers as Fred Newton Scott of the University of Michigan to hold to a more truly interdisciplinary rhetorical model.[3]

The triumph of the belles-lettres movement and the trend toward specialization were not solely responsible for the displacement of rhetoric in the curriculum. Ironic as it may seem, another trend--the growing

emphasis on writing in colleges, particularly seen in the shift from oral to written evaluation of students—also played an important role. The early colleges had nothing resembling our present written examinations and set themes, preferring instead to test students' skills in oral discourse. But large classes and the bureaucratic demands for departmentalization and specialization led teachers to search for ways to save time and standardize procedures. Hence the rise of written examinations and set essays. These exams, and the set themes students wrote, took up far less time than class debates or end-of-the-year disputations. Moreover, they lent themselves to systematic, standardized evaluation. Consequently, as Warren Guthrie points out, by 1850 most college curricula advertised "Rhetoric and Belles Lettres" or "Rhetoric and Composition," and seldom "Rhetoric and Oratory." The resulting emphasis on written discourse, with the inevitable loss of the powerful concept of oral public discourse, further weakened the ties between the new English discipline and the old model of rhetorical instruction and, into the bargain, set up a potentially disastrous conflict between instruction in reading (literature) and instruction in writing (composition). Once rhetoric's interdisciplinary base was gone, its role was seen less and less as the martialing of speaking, reading, and writing together in pursuit of a student's own goals. Where speaking, reading and writing had once been rhetoric's means to a desired end, increasingly they became only sterile ends in themselves.

Given our current notions about the relationship between writing and learning, we might be tempted to view the increased emphasis on writing in nineteenth-century colleges as a boon, even at the expense of orality. Unfortunately, once writing was viewed as an end in itself and was divorced from its former rhetorical role, this focus on writing only reinforced the

narrow view of rhetoric as concerned solely with forms, with empty words and stylistic flourishes. Bain's nineteenth-century texts on grammar and rhetoric, which were very influential in North America, devote primary attention to elements of writing style, not as an end in themselves but as a means of increasing student powers of analysis and criticism. But the over-simplistic codification of Bain's dicta in other texts, the emphasis on rigid rules for usage and arrangement, and the focus on writing as end rather than means—all these factors helped create a kind of assembly-line English curriculum. And, as noted earlier, accompanying the growing volume of student writing produced on the assembly line was the need to evaluate this writing in some standardized way. All these factors led to a preoccupation with standards of usage that grew, by the end of the century, into a virtual cult of correctness. But this focus on style and correctness, as I hope I have shown, is only a symptom of what was wrong with rhetorical instruction. It was not the cause, as Young and others have argued, but rather the result of rhetoric's loss of its interdisciplinary base, a loss which left the study of writing with no raison d'être.

This preoccupation with standards of usage unrelated to purposeful or meaningful public discourse was further entrenched by the debate over college entrance exams and the furor over the "illiteracy" of secondary school graduates. And in this debate we again witness the diminution of the old eighteenth-century model. In 1880, Richard White charged that the public school system was a total failure (537); Adams Sherman Hill, fifth Boylston Professor of Rhetoric, complained of "a tedious mediocrity everywhere" (12); and in 1889 C.C. Thach announced that "it is difficult to believe, at times, that many of the writers of college entrance papers are

English-speaking boys" (94). The journals of this period, in fact, present many of the very same charges made in recent years concerning a "literacy crisis."

The debate over standardizing entrance requirements was, of course, predictable, given the rise of specialization, the growth in enrollments, and the growing focus on writing not as a means of influencing important public affairs but merely as a "set exercise" by which one passed or failed. In this debate, Michigan and Harvard again took opposing points of view. The Michigan model, championed by Fred Newton Scott, called for university representatives to visit the public schools and examine faculty, curricula, and students. Scott defended his plan as "organic," noting that it brought the two levels of education face-to-face in working out standards and requirements and insisting that standards would thus be internal, rather than external, to the system. In his plan we can easily see the influence of the eighteenth-century oral-based curriculum as well as the influence of classical rhetoric, with its emphasis on dialectic and enthymematic reasoning as means of discovering and sharing knowledge. The Harvard model, on the other hand, was based on the Oxford-Cambridge tradition of using a set of arbitrary requirements for admission. To these, Harvard added a written examination for all applicants in 1873. Scott condemned these written exams, which were built around a required reading list, claiming that the rigid exams defied both the principles of learning and common sense and elicited "the merest fluff and ravelings of the adolescent mind, revealing neither the students' independent thought, nor command of English." The exams were, he charged, simply a "convenience for the examiner, not an essential of study" (13-14). Again, however, the Harvard model--with its emphasis on uniform, standardized written entrance

exams and its thinly-veiled contempt for the public schools—prevailed, contributing directly to the rage for correctness at any cost, a rage that completely undermined the traditional goals and functions of rhetoric and rejected the once powerful model of class disputation and oral examination.

The tendency to see writing as an end in itself rather than as a means of finding meaning and knowledge and bringing others to experience them, the shift away from oral discourse, and the rise of standardized examinations that seemed increasingly unrelated to questions of important public policy—all these factors helped destroy the classroom ethos described earlier. By enforcing standards of measurement that were external to the teaching situation, the Harvard overseers essentially pitted universities against public schools and teachers against students. In criticizing such exams, Bain says:

> The conduction of Examinations was originally viewed as a part of the teaching; and the point considered was only how much and what kind of examination should go along with _vive voce_ lecturing and with class disputation. . . . The examinations at the close of the course or curriculum, were merely questions analogous to those put during teaching, to show whether pupils retained in their memory to the last what they had imbibed from day to day" (309).

In Bain's remarks, we hear the echo of the ethos which dominated the eighteenth-century model of instruction, and which was increasingly absent in large "composition" classes set to write themes on such topics as "On Spring Flowers."

The loss of this ethos I believe led directly to the view, so strongly established by mid-twentieth century, that composition or writing was not "important", and justified I.A. Richards' famous remark that rhetoric was

"the dreariest and least profitable part of the waste the unfortunate travel through in freshman English" (3).

The final trend I wish to point to as being responsible for displacing rhetoric from the center of the curriculum has been implied in much I have already said: the divorce of theory and practice. Such a divorce was indeed inevitable once speaking, reading, and writing were separated, and once writing became merely an end, a demonstration of "proficiency," rather than a means to find and share truth. As the twentieth century progressed, "theoretical" work in rhetoric became the province of a small band of scholars, engaged primarily in textual analysis and preservation. Rhetorical theory became less and less of a living tradition and more and more of an arcane field of study locked away in footnotes and museums. Scholars interested in oral discourse, of course, opted out of English departments, whose primary commitment by then was to the analysis and appreciation of literary texts. Writing, divorced from its original purpose in rhetorical instruction, shifted its goal to being able to produce a "correct" essay in response to a set topic, and textbooks offered compendia of how-to tips completely ungrounded in any theoretical framework that could relate language, action, and belief. This state of affairs can only be described as the pale shadow of what had once been the most vital element in a student's instruction.

What I hope this look at the history of our discipline has shown us is that the rhetorical "paradigm" of the early twentieth century was not flawed simply by its attention to written products and to style. Rather, it was flawed by its failure to put important personal, social, and political purposes at the center of rhetorical instruction and to bring all of the communicative arts to bear in achieving those purposes. And

although I do not have the time to argue the position fully here, I also believe that this central failure was due as much to bureaucratic administrative demands as to the pernicious attitudes of rhetoric and English teachers and authors.

I also hope that this foray into the past suggests a good deal about the future of rhetorical studies. I firmly believe that if there is to be a future for rhetorical studies, we must create a discipline informed by but not slavishly imitative of the eighteenth-century model I described earlier, a model, incidentally, which was itself informed by the classical ideal of training good men skilled in speaking. As I see it, a viable new rhetoric must do more than focus on the writing process and on invention: it must reclaim its interdisciplinary base by, at the very least, reuniting speaking, reading, and writing; it must embrace a model of learning that will echo the classroom ethos I described; and it must marry theory with practice so that finding and sharing knowledge regarding significant public issues once again is at the heart of our efforts.

Let me be as forceful as I can. I believe that powerful rhetorical instruction can no longer maintain separate or discrete "places" for speaking, writing, and reading: the fragmentation of our discipline into speech departments, English departments, linguistics departments, even reading departments, with the accompanying splintering of rhetoric's original purpose is probably the central most important cause of the decline of rhetoric and composition studies. And in spite of their common separation in the university curriculum, I believe the issue of the differentiation among these three communicative arts is still far from clear. Recent research has pointed up the links between reading and writing. In addition, recent research on professional or work-related

writing has found that such writing most frequently grows out of and is closely related to speaking. I believe, in short, that we have the necessary research to argue for a reunion of these communicative skills. Such a reunion, however, implies a major restructuring of university curricula, a restructuring away from extreme fragmentation and departmentalization that I for one would welcome, but one that will not be easy, or perhaps even possible, to achieve. In the short run, however, we can bring this change about in our own classrooms by bringing reading, writing, and speaking together as those tools we use to shape and share knowledge. In this endeavor we may well be aided by the revolutionary new media, which tend to blur the distinctions especially between speech and writing. But even without such media, it requires very little effort on our parts to acknowledge that writing often grows out of speaking, that writers must be readers of their own work at least, and that the skills of writing, reading, and speaking are sterile ones indeed unless they are put to use in realizing individual purposes.

Secondly, the future of rhetorical studies depends on our creating and maintaining a classroom ethos that will more accurately reflect the values I believe we actually profess. To me, this means giving up the picture of ourselves as completely objective "learning facilitators" or "classroom managers," or even as repositories and transmitters of knowledge or markers of essays. Instead, it means putting dialogue and dialectic at the center of our classes, learning as well as teaching, and joining our students in holding to a high standard of public discourse. In such an atmosphere, teacher/connoisseur and student/apprentice work in a context of shared values to make meaning out of the world of their experience. Such an ethos would, I believe, have profound implications for our entire system of

evaluation, implications I have pursued elsewhere. Very briefly, however, such a shift would open up the possibility of creating a system of evaluation which would not be external to the teacher-student relationship and hence would not undermine it. In speaking of a classroom ethos, I do not intend to induce a flashback to sixties love-ins or to sound simple-mindedly idealistic; I have been teaching far too long for that. I do, however, want to insist that we have been too self-effacing for too long about our own importance. Fifty or a hundred years from now, someone may be reading a student's reminiscences about one of you, reminiscences which will show—as did those eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ones to which I earlier referred—that the teacher-student relationship is often at the very heart of what is learned in any class.

Lastly, and most importantly, I believe that a viable new rhetoric must again reunite theory and practice by putting rhetoric in the service of defining and maintaining what Michael Halloran calls public discourse and what Maxine Green refers to as "the public space," a concept which, she argues, might "give rise to a significant common world." Professor Green goes on to say:

> I do not believe that we can maintain public education . . . or restore its significance . . . if we do not concern ourselves in this way. I cannot imagine a coherent purpose in education if something common does not arise in a public space. I am not thinking . . . about anything that is predictable, anything that is sure. I want to see atmospheres created in which . . . "civic learning" can be revived. I want to see imagination released . . . so that young people will be enabled to look out beyond the actual and the given and summon into being alternative worlds. I want to

see alienation and fixity give way to participation and movement, the free play of movement, the free play of thought, all for the sake of the common world (9).

Establishing such a common world, one that would be conducive to purposeful discourse, demands a theory that accounts for and is integrated with practice. Unfortunately, we have a long way to go before we can achieve that goal. Our "theorists" are, most often, in English departments, struggling over abstruse questions of intentionality in literary texts, while theorists in linguistics and speech departments strive to describe the abstract grammar of a sentence or to define the theoretical concept of "dialogic communication." Meanwhile, instruction in rhetorical practice—speaking, reading, and writing—is quite ordinarily relegated to graduate students and part-time instructors, although we do little or nothing to train these graduate students in the rhetorical tradition. I also find it curious that much of the "theoretical" work in rhetoric has been in the service of proving that modern rhetoric is characterized by understanding, mutual sharing, and two-way communication, as in the psychological theory of Carl Rogers. Yet how well does such a theory account for or describe twentieth-century rhetorical practice, which has surely reached new heights (or depths) of the manipulative use of language? Such a curious disjunction between theory and practice is, of course, perfectly obvious to our students, both undergraduate and graduate, and has done much to cripple some of our best efforts.

Perhaps I do not need to convince readers of this volume of the extreme difficulty of reversing these trends and of realizing a future for rhetorical studies which would see our ancient interdisciplinary base restored and would see theory and practice wed in the pursuit of rhetoric's

classical goal: to prepare citizens who understand the shared values of their culture and who can bring that understanding, through language, to bear on significant personal and public problems. But in spite of the extreme difficulty, I am convinced that such an enterprise must be undertaken, that the time is propitious, and that we, as teachers of rhetoric, are best suited to the task. Surely our biggest challenge is learning to live in the world. In the richness of its best eighteenth-century embodiment, rhetoric was the art best suited to helping us learn to do so. As such, it is infinitely worth reviving and giving to our students who, by learning to live in this world, will surely change it.

NOTES

[1] The Boylston chair is the subject of a dissertation by Paul E. Ried.

[2] We should note, however, that by the time Adams's lectures were published, Blair's essentially anti-classical approach had a firm hold in American colleges.

[3] The man who succeeded Child as Boylston Professor was Adams Sherman Hill, who for thirty years presided over the demise of rhetoric at Harvard. For a discussion of Child's influence and of the alternative model developed by Fred Newton Scott, see Stewart.

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FUNDAMENTALS OF COMMUNICATION: SPOKEN AND WRITTEN DISCOURSE

Christine Mason Sutherland

Over the past decade, we have seen a steadily increasing concern about the writing skills of university students, and various universities throughout the country have introduced either tests or courses, sometimes both, in an attempt to improve the quality of students' writing. What I want to do in this report is to show how the experience of dealing with this problem has led to the introduction of a course in practical rhetoric at the University of Calgary.

The instructors who are developing and teaching this course are members of the Effective Writing Service, which was originally set up in 1976 merely to offer remedial instruction to students who failed the Effective Writing Qualification Test. Soon, however, instructors in the Service were seconded to the Department of English to teach the first-year credit half-course in composition. Our experience of teaching, both in the remedial classes and in the credit course, soon convinced us that there was something basically wrong with the standard approach to the teaching of composition. First, most of our students--whether or not they needed remedial instruction--had no sense of the art of writing as an accredited discipline in itself. They therefore had little respect for it; they almost despised us for teaching it and themselves for studying it. Nor had they much sense of writing as a purposeful communicative activity. Often they had no real purpose in writing, other than the wholly artificial one of meeting course requirements. This in itself prevented them from being committed to the task and interested in it and therefore they seldom wrote with real power. For many of them writing an essay was much like crossing

a minefield: it was a matter of dodging in and out of a great many arbitrary rules conceived with a view to preventing them from writing naturally. Above all, they had no real sense of audience--no recognition of the possible value and interest of their work. No one really wanted to read what they had written, least of all the professor who knew it all anyway and could therefore be relied upon to fill in their omissions and flesh out their arguments.

Students with such attitudes were naturally very difficult to teach. Our first task, then, was to find a way of changing those attitudes, and to do so we had first to change our own. In looking for fresh approaches--new and vitalizing attitudes, relevant to the demands of the 1970's and 80's--we came, predictably, upon Aristotle. We then began to teach our students, not about dangling modifiers and faulty predications, but about purpose, situation, speaker, audience. This approach effected a startling change: students who expected to be bored by a dreary repetition of rules they had failed to learn in Grade 5 suddenly realized that a new field was opening up before them. Of course, matters such as dangling modifiers could not be ignored, but they were dealt with in terms of rhetoric; they were related to the speaker's image and the audience's comprehension, and they therefore began to make sense.

But having had a taste of classical rhetoric, our students were hungry for more. Furthermore, they knew, as did we, that having passed the course in composition or the Effective Writing Test, they were still by no means proficient writers. Both instructors and students, then, were interested in a course in practical rhetoric--one which would allow a deeper understanding of principle and a better mastery of skills.

Our chance came when, in 1981, the Effective Writing Service was assigned to the new Faculty of General Studies, whose Dean was charged with developing new courses and programmes, particularly interdisciplinary ones. The Dean was already considering the possibility of offering a course in which writing skills would form a credit component. We were able to convince him that such a course would have a better chance of success if its content were specifically relevant to the acquiring of those skills. We were also able to demonstrate that rhetoric was par excellence an interdisciplinary study, and that a course in it was therefore particularly appropriate in the Faculty of General Studies. We were then invited to create such a course.

At this point we decided, for a number of reasons, to include primary rhetoric as part of the course. The very low level of oral articulacy among our students was not only a problem in itself; we believed that it affected their ability to write. And since the principles of rhetoric which apply to writing are also relevant, indeed, primarily relevant to speaking, we decided to try to develop both skills in the tutorial sessions following each of the two weekly lectures.

It took us over a year to generate the course, but it was finally accepted in December, 1982, and was offered for the first time in Fall, 1983. It is a second-year half-course, but is open to anyone who has completed the pre-requisite—which is the Effective Writing Requirement—and it has been taken by senior students and even by graduates. We have had students of all ages—I have had several in their sixties—and from most disciplines. Some have already had considerable work experience; others are just beginning their post-secondary education. The title of the course is Fundamentals of Communication: Spoken and

Written Discourse. It offers two weekly lectures of fifty minutes, each followed by a fifty-minute tutorial. Enrollment is limited to twenty-five. The course texts are The Oxford Guide to Writing by Thomas Kane and Principles of Speech Communication by Douglas Ehninger, Bruce Gronbeck and Alan Munroe, but these texts are used as resources; they do not define the course. Edward Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student is recommended reading, and instructors draw heavily on a number of modern rhetorics—for example Rhetoric: Discovery and Change by Richard Young, Alton Becker and Kenneth Pike.

Essentially, the course deals with the key concepts of speaker or writer, material, and audience or readers, and includes some discussion of medium. We consider each of these concepts separately, taking about a month of lectures for each, but of course the division is artificial and there is a good deal of overlap. In the first month we consider the sender of the message, the speaker or writer. First, we deal with ethos—that is, with authority and image—and its three Aristotelian elements: sound sense, high moral character and benevolence. This soon leads into a discussion of the varying importance of these elements in addressing different kinds of audience, and the uses of extrinsic and intrinsic ethos. Second, we study the speaker's or writer's responsibility to generate meaning, instead of merely stating facts. This matter ties in closely with the consideration of ethos, since most students who write material-dominated prose do so because they lack faith in their own authority.

A discussion of the material takes up the second month, and is concerned with inventio, dispositio and elocutio. We cover most of the classical topics under invention, not under development. Here we part

company with the writers of many modern rhetorics including, unfortunately, Kane, whose textbook we use. It is true, of course, that many of the topics can be used in development, but we believe that it is important to introduce some of them at an earlier stage of the writing process. Division, above all, is of crucial importance in invention, because it helps students not only to generate material but also to evaluate and qualify the thesis. It therefore introduces what is for many of them a new way of thinking and a new procedure in researching material: division shows them where the gaps in their knowledge lie and therefore serves to direct their reading.

Under disposition, we teach the various strategies and patterns of development and how their choice is governed by the speaker's purpose, the material itself and the nature of the audience. In particular, we consider the distinction between dyadic and triadic situations and introduce students to the Rogerian approach. We also include some discussion of the different techniques of transition required by written and by spoken discourse. The third part of rhetoric included in the discussion of material is elocutio. Here we consider particularly the rhetoric of sentences and diction, and some of the more important figures of speech. This is the most difficult part of the course for students since the discussion becomes fairly technical and requires some understanding of the terminology both of grammar and syntax and of rhetoric, neither of which is familiar to them. I try to introduce students to rhetorical terminology by finding instances of various figures of speech in their own writing throughout the term. I comment, "Good use of anaphora" or "Effective anadiplosis" beside certain passages. The typical student is delighted to

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discover that he is already a rhetorician malgré lui, and some of his fear of the terminology disappears.

There remain the other two parts of rhetoric, memoria and pronunciatio. Memory we deal with hardly at all--though I had one student who had quite independently developed her own scheme, based on melody. Pronunciatio is taught throughout the course, in the tutorials and as comment on written assignments. The art of delivery thus receives constant attention. Students' mastery of it, both in speaking and writing, is usually inadequate to begin with. Although they must have met the Effective Writing Requirement as a prerequisite for the course, some of them still make gross and elementary errors in writing. Our policy is simply to refuse to accept an assignment unless it is reasonably free of such errors. We invite those students who genuinely need instruction to come to us privately for help, but in fact most of them do not need to. In-class assignments and the final examination serve as a check on those students who get other people to do their proofreading. So far as oral delivery is concerned, we use the earlier tutorial sessions for practice in speaking. At the beginning of the course, we bring in a guest lecturer, an expert in voice production, who gives us all some very useful advice. During the first few weeks of term, students are required to practise reading aloud, sometimes using their own scripts. They learn to correct mistakes in the use of tone, pitch and speed, and they study one another's deportment, use of gesture, and eye contact with the audience.

The third month of the course is devoted to a study of the audience, but here the emphasis shifts. Although we include a discussion of pathos, this third part of the course is really an introduction to defensive rhetoric and the art of refutation. At this point, we ask the students to

consider themselves not primarily as senders of the message, but as its receivers. After giving some instruction in identifying logical errors, we provide materials such as articles and letters to the local paper for practice in analysis. This is very popular with the students, and leads to heated discussions in class. As their final assignment, they are required to write a refutation of an article or letter which they themselves select. The most interesting of these came from a girl who chose to refute a letter she herself had written to the student newspaper the previous year. She had had no idea, at the time, of the logical errors she was committing and was horrified by what she had written.

The content of the course is perhaps open to criticism in that although we use the elements of classical rhetoric as a framework, we include under its major headings concepts which are not, strictly speaking, classical. However, the system works so well that we are reluctant to abandon it, and we believe that we conform to the spirit if not to the letter of classical rhetoric.

The application of the principles of rhetoric to the problems of teaching remedial writing has had results far beyond our original expectations. For many, if not all students, the recognition that the art of communication has a theoretical base, and should be taken seriously as an academic discipline, has led to their developing a genuine interest in the subject for its own sake, and a commitment to improving their skills beyond the remedial level.

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